Convection-compensating PGSE experiment incorporating excitation-sculpting water suppression (CONVEX)

We present a new diffusion experiment which provides simultaneous suppression of an on-resonance solvent peak and compensation for convection. The experiment, which we name CONVEX, exploits similarities between two functionally different pulse sequences to enable the same sequence to be used simultaneously for two different purposes. The CONVEX pulse sequence combines a double-echo PGSE with double excitation-sculpting water suppression, using unequal gradient pulse-pair amplitudes (g1 and g2) and unequal diffusion intervals (Del1 and Del2). Convection compensation is achieved by setting g1 : g2 = Del2 : Del1. The new experiment provides the spectral quality, flat baseline, and water-suppression power characteristic of excitation-sculpting experiments, combined with excellent compensation for convection. The resulting Stejskal–Tanner plots are linear over a greater range of signal attenuation than in the absence of water suppression. Possible applications include protein NMR; NMR of cellular or colloidal systems; and the monitoring of technological processes

America's pyramids: Presidents and their libraries

Review of the purpose, history, and debates about the presidential library system, with a recommendation to end the system

Empowering Small Donors in Federal Elections

An effective new public matching funds system in which citizens direct the distribution of public funds to candidates would fundamentally change the way our campaigns are financed. The system would decrease the opportunities for corruption of federal officeholders and government decisions, and provide candidates with an alternative means for financing their elections without being obligated to special interest funders. Most importantly, the system would restore citizens to their rightful pre-eminent place in our democracy

Institutional Independence: Lawyers and the Administrative State

The institutional structure where federal government lawyers practice is fraught with political and economic pressures that undermine the ability of lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment. A lack of candid legal advice in this space not only removes a pivotal fail-safe between legal and illegal state action but also precariously imbalances the powerful administrative state, exposing it to undue political influence. For these reasons, this Article argues that structural changes to administrative institutions must be made to support and nurture lawyers’ ability to independently determine the bounds of legality. Previous scholarship has examined the role of professional independence for lawyers generally; however, the legal academy has yet to explore the centrality of professional independence to administrative law or the structural pressures influencing its exercise. This Article joins a body of work that adopts a new institutionalist approach to professional misconduct. In doing so, this Article makes three principal contributions: (1) it outlines why institutionally sustained professional independence is essential to the federal administrative state; (2) it identifies institutional failings that impede government lawyers’ exercise of professional independent judgment; and (3) it proposes institution-based solutions to facilitate professionally independent conduct by government lawyers. By insulating government lawyers from excessive interference on core professional judgment calls, civil society may rely on these lawyers to help protect the basic structure of the rule of law

John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture Series: List of Lectures

A list of lectures in the John F. Sonnett Memorial Lectures Series organized by topic. Document has handwritten notes.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/events_programs_sonnett_miscellaneous/1008/thumbnail.jp

Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), which bans corporations from offering bribes to foreign government officials, was enacted during the Watergate era’s crackdown on political corruption but remained only weakly enforced for its first two decades. American industry argued that the law created an uneven playing field in global commerce, which made robust enforcement politically unpopular. This Article documents how the executive branch strategically under- enforced the FCPA, while Congress and the President pushed for an international agreement that would bind other countries to rules similar to those of the United States. The Article establishes that U.S. officials ramped up enforcement only after the United States successfully concluded the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, twenty years after the enactment of the FCPA. Afterward, U.S. officials, desiring to maintain industry support for the FCPA, prosecuted both foreign and domestic corporations, thereby minimizing the statute’s competitive costs for American companies. This Article argues that the OECD Convention was critical to the dramatic expansion of FCPA enforcement because it allowed American prosecutors to adopt an “international-competition neutral” enforcement strategy, investigating domestic corporations and their foreign rivals alike. The existence of the treaty was decisive because it established anti-bribery as a binding legal principle and legitimized U.S. prosecutions of foreign corporations. Today, seven of the ten highest FCPA penalties have been against foreign corporations. This Article advocates, on a theoretical level, for a reevaluation of the multidirectional relationship between international and domestic law in transnational issue areas, such as foreign bribery. National laws are most often viewed as self-contained legal rules that develop or decline based on domestic officials’ policy decisions. The evolution of the FCPA, however, demonstrates that some statutes may require “international resonance” to be meaningfully enforced: a domestic statute can create pressure for national leaders to conclude an international agreement, and then that agreement provides the means for the national law to develop into a robust national policy. As this Article establishes, the OECD Convention owed its existence to the FCPA and, in turn, the FCPA owes much of its development and strength to the OECD Convention. A greater appreciation for international resonance’s feedback mechanisms is essential to understanding national enforcement of a wide range of transnational commercial, financial, and environmental statutes

Interview with Thomas Wolf, December 29, 1994 & August 9, 1995

Thomas Wolf was interviewed on December 29, 1994 & August 9, 1995 by Michael J. Birkner & David Hedrick about his service in World War II and involvement in the Nixon administration. He discusses his role in the Air Force Counterintelligence Corps during World War II, and his work with several government agencies, such as the Citizens of Eisenhower and the Office of Economic Opportunity. Wolf also describes the Watergate Scandal and his participation in the trial. Length of Interview: 92 Minutes (Part 1), 47 Minutes (Part 2) Collection Note: This oral history was selected from the Oral History Collection maintained by Special Collections & College Archives. Transcripts are available for browsing in the Special Collections Reading Room, 4th floor, Musselman Library. GettDigital contains the complete listing of oral histories done from 1978 to the present. To view this list and to access selected digital versions please visit -- http://gettysburg.cdmhost.com/cdm/landingpage/collection/p16274coll