Can We Use Speaker Recognition Technology to Attack Itself? Enhancing Mimicry Attacks Using Automatic Target Speaker Selection

(A slightly shorter version) has been submitted to IEEE ICASSP 2019We consider technology-assisted mimicry attacks in the context of automatic speaker verification (ASV). We use ASV itself to select targeted speakers to be attacked by human-based mimicry. We recorded 6 naive mimics for whom we select target celebrities from VoxCeleb1 and VoxCeleb2 corpora (7,365 potential targets) using an i-vector system. The attacker attempts to mimic the selected target, with the utterances subjected to ASV tests using an independently developed x-vector system. Our main finding is negative: even if some of the attacker scores against the target speakers were slightly increased, our mimics did not succeed in spoofing the x-vector system. Interestingly, however, the relative ordering of the selected targets (closest, furthest, median) are consistent between the systems, which suggests some level of transferability between the system

CFAD: A Chinese Dataset for Fake Audio Detection

Fake audio detection is a growing concern and some relevant datasets have been designed for research. However, there is no standard public Chinese dataset under complex conditions.In this paper, we aim to fill in the gap and design a Chinese fake audio detection dataset (CFAD) for studying more generalized detection methods. Twelve mainstream speech-generation techniques are used to generate fake audio. To simulate the real-life scenarios, three noise datasets are selected for noise adding at five different signal-to-noise ratios, and six codecs are considered for audio transcoding (format conversion). CFAD dataset can be used not only for fake audio detection but also for detecting the algorithms of fake utterances for audio forensics. Baseline results are presented with analysis. The results that show fake audio detection methods with generalization remain challenging. The CFAD dataset is publicly available at: https://zenodo.org/record/8122764.Comment: FAD renamed as CFA

Voice Mimicry Attacks Assisted by Automatic Speaker Verification

International audienceIn this work, we simulate a scenario, where a publicly available ASV system is used to enhance mimicry attacks against another closed source ASV system. In specific, ASV technology is used to perform a similarity search between the voices of recruited attackers (6) and potential target speakers (7,365) from VoxCeleb corpora to find the closest targets for each of the attackers. In addition, we consider 'median', 'furthest', and 'common' targets to serve as a reference points. Our goal is to gain insights how well similarity rankings transfer from the attacker's ASV system to the attacked ASV system, whether the attackers are able to improve their attacks by mimicking, and how the properties of the voices of attackers change due to mimicking. We address these questions through ASV experiments, listening tests, and prosodic and formant analyses. For the ASV experiments, we use i-vector technology in the attacker side, and x-vectors in the attacked side. For the listening tests, we recruit listeners through crowdsourcing. The results of the ASV experiments indicate that the speaker similarity scores transfer well from one ASV system to another. Both the ASV experiments and the listening tests reveal that the mimicry attempts do not, in general, help in bringing attacker's scores closer to the target's. A detailed analysis shows that mimicking does not improve attacks, when the natural voices of attackers and targets are similar to each other. The analysis of prosody and formants suggests that the attackers were able to considerably change their speaking rates when mimicking, but the changes in F0 and formants were modest. Overall, the results suggest that untrained impersonators do not pose a high threat towards ASV systems, but the use of ASV systems to attack other ASV systems is a potential threat.

