1,736 research outputs found
"If Oswald had not killed Kennedy" – Spohn on Counterfactuals
Wolfgang Spohn's theory of ranking functions is an elegant and powerful theory of the structure and dynamics of doxastic states. In two recent papers, Spohn has applied it to the analysis of conditionals, claiming to have presented a unified account of indicative and subjunctive (counterfactual) conditionals. I argue that his analysis fails to account for counterfactuals that refer to indirect causes. The strategy of taking the transitive closure that Spohn employs in the theory of causation is not available for counterfactuals. I have a close look at Spohn's treatment of the famous Oswald-Kennedy case in order to illustrate my points. I sketch an alternative view that seems to avoid the problems
Causality in concurrent systems
Concurrent systems identify systems, either software, hardware or even
biological systems, that are characterized by sets of independent actions that
can be executed in any order or simultaneously. Computer scientists resort to a
causal terminology to describe and analyse the relations between the actions in
these systems. However, a thorough discussion about the meaning of causality in
such a context has not been developed yet. This paper aims to fill the gap.
First, the paper analyses the notion of causation in concurrent systems and
attempts to build bridges with the existing philosophical literature,
highlighting similarities and divergences between them. Second, the paper
analyses the use of counterfactual reasoning in ex-post analysis in concurrent
systems (i.e. execution trace analysis).Comment: This is an interdisciplinary paper. It addresses a class of causal
models developed in computer science from an epistemic perspective, namely in
terms of philosophy of causalit
Arguing from Molinism to Neo-Molinism
In a pair of recent essays, William Lane Craig has argued that certain open theist understandings of the nature of the future are both semantically and modally confused. I argue that this is not the case and show that, if consistently observed, the customary semantics for counterfactuals Craig relies on not only undermine the validity of his complaint against the open theist, they actually support an argument for the openness position
Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics
It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’
The underlying conditionality of conditionals which do not use 'if'
In addressing a question at the semantics-pragmatics interface of how conditionals in English should be categorised, this paper addresses the underlying question: what is a conditional? Conditionals in English are very often associated with the canonical pattern ‘if p then q’. But while the word 'if' provides a simple function to aid us in expressing our conditional thought, it goes without saying that conditional thought does not go hand in hand with the single word 'if'. This paper explores some of the ways that conditionals may be expressed in English without using if by presenting observations obtained from the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB) combined with results from previous empirical studies (e.g. Declerck & Reed 2001). In doing so, this paper considers the question what exactly it is to be a conditional, proposing some criteria to guide the categorisation of conditional expressions. In turn, this paper aims to shed some light as to why conditionals using 'if' are so often focussed upon
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