68 research outputs found
10081 Abstracts Collection -- Cognitive Robotics
From 21.02. to 26.02.2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10081 ``Cognitive Robotics \u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
A Universal Knowledge Model and Cognitive Architecture for Prototyping AGI
The article identified 42 cognitive architectures for creating general
artificial intelligence (AGI) and proposed a set of interrelated functional
blocks that an agent approaching AGI in its capabilities should possess. Since
the required set of blocks is not found in any of the existing architectures,
the article proposes a new cognitive architecture for intelligent systems
approaching AGI in their capabilities. As one of the key solutions within the
framework of the architecture, a universal method of knowledge representation
is proposed, which allows combining various non-formalized, partially and fully
formalized methods of knowledge representation in a single knowledge base, such
as texts in natural languages, images, audio and video recordings, graphs,
algorithms, databases, neural networks, knowledge graphs, ontologies, frames,
essence-property-relation models, production systems, predicate calculus
models, conceptual models, and others. To combine and structure various
fragments of knowledge, archigraph models are used, constructed as a
development of annotated metagraphs. As components, the cognitive architecture
being developed includes machine consciousness, machine subconsciousness,
blocks of interaction with the external environment, a goal management block,
an emotional control system, a block of social interaction, a block of
reflection, an ethics block and a worldview block, a learning block, a
monitoring block, blocks of statement and solving problems, self-organization
and meta learning block
On evolution of thinking about semiosis: semiotics meets cognitive science
The aim of the paper is to sketch an ideaâseen from the point of view of a cognitive scientistâof cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semiotics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodological level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explanations of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded interpretation (in contrast to interpretability in principle) are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if someone rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of ânew mediaâ
On a Cognitive Model of Semiosis
What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems (Zlatev, 2002) like animals, or even plants (Krampen, 1992). It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that (at least some) semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial (computational) systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general
Between Language and Consciousness: Linguistic Qualia, Awareness, and Cognitive Models
The main goal of the paper is to present a putative role of consciousness in language capacity. The paper contrasts the two approaches characteristic for cognitive semiotics and cognitive science. Language is treated as a mental phenomenon and a cognitive faculty. The analysis of language activity is based on the Chalmersâ distinction between the two forms of consciousness: phenomenal and psychological. The approach is seen as an alternative to phenomenological analyses typical for cognitive semiotics. Further, a cognitive model of the language faculty is described. The model is implemented in SNePS/GLAIR architecture and based on GATN grammar and semantic networks as a representation formalism. The model - reflecting traditionally distinguished linguistic structures - consists of phonological, syntactic, and semantic modules. I claim that the most important role in the phenomenon of language is played by psychological consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness accompanies various stages of language functioning, but is not indispensable in explanations of the language faculty
Mind, Cognition, Semiosis: Ways to Cognitive Semiotics
What is meaning-making? How do new domains of meanings emerge in the course of childâs development? What is the role of consciousness in this process? What is the difference between making sense of pointing, pantomime and language utterances? Are great apes capable of meaning-making? What about dogs? Parrots? Can we, in any way, relate their functioning and behavior to a childâs? Are artificial systems capable of meaning-making?
The above questions motivated the emergence of cognitive semiotics as a discipline devoted to theoretical and empirical studies of meaning-making processes. As a transdisciplinary approach to meaning and meaning-making, cognitive semiotics necessarily draws on a different disciplines: starting with philosophy of mind, via semiotics and linguistics, cognitive science(s), neuroanthropology, developmental and evolutionary psychology, comparative studies, and ending with robotics.
The book presents extensively this discipline. It is a very eclectic story: highly abstract problems of philosophy of mind are discussed and, simultaneously, results of very specific experiments on picture recognition are presented. On the one hand, intentional acts involved in semiotic activity are elaborated; on the other, a computational system capable of a limited interpretation of excerpts from Carrollâs Through the Looking-Glass is described. Specifically, the two roads to cognitive semiotics are explored in the book: phenomenological-enactive path developed by the so-called Lund school and authorâs own proposal: a functional-cognitivist path
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