Global well-posedness for a slightly supercritical surface quasi-geostrophic equation

We use a nonlocal maximum principle to prove the global existence of smooth solutions for a slightly supercritical surface quasi-geostrophic equation. By this we mean that the velocity field $u$ is obtained from the active scalar $\theta$ by a Fourier multiplier with symbol $i k^\perp |k|^{-1} m(k|)$, where $m$ is a smooth increasing function that grows slower than $\log \log |k|$ as $|k|\rightarrow \infty$.Comment: 11 pages, second version with slightly stronger resul

Regularity and blow up for active scalars

We review some recent results for a class of fluid mechanics equations called active scalars, with fractional dissipation. Our main examples are the surface quasi-geostrophic equation, the Burgers equation, and the Cordoba-Cordoba-Fontelos model. We discuss nonlocal maximum principle methods which allow to prove existence of global regular solutions for the critical dissipation. We also recall what is known about the possibility of finite time blow up in the supercritical regime.Comment: 33 page

Shape-enforcing operators for point and interval estimators

https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01038https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01038First author draf

Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation

Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, while pairwise-Nash networks are robust to one-link creation but multi-link severance. Under these conditions, proper equilibria in pure strategies are fully characterized by one-link deviation checks.Network formation, Pairwise-stability, Proper equilibrium

Different quantum f-divergences and the reversibility of quantum operations

The concept of classical $f$-divergences gives a unified framework to construct and study measures of dissimilarity of probability distributions; special cases include the relative entropy and the R\'enyi divergences. Various quantum versions of this concept, and more narrowly, the concept of R\'enyi divergences, have been introduced in the literature with applications in quantum information theory; most notably Petz' quasi-entropies (standard $f$-divergences), Matsumoto's maximal $f$-divergences, measured $f$-divergences, and sandwiched and $\alpha$-$z$-R\'enyi divergences. In this paper we give a systematic overview of the various concepts of quantum $f$-divergences with a main focus on their monotonicity under quantum operations, and the implications of the preservation of a quantum $f$-divergence by a quantum operation. In particular, we compare the standard and the maximal $f$-divergences regarding their ability to detect the reversibility of quantum operations. We also show that these two quantum $f$-divergences are strictly different for non-commuting operators unless $f$ is a polynomial, and obtain some analogous partial results for the relation between the measured and the standard $f$-divergences. We also study the monotonicity of the $\alpha$-$z$-R\'enyi divergences under the special class of bistochastic maps that leave one of the arguments of the R\'enyi divergence invariant, and determine domains of the parameters $\alpha,z$ where monotonicity holds, and where the preservation of the $\alpha$-$z$-R\'enyi divergence implies the reversibility of the quantum operation.Comment: 70 pages. v4: New Proposition 3.8 and Appendix D on the continuity properties of the standard f-divergences. The 2-positivity assumption removed from Theorem 3.34. The achievability of the measured f-divergence is shown in Proposition 4.17, and Theorem 4.18 is updated accordingl

Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form