15,772 research outputs found

    Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying stage duration

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    We study the links between the values of stochastic games with varying stage duration hh, the corresponding Shapley operators T\bf{T} and T_h{\bf{T}}\_hand the solution of f˙_t=(T−Id)f_t\dot f\_t = ({\bf{T}} - Id )f\_t. Considering general non expansive maps we establish two kinds of results, under both the discounted or the finite length framework, that apply to the class of "exact" stochastic games. First, for a fixed length or discount factor, the value converges as the stage duration go to 0. Second, the asymptotic behavior of the value as the length goes to infinity, or as the discount factor goes to 0, does not depend on the stage duration. In addition, these properties imply the existence of the value of the finite length or discounted continuous time game (associated to a continuous time jointly controlled Markov process), as the limit of the value of any time discretization with vanishing mesh.Comment: 22 pages, International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 201

    Game-theoretical control with continuous action sets

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    Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques to the design of distributed control systems, we study a class of control problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets, and we propose an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm that provably converges to equilibrium in this class of problems. The method employed is to analyse the learning process under study through a mean-field dynamical system that evolves in an infinite-dimensional function space (the space of probability distributions over the players' continuous controls). To do so, we extend the theory of finite-dimensional two-timescale stochastic approximation to an infinite-dimensional, Banach space setting, and we prove that the continuous dynamics of the process converge to equilibrium in the case of potential games. These results combine to give a provably-convergent learning algorithm in which players do not need to keep track of the controls selected by the other agents.Comment: 19 page
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