The Hidden Effects of Opening Bids in Online Auctions

Auction opening bid is one of the online auction features that can be manipulated to promote bidding activity. Oftentimes, auction sellers that expect high bidding volume set their opening bids low only to later realize a lower price premium in their auctions. The current study offers explanations to this phenomenon by approaching this situation in a more holistic way. It examines the impacts of auction opening bids on bidding behaviors. Auction data from eBay were collected and separated into two samples, including auctions with low and high opening bids (LOB and HOB auctions). We found that HOB auctions attracted more serious bidders as indicated by their commitment to stay longer in the auctions. We also found that some bidding strategies that were commonly considered undesirable by auction sellers produced positive price premium to HOB auctions but not to its counterparts. Theoretical and pragmatic implications are later offered in the study

Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis

In this paper, we examine the price dynamics of on-line art auctions of modern Indian art using functional data analysis. The purpose here is not just to understand what determines the final prices of art objects, but also the price movement during the entire auction. We identify several factors, such as artist characteristics (established or emerging artist; prior sales history), art characteristics (size; painting medium--canvas or paper), competition characteristics (current number of bidders; current number of bids) and auction design characteristics (opening bid; position of the lot in the auction), that explain the dynamics of price movement in an on-line art auction. We find that the effects on price vary over the duration of the auction, with some of these effects being stronger at the beginning of the auction (such as the opening bid and historical prices realized). In some cases, the rate of change in prices (velocity) increases at the end of the auction (for canvas paintings and paintings by established artists). Our analysis suggests that the opening bid is positively related to on-line auction price levels of art at the beginning of the auction, but its effect declines toward the end of the auction. The order in which the lots appear in an art auction is negatively related to the current price level, with this relationship decreasing toward the end of the auction. This implies that lots that appear earlier have higher current prices during the early part of the auction, but that effect diminishes by the end of the auction. Established artists show a positive relationship with the price level at the beginning of the auction. Reputation or popularity of the artists and their investment potential as assessed by previous history of sales are positively related to the price levels at the beginning of the auction. The medium (canvas or paper) of the painting does not show any relationship with art auction price levels, but the size of the painting is negatively related to the current price during the early part of the auction. Important implications for auction design are drawn from the analysis.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000196 in the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Do economic agents act rationally? Empirical evidence from internet auctions

As a rule, economic models assume that economic agents are rational and maximise their utility. Experimental economic research in particular attempts to verify this assumption under artificial conditions using laboratory tests. Experiment results must be carefully interpreted, as laboratory conditions often fail to fully represent reality. Internet auctions on the other hand present the possibility of observing the actual behaviour of economic agents and comparing it with theoretical expectations. The analysis of market leader eBay's auctions shows that participants behave differently not only in individual cases, as would at first be expected theoretically. Herd behaviour among the auction participants would appear to be an important explanatory factor. Closer examination reveals, however, that at least a portion of the supposed irrationality can in fact be explained by rational behaviour. --

Your call: eBay and demand for the iPhone 4

The iPhone 4 was introduced into the UK market on 24th June 2010 to significant consumer interest. This clearly exceeded supply through conventional channels, since there was very extensive activity in terms of bidding on eBay auctions for the product. We monitored all eBay transactions on the iPhone 4 for six weeks from introduction, with total transactions amounting to around £1.5m. We analyse determinants of the winning bid in terms of characteristics of the phone, the seller and the buyer. Our most notable and novel finding relative to previous studies is a very significant premium over list price being paid in almost all cases, with positive uplift factors including whether the phone was unlocked and whether it could be sold overseas. Demand fell over time, as evidenced by lower achieved prices, but the fall in price was relatively modest. A significant premium of 32GB over 16GB versions is revealed.eBay auctions ; demand revelation ; auctions ; bidding ; short supply ; versioning JEL Classification: D44 ; L81 ; D12 ; L63

Procurement in infrastructure : what does theory tell us ?

Infrastructure has particular challenges in public procurement, because it is highly complex and customized and often requires economic, political and social considerations from a long time horizon. To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. The paper provides a minimum package of important economic theories that could guide governments to wise decision-making at each stage. Theory suggests that in general it would be a good option to contract out infrastructure to the private sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such as fixed-price contracts. However, this holds under certain conditions. Theory also shows that ownership should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or objective of infrastructure provision. Public and private ownership have different advantages and can deal with different problems. It is also shown that it would be a better option to integrate more than one public task (for example, investment and operation) into the same ownership, whether public or private, if they exhibit positive externalities.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Debt Markets,Infrastructure Economics,Contract Law,Transport Economics Policy&Planning

Online Auctions

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

The adverse effect of dummy auction bids on market value

The popularity of an auction as a means of selling residential real estate has increased markedly in recent years. The effectiveness of an auction program is heavily promoted by most real estate agents, claiming it to be the best means of attracting the best price from the highest bidder, It is based on the theory of gathering all buyers together at a publicised time, and then offering the property for sale to the open market.In theory, the person most willing to buy the property will have the highest bid, supposedly agreeing at market value with the vendor (although above the vendor\u27s reserve I. Unfortunately, the practice of dummy bidding has recently resurfaced and highlights serious flaws in the auction system, with hundreds of residential auctions conducted across Australia every weekend.Clearly, it is in the vendor\u27s best interests land the auctioneer\u27s best interests, who is paid even more by the vendor if the price is higherl to achieve the highest offer from the last bidder. The tactic of dummy bids is designed to deceive genuine purchasers into a false sense of perception, where there appears to be more competition for the property than there actually exists.This paper examines the auction process with the emphasis placed on the practice of dummy biding, It considers the broad implications for the definition of market value and also the overall residential market. Useful advice is also included for real estate valuers relying upon auction sale properties in their market analysis. As well as strongly supporting the auction concept, the authors suggest improvements to the overall auction process to ensure relevance to the definition of market value is maintained.<br /

When Online Auction Meets Virtual Reality: An Empirical Investigation

The online auction is becoming increasingly popular in e-commerce, which allows to sell a product to the buyer with the highest bid. However, the lack of authentic product details for a thorough evaluation still poses challenges to its success. Recently, virtual reality (VR) is introduced to online auctions. We employ a unique dataset to investigate the effects of VR on auction outcomes and bidding activities. Results show that VR enhances buyers’ bidding competition, which in turn increases auction success and price, resulting in a competitive effect. Additionally, we find VR boosts buyers’ strategic responses to the bidding war, leading to a late-bidding effect. Findings contribute to both the theory and practice of VR and online auctions in selling houses

Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction

In second price internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders ‘snipe’, i.e., they submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that are automatically extended if a bid is submitted very late, as in auctions conducted on Amazon. We propose a model of second price internet auctions, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that sniping in a fixed deadline auction can occur even at equilibrium in auctions with private values, as well as in auctions with uncertain, dependent values. Sniping in fixed-deadline auctions also arises out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of sniping are eliminated or severely attenuated in auctions that apply the automatic extension rule. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the field data. There is more sniping on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding. It appears that one substantial cause of late bidding is as a strategic response to incremental bidding.