22 research outputs found
Protective Behavior in Games
This paper introduces the notion of protective equilibrium in the context of fin ite games in strategic form.It shows that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria.Moreover, in the context of bima trix games, the notion of protective behaviour is used as a refinement tool
Wiretapping a hidden network
We consider the problem of maximizing the probability of hitting a
strategically chosen hidden virtual network by placing a wiretap on a single
link of a communication network. This can be seen as a two-player win-lose
(zero-sum) game that we call the wiretap game. The value of this game is the
greatest probability that the wiretapper can secure for hitting the virtual
network. The value is shown to equal the reciprocal of the strength of the
underlying graph.
We efficiently compute a unique partition of the edges of the graph, called
the prime-partition, and find the set of pure strategies of the hider that are
best responses against every maxmin strategy of the wiretapper. Using these
special pure strategies of the hider, which we call
omni-connected-spanning-subgraphs, we define a partial order on the elements of
the prime-partition. From the partial order, we obtain a linear number of
simple two-variable inequalities that define the maxmin-polytope, and a
characterization of its extreme points.
Our definition of the partial order allows us to find all equilibrium
strategies of the wiretapper that minimize the number of pure best responses of
the hider. Among these strategies, we efficiently compute the unique strategy
that maximizes the least punishment that the hider incurs for playing a pure
strategy that is not a best response. Finally, we show that this unique
strategy is the nucleolus of the recently studied simple cooperative spanning
connectivity game