Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.Experiments, Leadership, Reciprocity, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

Some Issues of Methods, Theories, and Experimental Designs

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On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences

Kooperationsbeziehungen managen: Neid schafft Investitionsanreize

Kooperationen erfordern in der Praxis häufig (spezifische) Investitionen und sind daher mit dem Problem der "fairen" Aufteilung entstehender Kooperationsrenten behaftet. Der folgende Beitrag zeigt, dass die Kooperationspartner die Möglichkeit haben sollten, flexibel auf die Höhe ihrer spezifischen Investitionen zu reagieren. Starre Gewinnaufteilungsregeln hingegen werden leicht als unfair empfunden und können daher die Investitionsanreize in Kooperationsbeziehungen zerstören

Doing Well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?

Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trustee’s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegate’s transfer is much higher than the value of the investor’s transfer.Delegation, trusts, reciprocity, intentions, experiment

How to be kind? Outcomes versus Intentions as Determinants of Fairness

This paper presents an experimental analysis of the role of out comes and intentions for fair behavior. We consider a symmetric version of the gift-exchange game in a 2x2 design with two treatment variables: intentionality (¯rst mover's choice is either intentional or randomly determined) and outcome (¯rst mover's choice is either costly or free, ie compensated by the experimenter). The four treatments differ with respect to the presence-absence of intentionality and cost for the ¯rst mover, whereas the outcome of the ¯rst mover's action for the second mover's payo® is kept constant across treatments. The results indicate that intentions do not matter for fair behavior, whereas outcomes do matter. In particular, the effect of outcomes is due to concerns for distributional fairness, whereas there is no evidence of an intention-based role for outcomes through signalling kindness.Reciprocity, Export, Intentions, Laboratory Experiments

Individual vs. collective contracts: An experimental investigation using the gift exchange game

This paper compares individual with collective contracts using modified repeated gift exchange games. The game had two variations, both following a partner design. In the individual variation different workers in the same firm can receive separate wages, and in the collective variation all workers in the same firm receive the same wage. These two variations are played altering the order. Thus the experiment has four treatments, two within subjects (regarding the games played) and two between subjects (regarding the order in which the games are played). We did not find significant differences between the two variations of the game when subjects had no experience. However, individual agreements turned out to be more efficient when subjects have previously experienced collective agreements. This result suggests subjects learned to reciprocate when they played the collective variation followed by the individual variation of the gift exchange game.laboratory experiments, gift exchange, collective contracts.

On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.Experiments; other-regarding preferences; inequity aversion;

Sequence Matters: an Experimental Study of the Effects of Experiencing Positive and Negative Reciprocity

This paper presents an experimental analysis of people’s behavior in situations involving both positive and negative reciprocity. The experiment implements sequences of two types of extensive form games called Punishment games and Trust games. The contemporaneous use of these two types of games allows us to define an ideal framework for understanding the basic elements of reciprocal behavior. Results show that the level of trust and punishment are consistent with the view that emotions are involvedReciprocity, trust, intentions, emotions, experiments J.E.L. Classification: D63, C78, C91