Writing to Save the Earth

A Magazine of Sustainable Ideas from EN199 Writing for the Earth (Professor John Kucich, Fall 2015) A Sense of Place: Essays on Where We Live Fogo, Cabo Verde, by Leonarda Vieira Weweantic River, by Sydney Holbrook Carver Pond, by Brianna Gallagher Nantasket Beach, by Brianna Davidson Ames Nowell, by Cassidy Morrow Old Orchard Beach, by Jill Blye A Place in the Sky, by Danielle Souza Pond Meadow, by Samantha Cicirelli Imagining a Future: Speculative Fiction Peggy the Penguin in Antarctica, by Haley Piotrowski Lives Change in One Day, by Julianne Kilduff Dust, by Adam Hayes Taking Action: Policy, Politics and Activisim Climate Reality, by Brea Caisey Wind Turbines in Massachusetts, by William Tkaczu

Affirmative Refraction: Grutter v. Bollinger Through the Lens of the Case The Case of the Speluncean Explorers

What can a fifty year-old hypothetical about human cannibalism concocted by the late Lon Fuller teach us about the Supreme Court\u27s recent foray into the affirmative action debate in twenty-first century America? Indeed, what can a tax law professor and a labor law professor add to the cacophony of voices of leading constitutional law scholars on the Court\u27s most important pronouncement on race in a generation? We make a rather modest claim, based on teaching both of these cases in our one-week Introduction to Law classes for incoming first year students, that a helpful way to view Grutter v. Bollinger is through the lens of The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. Legal scholars have issued dozens of new “opinions” on the hypothetical legal issue in that case to take into account contemporary legal theories developed in the past fifty-five years. This article is the first to take the opposite approach and view a real-life legal issue through the eyes of the fictional Justices in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. This article also is the first to consider the applicability of Fuller\u27s hypothetical outside the context of statutory construction

The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of Administrative Law

Philip Hamburger’s Is Administrative Law Unlawful? is a truly brilliant and important book. In a prodigious feat of scholarship, Professor Hamburger uncovers the British and civil law antecedents of modern American administrative law, showing that contemporary administrative law “is really just the most recent manifestation of a recurring problem.” That problem is the problem of power: its temptations, its dangers, and its tendency to corrupt. Administrative law, far from being a distinctive product of modernity, is thus the “contemporary expression of the old tendency toward absolute power – toward consolidated power outside and above the law.” It represents precisely the forms of governmental action that constitutionalism – both in general and as specifically manifested in the United States Constitution – was designed to prevent. Accordingly, virtually every aspect of modern administrative law directly challenges the Constitution. This extraordinary book will be immensely valuable to anyone interested in public law. My comments here concern two relatively minor points that call for more clarification. First, Professor Hamburger does not clearly identify what it means for administrative law to be “unlawful.” Does that mean “in violation of the written Constitution”? “In violation of unwritten constitutional norms?” In violation of natural law”? There is evidence that Professor Hamburger means something more than the former, but it is not clear what more is intended. In order to gauge the real status of administrative law, we must have a more direct conception of law than Professor Hamburger provides. Second, much of Professor Hamburger’s historical and constitutional analysis focuses on the subdelegation of legislative authority. While his discussion contains numerous profound insights, including some that require correction in my own prior scholarship on the subject, it does not discuss how to distinguish interpretation by judicial and executive actors from lawmaking by those actors. Presumably, the prohibition on subdelegation of legislative authority prohibits only the latter. Figuring out where interpretation ends and lawmaking begins is one of the most difficult questions in all of jurisprudence, and I am not convinced that Professor Hamburger can successfully perform an end-run around it. But these are modest nitpicks about a path-breaking work that should keep people of all different persuasions engaged and occupied for quite some time