Phoneme duration modelling for speaker verification

Higher-level features are considered to be a potential remedy against transmission line and cross-channel degradations, currently some of the biggest problems associated with speaker verification. Phoneme durations in particular are not altered by these factors; thus a robust duration model will be a particularly useful addition to traditional cepstral based speaker verification systems. In this dissertation we investigate the feasibility of phoneme durations as a feature for speaker verification. Simple speaker specific triphone duration models are created to statistically represent the phoneme durations. Durations are obtained from an automatic hidden Markov model (HMM) based automatic speech recognition system and are modeled using single mixture Gaussian distributions. These models are applied in a speaker verification system (trained and tested on the YOHO corpus) and found to be a useful feature, even when used in isolation. When fused with acoustic features, verification performance increases significantly. A novel speech rate normalization technique is developed in order to remove some of the inherent intra-speaker variability (due to differing speech rates). Speech rate variability has a negative impact on both speaker verification and automatic speech recognition. Although the duration modelling seems to benefit only slightly from this procedure, the fused system performance improvement is substantial. Other factors known to influence the duration of phonemes are incorporated into the duration model. Utterance final lengthening is known be a consistent effect and thus “position in sentence” is modeled. “Position in word” is also modeled since triphones do not provide enough contextual information. This is found to improve performance since some vowels’ duration are particularly sensitive to its position in the word. Data scarcity becomes a problem when building speaker specific duration models. By using information from available data, unknown durations can be predicted in an attempt to overcome the data scarcity problem. To this end we develop a novel approach to predict unknown phoneme durations from the values of known phoneme durations for a particular speaker, based on the maximum likelihood criterion. This model is based on the observation that phonemes from the same broad phonetic class tend to co-vary strongly, but that there is also significant cross-class correlations. This approach is tested on the TIMIT corpus and found to be more accurate than using back-off techniques.Dissertation (MEng)--University of Pretoria, 2009.Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineeringunrestricte

SAS: A Speaker Verification Spoofing Database Containing Diverse Attacks

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.This paper presents the first version of a speaker verification spoofing and anti-spoofing database, named SAS corpus. The corpus includes nine spoofing techniques, two of which are speech synthesis, and seven are voice conversion. We design two protocols, one for standard speaker verification evaluation, and the other for producing spoofing materials. Hence, they allow the speech synthesis community to produce spoofing materials incrementally without knowledge of speaker verification spoofing and anti-spoofing. To provide a set of preliminary results, we conducted speaker verification experiments using two state-of-the-art systems. Without any anti-spoofing techniques, the two systems are extremely vulnerable to the spoofing attacks implemented in our SAS corpus.EPSRC ; CAF ; TÜBİTA

Vulnerability of speaker verification systems against voice conversion spoofing attacks: The case of telephone speech

Voice conversion - the methodology of automatically converting one's utterances to sound as if spoken by another speaker - presents a threat for applications relying on speaker verification. We study vulnerability of text-independent speaker verification systems against voice conversion attacks using telephone speech. We implemented a voice conversion systems with two types of features and nonparallel frame alignment methods and five speaker verification systems ranging from simple Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) to state-of-the-art joint factor analysis (JFA) recognizer. Experiments on a subset of NIST 2006 SRE corpus indicate that the JFA method is most resilient against conversion attacks. But even it experiences more than 5-fold increase in the false acceptance rate from 3.24 % to 17.33 %

Voice Spoofing Countermeasures: Taxonomy, State-of-the-art, experimental analysis of generalizability, open challenges, and the way forward

Malicious actors may seek to use different voice-spoofing attacks to fool ASV systems and even use them for spreading misinformation. Various countermeasures have been proposed to detect these spoofing attacks. Due to the extensive work done on spoofing detection in automated speaker verification (ASV) systems in the last 6-7 years, there is a need to classify the research and perform qualitative and quantitative comparisons on state-of-the-art countermeasures. Additionally, no existing survey paper has reviewed integrated solutions to voice spoofing evaluation and speaker verification, adversarial/antiforensics attacks on spoofing countermeasures, and ASV itself, or unified solutions to detect multiple attacks using a single model. Further, no work has been done to provide an apples-to-apples comparison of published countermeasures in order to assess their generalizability by evaluating them across corpora. In this work, we conduct a review of the literature on spoofing detection using hand-crafted features, deep learning, end-to-end, and universal spoofing countermeasure solutions to detect speech synthesis (SS), voice conversion (VC), and replay attacks. Additionally, we also review integrated solutions to voice spoofing evaluation and speaker verification, adversarial and anti-forensics attacks on voice countermeasures, and ASV. The limitations and challenges of the existing spoofing countermeasures are also presented. We report the performance of these countermeasures on several datasets and evaluate them across corpora. For the experiments, we employ the ASVspoof2019 and VSDC datasets along with GMM, SVM, CNN, and CNN-GRU classifiers. (For reproduceability of the results, the code of the test bed can be found in our GitHub Repository