275 research outputs found
All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus
There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyerseller exact representative.core, nucleolus, assignment game, kernel
Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to know how much they should each contribute. We model this compensation problem as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules are applied and related to the solution resulting from the auction procedures proposed by Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994).public goods, cost sharing, core, nucleolus, Shapley value
Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods.
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to know how much they should each contribute. We model this compensation problem as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules are applied and related to the solution resulting from the auction procedures proposed by Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994).public goods, cost sharing, core, nucleolus, Shapley value.
All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus
There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representativeExisteixen jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que tot i tenir el mateix core tenen diferent nucleolus. En aquest treball es mostra que això no pot passar amb els jocs d'assignaciò és a dir que, en aquests jocs, el nucleolus ve determinat pel core del joc i per tant dos jocs d'assignació amb el mateix core tenen forçosament el mateix nucleolus. Per provar-ho mostrem
que el nucleolus d'un joc d'assignació coincideix amb el de l'únic joc que el representa amb la propietat de ser 'buyer-seller' exact
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions
We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nuceolus and
investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some
well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game.
Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all
dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual
game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita
(pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time
algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions
of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with
polynomial many dually essential coalitions
Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game. We generalize Sobolev’s axiomatization of the prenucleolus and its modification for the nucleolus as well as Peleg’s axiomatization of the prekernel to the symmetrically weighted versions. Only the reduced games have to be replaced by suitably modified reduced games whose definitions may depend on the weight system. Moreover, it is shown that a solution may only satisfy the mentioned sets of modified axioms if the weight system is symmetric
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