Relevance, Choices, and the Goldilocks Problem

Ms. Whisner ponders a core question in answering reference queries: How can we know whether what we find is relevant to what the questioner wants? Her article provides criteria to consider and some guidelines for choosing sources in response to a query

Microlensing and the Search for Extraterrestrial Life

Are microlensing searches likely to discover planets that harbor life? Given our present state of knowledge, this is a difficult question to answer. We therefore begin by asking a more narrowly focused question: are conditions on planets discovered via microlensing likely to be similar to those we experience on Earth? In this paper I link the microlensing observations to the well-known "Goldilocks Problem" (conditions on the Earth-like planets need to be "just right"), to find that Earth-like planets discovered via microlensing are likely to be orbiting stars more luminous than the sun. This means that light from the planetary system's central star may contribute a significant fraction of the baseline flux relative to the star that is lensed. Such blending of light from the lens with light from the lensed source can, in principle, limit our ability to detect these events. This turns out not to be a significant problem, however. A second consequence of blending is the opportunity to determine the spectral type of the lensed spectral type of the lensed star. This circumstance, plus the possibility that finite-source-size effects are important, implies that some meaningful follow-up observations are likely to be possible for a subset Earth-like planets discovered via microlensing. In addition, calculations indicate that reasonable requirements on the planet's density and surface gravity imply that the mass of Earth-like planets is likely to be within a factor of $\sim 15$ of an Earth mass.Comment: 15 pages, 2 figures. To be published in the Astrophysical Journa

Understanding media publics and the antimicrobial resistance crisis

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) imperils health for people across the world. This enormous challenge is being met with the rationalisation of prescription, dispensing and consumption of antimicrobials in clinical settings and in the everyday lives of members of the general population. Individuals need to be reached outside clinical settings to prepare them for the necessary changes to the pharmaceutical management of infections; efforts that depend on media and communications and, therefore, how the AMR message is mediated, received and applied. In 2016, the UK Review on Antimicrobial Resistance called on governments to support intense, worldwide media activity to promote public awareness and to further efforts to rationalise the use of antimicrobial pharmaceuticals. In this article, we consider this communications challenge in light of contemporary currents of thought on media publics, including: the tendency of health communications to cast experts and lay individuals in opposition; the blaming of individuals who appear to ‘resist’ expert advice; the challenges presented by negative stories of AMR and their circulation in public life, and; the problems of public trust tied to the construction and mediation of expert knowledge on the effective management of AMR

Specialized Visual Experiences

Through extensive training, experts acquire specialized knowledge and abilities. In this paper, I argue that experts also acquire specialized visual experiences. Specifically, I articulate and defend the account that experts enjoy visual experiences that represent gestalt properties through perceptual learning. I survey an array of empirical studies on face perception and perceptual expertise that support this account. I also look at studies on perceptual adaptation that some might argue present a problem for my account. I show how the data are subject to an interpretation that is friendly to it. Last, I address two theoretical objections to the claim that visual experiences represent gestalt properties

The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content

Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva No

Explanatory Abstraction and the Goldilocks Problem: Interventionism Gets Things Just Right

Theories of explanation need to account for a puzzling feature of our explanatory practices: the fact that we prefer explanations that are relatively abstract but only moderately so. Contra Franklin-Hall (2016), I argue that the interventionist account of explanation provides a natural and elegant explanation of this fact. By striking the right balance between specificity and generality, moderately abstract explanations optimally subserve what interventionists regard as the goal of explanation, namely identifying possible interventions that would have changed the explanandum

A Threshold Concepts Approach to the Standards Revision

This article describes how threshold concepts can inform the revision of ACRL\u27s Information Literacy Competency Standards for Higher Education