Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games

In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms have limited information about each other's strategies, some large number of them may choose the same high-risk investment in hopes of high returns. While this might be acceptable in some cases, the economy can be hurt badly if many firms make investments in the same risky market segment and it fails. One reason why many firms might end up choosing the same segment is that they do not have information about other firms' investments (imperfect information may lead to `bad' game states). Directly reporting all players' investments, however, raises confidentiality concerns for both individuals and institutions. In this paper, we explore whether information about the game-state can be publicly announced in a manner that maintains the privacy of the actions of the players, and still suffices to deter players from reaching bad game-states. We show that in many games of interest, it is possible for players to avoid these bad states with the help of privacy-preserving, publicly-announced information. We model behavior of players in this imperfect information setting in two ways -- greedy and undominated strategic behaviours, and we prove guarantees on social welfare that certain kinds of privacy-preserving information can help attain. Furthermore, we design a counter with improved privacy guarantees under continual observation

Optimizing egalitarian performance in the side-effects model of colocation for data center resource management

In data centers, up to dozens of tasks are colocated on a single physical machine. Machines are used more efficiently, but tasks' performance deteriorates, as colocated tasks compete for shared resources. As tasks are heterogeneous, the resulting performance dependencies are complex. In our previous work [18] we proposed a new combinatorial optimization model that uses two parameters of a task - its size and its type - to characterize how a task influences the performance of other tasks allocated to the same machine. In this paper, we study the egalitarian optimization goal: maximizing the worst-off performance. This problem generalizes the classic makespan minimization on multiple processors (P||Cmax). We prove that polynomially-solvable variants of multiprocessor scheduling are NP-hard and hard to approximate when the number of types is not constant. For a constant number of types, we propose a PTAS, a fast approximation algorithm, and a series of heuristics. We simulate the algorithms on instances derived from a trace of one of Google clusters. Algorithms aware of jobs' types lead to better performance compared with algorithms solving P||Cmax. The notion of type enables us to model degeneration of performance caused by using standard combinatorial optimization methods. Types add a layer of additional complexity. However, our results - approximation algorithms and good average-case performance - show that types can be handled efficiently.Comment: Author's version of a paper published in Euro-Par 2017 Proceedings, extends the published paper with addtional results and proof