Last Minute Feedback

Feedback mechanisms that allow partners to rate each other after a transaction are considered crucial for the success of anonymous internet trading platforms. We document an asymmetry in the feedback behavior on eBay, propose an explanation based on the micro structure of the feedback mechanism and the time when feedbacks are given, and support this explanation by findings from a large data set. Our analysis implies that the informational content of feedback records is likely to be low. The reason for this is that agents appear to leave feedbacks strategically. Negative feedbacks are given late, in the "last minute," or not given at all, most likely because of the fear of retaliative negative feedback. Conversely, positive feedbacks are given early in order to encourage reciprocation. Towards refining our insights into the observed pattern, we look separately at buyers and sellers, and relate the magnitude of the effects to the trading partners' experience

Last Minute Feedback

Feedback mechanisms that allow partners to rate each other after a transaction are considered crucial for the success of anonymous internet trading platforms. We document an asymmetry in the feedback behavior on eBay, propose an explanation based on the micro structure of the feedback mechanism and the time when feedbacks are given, and support this explanation by findings from a large data set. Our analysis implies that the informational content of feedback records is likely to be low. The reason for this is that agents appear to leave feedbacks strategically. Negative feedbacks are given late, in the "last minute," or not given at all, most likely because of the fear of retaliative negative feedback. Conversely, positive feedbacks are given early in order to encourage reciprocation. Towards refining our insights into the observed pattern, we look separately at buyers and sellers, and relate the magnitude of the effects to the trading partners' experience.eBay; reputation mechanism; strategic feedback behavior; informational content; reciprocity; fear of retaliation

Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

Cyber-crime Science = Crime Science + Information Security

Cyber-crime Science is an emerging area of study aiming to prevent cyber-crime by combining security protection techniques from Information Security with empirical research methods used in Crime Science. Information security research has developed techniques for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets but is less strong on the empirical study of the effectiveness of these techniques. Crime Science studies the effect of crime prevention techniques empirically in the real world, and proposes improvements to these techniques based on this. Combining both approaches, Cyber-crime Science transfers and further develops Information Security techniques to prevent cyber-crime, and empirically studies the effectiveness of these techniques in the real world. In this paper we review the main contributions of Crime Science as of today, illustrate its application to a typical Information Security problem, namely phishing, explore the interdisciplinary structure of Cyber-crime Science, and present an agenda for research in Cyber-crime Science in the form of a set of suggested research questions

Transactions Behavior Analysis for Internet Auction Fraud

People often enmesh the Internet auction frauds which damage the benefits of Internet market and threaten transactions security. This research applies social network analysis and data mining to extract characteristic features from two random collected transaction datasets of Yahoo auction site. One dataset is used to construct prediction model and another is treated as validation. The average accuracy ratio of proposed model is at least 90%. The findings are: (1) the abnormal accounts involve circular transaction; (2) fraud accounts can accumulate higher positive reputations in very short time from its circular transaction and rarely play key nodes in transaction network

Exploring Information Disclosure In Online Auctions

This research examines how a seller’s reputation score and auction pre-configuration affects people’s participation in communication within online auction communities. A leading horizontal intermediary auction platform is used to conduct this research. Its seller “feedback” mechanism and “ask seller a question” forum are chosen as representatives of post- and intra-transactional information disclosure. A self-developed classification approach is used to classify the buyer-initiated questions. The results of multinomial logistic regression indicate that product quality, shipment and payment issues are aspects that concern buyers the most in the early stages of an auction. Subsequently, their attention is likely to shift to seller credibility and price negotiations as listing durations get longer. In terms of the influ- ence of seller feedback ratings, our findings suggest that lower-rated traders are more likely to be asked questions about product description and seller credibility. Buyer concern about seller uncertainty is only alleviated if the seller has a good reputation. Even medium-rated sellers are suspected of being opportunistic. Moreover, buyers are more willing to discuss transaction-related issues and raise negotiation-associated questions with sellers who have already achieved high reputation scores. Finally, the theoretical and managerial implications are elaborated

データマイニングにおけるユーザベリティ向上と応用に関する研究

制度:新 ; 文部省報告番号:甲2574号 ; 学位の種類:博士(工学) ; 授与年月日:2008/3/15 ; 早大学位記番号:新473

Two case studies on electronic distribution of government securities: the U.S. Treasury Direct System and the Philippine Expanded Small Investors Program

The case study on the U.S. Treasury Direct examines the evolution of the electronic distribution systems for marketable and nonmarketable government securities, the main objectives, and the basic legal infrastructure and the preconditions enabling the system. The U.S. experience highlights that the enabling environment and infrastructure (for example, in terms of information databases such as Pay.Gov) make a large difference in terms of both the security and convenience that customers can expect in the use of the system. The system also achieved important cost savings for the Bureau of the Public Debt. The case study on the Small Investors Program of the Philippines looks at a program that the Philippine government has been experimenting with to sell its securities directly to retail investors over the Internet. The recently revised version of the program-called the Expanded Small Investors Program-aims to increase access to government securities and distribute them more widely, develop better savings products, and enhance competition in the primary markets for these securities. The authors analyze whether the program's main goals can be achieved while mitigating the risks. Their analysis suggests thatthere are good reasons to believe that the new program will succeed. Still, regular and responsive assessments and adjustments will be required as the program moves forward.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform

Proactive or Reactive? Platform Governance Strategy in C2C Marketplace

In this paper, we present a case study of two major consumer-to-consumer marketplaces that adopt different platform governance strategies and examine how the users of each marketplace trust other users and the marketplace platforms. Our study was conducted in two steps: qualitative and quantitative research. As a first step, we conducted interviews with the directors of the two platforms. As the second step, we conducted user survey to assess the user perception of platform governance strategies. The preliminary finding from our interview with the operators of two major C2C marketplaces shows that the both operators acknowledge an effective governance system as the key factor of success, but adopt different approaches to ensure effectiveness. Two different strategies for platform governance are adopted: proactive and reactive. The preliminary finding from our user survey indicates that users perceive a reactive strategy as more effective compared to a proactive strategy