The cybernetics of language

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.As a complement to the philosophy of language, the cybernetics of language-is to synthesise a picture of language as a whole; and runs into-(descriptive) difficulties where (at any one time) we can only speak about bounded portions of the world (Wittgenstein). This same difficulty permeates the short history of cybernetics in the concern for wholistic representation, and thus the concern of the cybernetics of language leads to (or arises in) the concern for the language of cybernetics. It becomes resolvable in the context of Second order cybernetics (i.e. the cybernetics of' describing as well as described systems (von Foerster)). The difficulty and the possibility of its resolution are introduced in terms of differences between Russell and Wittgenstein; in terms of the second order cybernetic discussions of the black box (seen as capturing Wittgenstein's silence and, in general, interpretation) and distinctions (G. S. Brown); and in terms of the distinction between natural and artificial languages and the problem of describing description (self-reference). Here the cybernetics of language concerns the nature of inquiry into our descriptive abilities and activities, and determines what we can and what we cannot (objectively) speak about. The notions of 'the function of language' and 'the existence of language' (presupposed in a first order description) are shown to be mutually interdependent, giving rise to a paradox of means (and giving rise to the question of the 'origin of language'). This paradox is resolved where a language is seen as constructed (for a particular purpose), and thus the circularity is unfolded, considering that (i) in terms of a constructive function of language, there is no language (something is in the process of being constructed); (ii) in terms of a communicative function of language, such a construction is in the process of being accepted (something is being negotiated); (iii) in terms of an argumentative-function of language, a language (accepted, eg. having, been negotiated) is used to negotiate things distinct from-this language. Language is seen as comprising the interaction between these activities. The cybernetics of language is developed in terms of the requirements for an observer to construct, communicate and argue: a language is constructed for the description of these processes in terms of the; complementarity between description and interpretation (underlying the process of construction) and the complementarity between saying and doing (enabling an observer to explore, eg. question, test and explain his construction and distinguish another observer; and enabling two or more observers to negotiate and accept relations and argue by distinguishing both a language and the things this is used to describe)

The view from the paradoxical world

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.The consequences of using such complex tools as Logic and Mathematics, which are so ingrained in our own nature as thinking living organisms, to explain precisely that Nature in which we ourselves are imbedded, are disucssed from a new perspective. The interplay between the individual (subjective) world and the social (objective) world emerges with clarity under this light. Paradoxes, a nightmare for Logicians and Mathematicians, are returned to their cradle, the observer, where no hunt is set up to “solve" them. Though I am not alone in this endeavour to consider paradoxes from a different perspective, new insights into the nature of the living organization and the working of the nervous system allow today the opportunity to strengthen this revolutionary viewpoint. Several experiments performed on a multicomputer realization of organizationally closed (paradoxical) unities, suggest a nervous system where processes and descriptions are more fundamental concepts than time and space. While the consequences of this new approach remain still to be explored, a sensitive reader will already enjoy them

Convivial Solipsism as a maximally perspectival interpretation

A classification of different interpretations of the quantum formalism is examined and the concept of perspectival interpretation is presented. A perspectival interpretation implies that the truth is relative to the observer. The degree to which QBism and Convivial Solipsism are perspectival is examined and Convivial Solipsim is shown to be perspectival at a higher degree than QBism or at least than the QBism founders version.Comment: 16 page

On the Arbitrary Choice Regarding which Inertial Reference Frame is "Stationary" and which is "Moving" in the Special Theory of Relativity

Einstein's argument on the relativity of simultaneity itself is the first result of the special theory of relativity. This argument is reflected in the structure and functioning of the physical world. The arbitrary nature of the decision regarding the particular inertial reference frame from which the argument on the relativity of simultaneity begins is discussed. It is this arbitrary, or freely made, decision that is the basis for the significance of the argument of the relativity of simultaneity itself on the structure and functioning of the physical world. The same concrete circumstances in the physical world can support either direction in the argument on the relativity of simultaneity, as well as other results, in the special theory (i.e., with either of two inertial reference frames in uniform translational motion relative to one another considered "stationary" while the other inertial reference frame is considered "moving"). There are different sets of results in the physical world associated with the choice in direction that is made, for example as concerns the temporal durations of occurrences or the spatial lengths of existents in these inertial reference frames. Experiments testing the equations derived in the special theory that relate the temporal durations of occurrences or the spatial lengths of physical existents in inertial reference frames in uniform motion relative to one another generally have not tested predictions with both of the two inertial reference frames considered, in separate scenarios, the "stationary" reference frame. It is proposed that empirical tests in two directions be developed and conducted. If empirical results from such tests support the predictions of the special theory, these empirical results would support the thesis that there is a cognitive factor in Einstein's argument on the relativity of simultaneity that affects results derived in the special theory concerning the physical world. One such test is proposed

Interactive Destiny

Mitra demonstrates that specific memory erasure causes the observer to be in a different sector of the multiverse, one with a different destiny: events in the future, remote to any possible influence of the observer, having radically different probabilities. The concept only applies to an observer defined by a structure of information, so cannot apply to a human observer as usually defined, as the physical body. However, Everett defines the functional identity of the observer as the contents of the memory, a structure of information. Only such an identity encounters the appearance of collapse. Thus, any observer encountering change of this nature is necessarily of this type, and in principle Mitra's effect would apply. Alteration to the quantum state of the physical environment effective for the observer merely by deletion of a record of observation would seem to require that the universe is primarily an information system, and that physical reality is secondary to the information defining it. This, however, is only the case with respect to the collapse dynamics. The universe is first and foremost a physical reality, as generally understood, defined by the quantum state, with the concomitant linear dynamics. Thus, at any given moment, the effective physical environment of the observer is a Newtonian, relativistic, physical domain, probabilistically defined throughout four-dimensional space-time by the linear dynamics of the quantum state of the environment effective for that observer: here the quantum mechanical frame of reference. With regard to the collapse dynamics, such a domain is of a first, primitive, logical type, while collapse, the change of the quantum mechanical frame of reference, is of a different, second logical type. As Everett makes clear, collapse is a purely subjective phenomenon, and as Tegmark explains, it exists only on the inside view of the quantum mechanical frame of reference. In this regard, and here only, the information process of the collapse dynamics, the establishment of new correlations with the physical environment, is primary, and, in a sense, 'overrules' the linear dynamics of the physical environment