Marshall Shapo\u27s Constitutional Tort Fifty-Five Years Later

In 1965, Northwestern University Law Review published Professor Marshall Shapo’s article, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond.1 Professor Shapo’s paper analyzed the origins of constitutional tort law, which consists of suits for damages for constitutional violations committed by government officials or the governments themselves. The article began with an account of the post-Civil War background of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute enacted in 1871 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Civil War, recalcitrant southerners, acting through groups like the Ku Klux Klan, intimidated the freedmen and their white supporters, organized lynch mobs, burned houses, and, in general, attempted to restore the old order. The statute authorizes a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, acting “under color of” state law, violates constitutional rights.2 Professor Shapo went on to recount the legislative history of § 1983 and the relevant case law over the next nine decades.3 Interestingly, the Supreme Court rarely addressed § 1983 issues during that ninety-year period.4 Few cases were brought under the statute,5 and lower courts typically gave it a limited reach. When lower courts did consider § 1983 claims, they mainly read “under color of” as a requirement that the plaintiff show that state law authorized the violation, so that the availability of a state remedy would thwart the plaintiff’s effort to obtain access to federal court.6 Under this interpretation, the application of a statute that denies the right to vote to African Americans would be a § 1983 violation, whereas police brutality that violates state law would not

Evangelical Friend, April 1969 (Vol. 2, No. 8)

Easter and Christian concern A Christian concern, born out of love, ought to carry through to action. Page 5 Science and Christian Thought The first in a new monthly series written by a college science professor. Page 6 Remembering our men in military service A concerned Friend in Ohio Yearly Meeting tells of a program of contact with men in service. Page 7 Israel-modern yet ancient Even today one cannot speak of the land of Israel or the people without speaking of the Bible. Page 9 Missionary Voice Easter in Mexico 10\u27I\u27ll have a white robe\u27 11 The end of failure 12 From tradition to mission How an emphasis on missions has brought new life to a 130-year-old church in Iowa. Page 16 Report from Korea A pictorial report of the work of Jerry Sandoz with the World Relief Commission in Korea. Page 18 Regular Features The Face of the World 4Reach and Teach 13The Children\u27s Page 15Books 19Friends Write 19Over the Teacup 20 ---------- Ohio SupplementSouthwest Supplement Rocky Mountain SupplementNorthwest Supplementhttps://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/nwym_evangelical_friend/1019/thumbnail.jp

Showcase Panel I: What Is Regulation For?

2018 National Lawyers Convention Transcripts “The administrative state, with roots over a century old, was founded on the premise that Congress lacked the expertise to deal with the many complex issues facing government in a fast-changing country, and that it was unhelpfully mired in and influenced by politics, leading to bad outcomes when it did act. The alternative was to establish administrative agencies, each with assigned areas of responsibility, housing learned experts qualified to make policy decisions, deliberately insulated from political accountability. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946, both governs the manner in which agencies may adopt and enforce regulations, and provides for judicial review of agency action. Supporters of the administrative state point to the successes of agency actions leading to a cleaner environment, more sensible use of finite resources, healthier foods, safety on the roads and rails, and many other areas of improved quality of life. But even looking past structural separation of powers issues written into the bones of the administrative state, critics assert that in the ensuing 70 years the APA has become an ineffective limitation on agency power, as agencies bypassed its requirements by issuing sub-regulatory guidance, letters, FAQs, and more. Compounding the problem, the critics continue, the courts have adopted a policy of deference to agency actions that grant agencies even more latitude. Is it time to revisit the APA? If so, how should it be updated?” Speakers:Prof. Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, and Director, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of Law Prof. Philip Hamburger, Maurice & Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School Prof. Kathryn Kovacs, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School Prof. Jon Michaels, Professor of Law, UCLA School Of Law Moderator: Hon. Britt Grant, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Credit: The Federalist Society, https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2018-national-lawyers-convention#agenda-item-showcase-panel-i-what-is-regulation-fo

Solar Rights and Restrictive Covenants: A Microeconomic Analysis

This comment addresses the enforceability of restrictive covenants in relation to solar energy rights. Articulating the framework for development of solar energy, this comment works through an economic model formulated by Professors Ellickson, Coase, Calabresi, and Malemed. Looking for an efficient allocation of resources, this comment proposes a modernization of common law property principles to ensure the proper growth of solar energy