On first-order expressibility of satisfiability in submodels

Let $\kappa,\lambda$ be regular cardinals, $\lambda\le\kappa$, let $\varphi$ be a sentence of the language $\mathcal L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ in a given signature, and let $\vartheta(\varphi)$ express the fact that $\varphi$ holds in a submodel, i.e., any model $\mathfrak A$ in the signature satisfies $\vartheta(\varphi)$ if and only if some submodel $\mathfrak B$ of $\mathfrak A$ satisfies $\varphi$. It was shown in [1] that, whenever $\varphi$ is in $\mathcal L_{\kappa,\omega}$ in the signature having less than $\kappa$ functional symbols (and arbitrarily many predicate symbols), then $\vartheta(\varphi)$ is equivalent to a monadic existential sentence in the second-order language $\mathcal L^{2}_{\kappa,\omega}$, and that for any signature having at least one binary predicate symbol there exists $\varphi$ in $\mathcal L_{\omega,\omega}$ such that $\vartheta(\varphi)$ is not equivalent to any (first-order) sentence in $\mathcal L_{\infty,\omega}$. Nevertheless, in certain cases $\vartheta(\varphi)$ are first-order expressible. In this note, we provide several (syntactical and semantical) characterizations of the case when $\vartheta(\varphi)$ is in $\mathcal L_{\kappa,\kappa}$ and $\kappa$ is $\omega$ or a certain large cardinal

Model Checking Games for the Quantitative mu-Calculus

We investigate quantitative extensions of modal logic and the modal mu-calculus, and study the question whether the tight connection between logic and games can be lifted from the qualitative logics to their quantitative counterparts. It turns out that, if the quantitative mu-calculus is defined in an appropriate way respecting the duality properties between the logical operators, then its model checking problem can indeed be characterised by a quantitative variant of parity games. However, these quantitative games have quite different properties than their classical counterparts, in particular they are, in general, not positionally determined. The correspondence between the logic and the games goes both ways: the value of a formula on a quantitative transition system coincides with the value of the associated quantitative game, and conversely, the values of quantitative parity games are definable in the quantitative mu-calculus

Zero-one laws with respect to models of provability logic and two Grzegorczyk logics

It has been shown in the late 1960s that each formula of first-order logic without constants and function symbols obeys a zero-one law: As the number of elements of finite models increases, every formula holds either in almost all or in almost no models of that size. Therefore, many properties of models, such as having an even number of elements, cannot be expressed in the language of first-order logic. Halpern and Kapron proved zero-one laws for classes of models corresponding to the modal logics K, T, S4, and S5 and for frames corresponding to S4 and S5. In this paper, we prove zero-one laws for provability logic and its two siblings Grzegorczyk logic and weak Grzegorczyk logic, with respect to model validity. Moreover, we axiomatize validity in almost all relevant finite models, leading to three different axiom systems

Partial Awareness

We develop a modal logic to capture partial awareness. The logic has three building blocks: objects, properties, and concepts. Properties are unary predicates on objects; concepts are Boolean combinations of properties. We take an agent to be partially aware of a concept if she is aware of the concept without being aware of the properties that define it. The logic allows for quantification over objects and properties, so that the agent can reason about her own unawareness. We then apply the logic to contracts, which we view as syntactic objects that dictate outcomes based on the truth of formulas. We show that when agents are unaware of some relevant properties, referencing concepts that agents are only partially aware of can improve welfare.Comment: Appears in AAAI-1