Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx \beta x_i$, and estimates $\beta$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $\beta$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $\delta > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $\epsilon$)-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression

Draining the Water Hole: Mitigating Social Engineering Attacks with CyberTWEAK

Cyber adversaries have increasingly leveraged social engineering attacks to breach large organizations and threaten the well-being of today's online users. One clever technique, the "watering hole" attack, compromises a legitimate website to execute drive-by download attacks by redirecting users to another malicious domain. We introduce a game-theoretic model that captures the salient aspects for an organization protecting itself from a watering hole attack by altering the environment information in web traffic so as to deceive the attackers. Our main contributions are (1) a novel Social Engineering Deception (SED) game model that features a continuous action set for the attacker, (2) an in-depth analysis of the SED model to identify computationally feasible real-world cases, and (3) the CyberTWEAK algorithm which solves for the optimal protection policy. To illustrate the potential use of our framework, we built a browser extension based on our algorithms which is now publicly available online. The CyberTWEAK extension will be vital to the continued development and deployment of countermeasures for social engineering.Comment: IAAI-20, AICS-2020 Worksho

Algorithms for the continuous nonlinear resource allocation problem---new implementations and numerical studies

Patriksson (2008) provided a then up-to-date survey on the continuous,separable, differentiable and convex resource allocation problem with a single resource constraint. Since the publication of that paper the interest in the problem has grown: several new applications have arisen where the problem at hand constitutes a subproblem, and several new algorithms have been developed for its efficient solution. This paper therefore serves three purposes. First, it provides an up-to-date extension of the survey of the literature of the field, complementing the survey in Patriksson (2008) with more then 20 books and articles. Second, it contributes improvements of some of these algorithms, in particular with an improvement of the pegging (that is, variable fixing) process in the relaxation algorithm, and an improved means to evaluate subsolutions. Third, it numerically evaluates several relaxation (primal) and breakpoint (dual) algorithms, incorporating a variety of pegging strategies, as well as a quasi-Newton method. Our conclusion is that our modification of the relaxation algorithm performs the best. At least for problem sizes up to 30 million variables the practical time complexity for the breakpoint and relaxation algorithms is linear

Min-Max Regret Scheduling To Minimize the Total Weight of Late Jobs With Interval Uncertainty

We study the single machine scheduling problem with the objective to minimize the total weight of late jobs. It is assumed that the processing times of jobs are not exactly known at the time when a complete schedule must be dispatched. Instead, only interval bounds for these parameters are given. In contrast to the stochastic optimization approach, we consider the problem of finding a robust schedule, which minimizes the maximum regret of a solution. Heuristic algorithm based on mixed-integer linear programming is presented and examined through computational experiments