Shining Light On Shadow Stacks

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and the deployability of Shadesmar. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios.Comment: To Appear in IEEE Security and Privacy 201

Conditional Random Field Autoencoders for Unsupervised Structured Prediction

We introduce a framework for unsupervised learning of structured predictors with overlapping, global features. Each input's latent representation is predicted conditional on the observable data using a feature-rich conditional random field. Then a reconstruction of the input is (re)generated, conditional on the latent structure, using models for which maximum likelihood estimation has a closed-form. Our autoencoder formulation enables efficient learning without making unrealistic independence assumptions or restricting the kinds of features that can be used. We illustrate insightful connections to traditional autoencoders, posterior regularization and multi-view learning. We show competitive results with instantiations of the model for two canonical NLP tasks: part-of-speech induction and bitext word alignment, and show that training our model can be substantially more efficient than comparable feature-rich baselines

ret2spec: Speculative Execution Using Return Stack Buffers

Speculative execution is an optimization technique that has been part of CPUs for over a decade. It predicts the outcome and target of branch instructions to avoid stalling the execution pipeline. However, until recently, the security implications of speculative code execution have not been studied. In this paper, we investigate a special type of branch predictor that is responsible for predicting return addresses. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study return address predictors and their consequences for the security of modern software. In our work, we show how return stack buffers (RSBs), the core unit of return address predictors, can be used to trigger misspeculations. Based on this knowledge, we propose two new attack variants using RSBs that give attackers similar capabilities as the documented Spectre attacks. We show how local attackers can gain arbitrary speculative code execution across processes, e.g., to leak passwords another user enters on a shared system. Our evaluation showed that the recent Spectre countermeasures deployed in operating systems can also cover such RSB-based cross-process attacks. Yet we then demonstrate that attackers can trigger misspeculation in JIT environments in order to leak arbitrary memory content of browser processes. Reading outside the sandboxed memory region with JIT-compiled code is still possible with 80\% accuracy on average.Comment: Updating to the cam-ready version and adding reference to the original pape

Comparing Tag Scheme Variations Using an Abstract Machine Generator

In this paper we study, in the context of a WAM-based abstract machine for Prolog, how variations in the encoding of type information in tagged words and in their associated basic operations impact performance and memory usage. We use a high-level language to specify encodings and the associated operations. An automatic generator constructs both the abstract machine using this encoding and the associated Prolog-to-byte code compiler. Annotations in this language make it possible to impose constraints on the final representation of tagged words, such as the effectively addressable space (fixing, for example, the word size of the target processor /architecture), the layout of the tag and value bits inside the tagged word, and how the basic operations are implemented. We evaluate large number of combinations of the different parameters in two scenarios: a) trying to obtain an optimal general-purpose abstract machine and b) automatically generating a specially-tuned abstract machine for a particular program. We conclude that we are able to automatically generate code featuring all the optimizations present in a hand-written, highly-optimized abstract machine and we canal so obtain emulators with larger addressable space and better performance

Time Protection: the Missing OS Abstraction

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must provide time protection in addition to the established memory protection. We examine the requirements of time protection, present a design and its implementation in the seL4 microkernel, and evaluate its efficacy as well as performance overhead on Arm and x86 processors

Same Coverage, Less Bloat: Accelerating Binary-only Fuzzing with Coverage-preserving Coverage-guided Tracing

Coverage-guided fuzzing's aggressive, high-volume testing has helped reveal tens of thousands of software security flaws. While executing billions of test cases mandates fast code coverage tracing, the nature of binary-only targets leads to reduced tracing performance. A recent advancement in binary fuzzing performance is Coverage-guided Tracing (CGT), which brings orders-of-magnitude gains in throughput by restricting the expense of coverage tracing to only when new coverage is guaranteed. Unfortunately, CGT suits only a basic block coverage granularity -- yet most fuzzers require finer-grain coverage metrics: edge coverage and hit counts. It is this limitation which prohibits nearly all of today's state-of-the-art fuzzers from attaining the performance benefits of CGT. This paper tackles the challenges of adapting CGT to fuzzing's most ubiquitous coverage metrics. We introduce and implement a suite of enhancements that expand CGT's introspection to fuzzing's most common code coverage metrics, while maintaining its orders-of-magnitude speedup over conventional always-on coverage tracing. We evaluate their trade-offs with respect to fuzzing performance and effectiveness across 12 diverse real-world binaries (8 open- and 4 closed-source). On average, our coverage-preserving CGT attains near-identical speed to the present block-coverage-only CGT, UnTracer; and outperforms leading binary- and source-level coverage tracers QEMU, Dyninst, RetroWrite, and AFL-Clang by 2-24x, finding more bugs in less time.Comment: CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Securit