The Money Laundering Prevention System

The paper presents the money laundering and terrorist financing prevention system in Croatia. The basic concepts are defined, the principles and fundamentals of international regulations analysed, and the regulatory system in Croatia covered by statute and money laundering prevention Regulations is presented, in conjunction with a description of the organisation, remit and international actions of the Money Laundering Prevention Office. The infiltration of dirty money is a crucial problem from national economies. The purchase of shares, of real estate, the establishment of dirty investment funds and the use of the banking system for the embedding of such resources is a danger to the credibility of a whole country, and in particular to the security of the financial and banking system. Croatia has adopted statutory measures aimed at the effective detection and prevention of suspicious financial transactions, in other words the prevention of money laundering. Launderers constantly find new ways, make use of new non-financial channels and expand their activities to real estate, artworks and insurance. Hence it is necessary to keep up with European approaches and recommendations, to strive for further improvement of the laws and the modernisation of the system, and to adopt new regulations harmonised with international standards, particularly with Directive 2005/60/EC.money laundering, terrorist financing, prevention, harmonisation with international standards, due diligence, reporting suspicious transactions

An Investigation of Risk Management Issues in the Context of Emergency Response Systems

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, efforts to enhance risk management have taken on increased importance both at the national and state levels. Most current incident response systems do not consider risk as part of the decision making scenario. To effectively mitigate multi-incident coordinated terrorist threats, it is important to consider risk in incident management systems. Based on the review of previous literature, this study proposes a theory-based risk framework for an emergency response system. Proof of concept is provided by applying the framework to two separate existing incident management systems - the urban search-and-rescue system and the biological detection systems

Selective Screening of Rail Passengers, MTI 06-07

The threat of another major terrorist attack in the United States remains high, with the greatest danger coming from local extremists inspired by events in the Middle East. Although the United States removed the Taliban government and destroyed al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan, events in Europe and elsewhere have shown that the terrorist network leadership remains determined to carry out further attacks and is capable of doing so. Therefore, the United States must systematically conduct research on terrorist strikes against transportation targets to distill lessons learned and determine the best practices for deterrence, response, and recovery. Those best practices must be taught to transportation and security professionals to provide secure surface transportation for the nation. Studying recent incidents in Europe and Asia, along with other research, will help leaders in the United States learn valuable lessons—from preventing attacks, to response and recovery, to addressing the psychological impacts of attacks to business continuity. Timely distillations of the lessons learned and best practices developed in other countries, once distributed to law enforcement, first responders, and rail- and subway-operating transit agencies, could result in the saving of American lives. This monograph focuses on the terrorist risks confronting public transportation in the United States—especially urban mass transit—and explores how different forms of passenger screening, and in particular, selective screening, can best be implemented to reduce those risks

Supplement to MTI Study on Selective Passenger Screening in the Mass Transit Rail Environment, MTI Report 09-05

This supplement updates and adds to MTIs 2007 report on Selective Screening of Rail Passengers (Jenkins and Butterworth MTI 07-06: Selective Screening of Rail Passengers). The report reviews current screening programs implemented (or planned) by nine transit agencies, identifying best practices. The authors also discuss why three other transit agencies decided not to implement passenger screening at this time. The supplement reconfirms earlier conclusions that selective screening is a viable security option, but that effective screening must be based on clear policies and carefully managed to avoid perceptions of racial or ethnic profiling, and that screening must have public support. The supplement also addresses new developments, such as vapor-wake detection canines, continuing challenges, and areas of debate. Those interested should also read MTI S-09-01 Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit

Automatic Detection of Online Jihadist Hate Speech

We have developed a system that automatically detects online jihadist hate speech with over 80% accuracy, by using techniques from Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning. The system is trained on a corpus of 45,000 subversive Twitter messages collected from October 2014 to December 2016. We present a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the jihadist rhetoric in the corpus, examine the network of Twitter users, outline the technical procedure used to train the system, and discuss examples of use.Comment: 31 page

Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United States, Research Report 12-03

This report presents an analysis of information relating to attacks, attempted attacks, and plots against high-speed rail (HSR) systems. It draws upon empirical data from MTI’s Database of Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation and from reviews of selected HSR systems, including onsite observations. The report also examines the history of safety accidents and other HSR incidents that resulted in fatalities, injuries, or extensive asset damage to examine the inherent vulnerabilities (and strengths) of HSR systems and how these might affect the consequences of terrorist attacks. The study is divided into three parts: (1) an examination of security principles and measures; (2) an empirical examination of 33 attacks against HSR targets and a comparison of attacks against HSR targets with those against non-HSR targets; and (3) an examination of 73 safety incidents on 12 HRS systems. The purpose of this study is to develop an overall strategy for HSR security and to identify measures that could be applied to HSR systems currently under development in the United States. It is hoped that the report will provide useful guidance to both governmental authorities and transportation operators of current and future HSR systems

Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad, MTI Report 04-05

Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for terrorist acts. Today, transit security is widely viewed as an important public policy issue and is a high priority at most large transit systems and at smaller systems operating in large metropolitan areas. Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security by (1) reviewing and synthesizing nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism; (2) conducting detailed case studies of transit systems in London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C.; (3) interviewing federal officials here in the United States responsible for overseeing transit security and transit industry representatives both here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning; and (4) surveying 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States. Our major findings include: (1) the threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal—most major attacks in the developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities; (2) this asymmetry of risk does not square with fiscal politics that seek to spread security funding among many jurisdictions; (3) transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers; (4) coordination and cooperation between security and transit agencies is improving, but far from complete; (5) enlisting passengers in surveillance has benefits, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit; (6) the role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is waxing; and (7) given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related person and property crimes

Does “See Something, Say Something” Work?

Do “See Something, Say Something” programs work? The evidence strongly suggests that in the specific case of public surface transportation, the answer is “yes.” Transport staff and passengers play an important role in the prevention of terrorist attacks. By discovering and reporting suspicious objects, they have prevented more than 10 percent of all terrorist attacks on public surface transportation. Detection rates are even better in the economically advanced countries where more than 14 percent of the attempts are detected—and have been improving. This MTI Security Perspective analyzes detections since 1970 and suggests that “See Something, Say Something” campaigns are worthwhile