1,213 research outputs found
Shared and Searchable Encrypted Data for Untrusted Servers
Current security mechanisms pose a risk for organisations that outsource their data management to untrusted servers. Encrypting and decrypting sensitive data at the client side is the normal approach in this situation but has high communication and computation overheads if only a subset of the data is required, for example, selecting records in a database table based on a keyword search. New cryptographic schemes have been proposed that support encrypted queries over encrypted data but all depend on a single set of secret keys, which implies single user access or sharing keys among multiple users, with key revocation requiring costly data re-encryption. In this paper, we propose an encryption scheme where each authorised user in the system has his own keys to encrypt and decrypt data. The scheme supports keyword search which enables the server to return only the encrypted data that satisfies an encrypted query without decrypting it. We provide two constructions of the scheme giving formal proofs of their security. We also report on the results of a prototype implementation.
This research was supported by the UKās EPSRC research grant EP/C537181/1. The authors would like to thank the members of the Policy Research Group at Imperial College for their support
Forward Private Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Optimized I/O Efficiency
Recently, several practical attacks raised serious concerns over the security
of searchable encryption. The attacks have brought emphasis on forward privacy,
which is the key concept behind solutions to the adaptive leakage-exploiting
attacks, and will very likely to become mandatory in the design of new
searchable encryption schemes. For a long time, forward privacy implies
inefficiency and thus most existing searchable encryption schemes do not
support it. Very recently, Bost (CCS 2016) showed that forward privacy can be
obtained without inducing a large communication overhead. However, Bost's
scheme is constructed with a relatively inefficient public key cryptographic
primitive, and has a poor I/O performance. Both of the deficiencies
significantly hinder the practical efficiency of the scheme, and prevent it
from scaling to large data settings. To address the problems, we first present
FAST, which achieves forward privacy and the same communication efficiency as
Bost's scheme, but uses only symmetric cryptographic primitives. We then
present FASTIO, which retains all good properties of FAST, and further improves
I/O efficiency. We implemented the two schemes and compared their performance
with Bost's scheme. The experiment results show that both our schemes are
highly efficient, and FASTIO achieves a much better scalability due to its
optimized I/O
Adaptively Secure Computationally Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable encryption is a technique that allows a client to store documents on a server in encrypted form. Stored documents can be retrieved selectively while revealing as little information as\ud
possible to the server. In the symmetric searchable encryption domain, the storage and the retrieval are performed by the same client. Most conventional searchable encryption schemes suffer\ud
from two disadvantages.\ud
First, searching the stored documents takes time linear in the size of the database, and/or uses heavy arithmetic operations.\ud
Secondly, the existing schemes do not consider adaptive attackers;\ud
a search-query will reveal information even about documents stored\ud
in the future. If they do consider this, it is at a significant\ud
cost to updates.\ud
In this paper we propose a novel symmetric searchable encryption\ud
scheme that offers searching at constant time in the number of\ud
unique keywords stored on the server. We present two variants of\ud
the basic scheme which differ in the efficiency of search and\ud
update. We show how each scheme could be used in a personal health\ud
record system
SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search
Protected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of
reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation
limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system
breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown
rapidly; systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies.
However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques.
Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality,
performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing
database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL,
NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the
protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality
consistent with newly invented databases.
At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the
tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide
the following contributions:
1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database
paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used
and combined to support a large number of database paradigms.
2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in
implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main
approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts
protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in
functionality.
3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base
queries.
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a
protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform
and initial user opinions of protected search.Comment: 20 pages, to appear to IEEE Security and Privac
HardIDX: Practical and Secure Index with SGX
Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still either
challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow performance.
Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale well due to hardware
limitations and software designs that are not specifically tailored to the
hardware architecture, and are rarely well analyzed for their security (e.g.,
the impact of side channels). Additionally, existing hardware-based solutions
often have a large code footprint in the trusted environment susceptible to
software compromises. In this paper we present HardIDX: a hardware-based
approach, leveraging Intel's SGX, for search over encrypted data. It implements
only the security critical core, i.e., the search functionality, in the trusted
environment and resorts to untrusted software for the remainder. HardIDX is
deployable as a highly performant encrypted database index: it is logarithmic
in the size of the index and searches are performed within a few milliseconds
rather than seconds. We formally model and prove the security of our scheme
showing that its leakage is equivalent to the best known searchable encryption
schemes. Our implementation has a very small code and memory footprint yet
still scales to virtually unlimited search index sizes, i.e., size is limited
only by the general - non-secure - hardware resources
Public-Key Encryption with Delegated Search
In public-key setting, Alice encrypts email with public key of Bob, so that only Bob will be able to learn contents of email. Consider scenario when computer of Alice is infected and unbeknown to Alice it also embeds malware into message. Bob's company, Carol, cannot scan his email for malicious content as it is encrypted so burden is on Bob to do scan. This is not efficient. We construct mechanism that enables Bob to provide trapdoors to Carol such that Carol, given encrypted data and malware signature, is able to check whether encrypted data contains malware signature, without decrypting it. We refer to this mechanism as Public-Key Encryption with Delegated Search SPKE.\ud
\ud
We formalize SPKE and give construction based on ElGamal public-key encryption (PKE). proposed scheme has ciphertexts which are both searchable and decryptable. This property of scheme is crucial since entity can search entire content of message, in contrast to existing searchable public-key encryption schemes where search is done only in metadata part. We prove in standard model that scheme is ciphertext indistinguishable and trapdoor indistinguishable under Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (sxdh) assumption. We prove also ciphertext one-wayness of scheme under modified Computational Diffie-Hellman (mcdh) assumption. We show that our PKEDS scheme can be used in different applications such as detecting encrypted malwares and forwarding encrypted emails
Achieving Secure and Efficient Cloud Search Services: Cross-Lingual Multi-Keyword Rank Search over Encrypted Cloud Data
Multi-user multi-keyword ranked search scheme in arbitrary language is a
novel multi-keyword rank searchable encryption (MRSE) framework based on
Paillier Cryptosystem with Threshold Decryption (PCTD). Compared to previous
MRSE schemes constructed based on the k-nearest neighbor searcha-ble encryption
(KNN-SE) algorithm, it can mitigate some draw-backs and achieve better
performance in terms of functionality and efficiency. Additionally, it does not
require a predefined keyword set and support keywords in arbitrary languages.
However, due to the pattern of exact matching of keywords in the new MRSE
scheme, multilingual search is limited to each language and cannot be searched
across languages. In this pa-per, we propose a cross-lingual multi-keyword rank
search (CLRSE) scheme which eliminates the barrier of languages and achieves
semantic extension with using the Open Multilingual Wordnet. Our CLRSE scheme
also realizes intelligent and per-sonalized search through flexible keyword and
language prefer-ence settings. We evaluate the performance of our scheme in
terms of security, functionality, precision and efficiency, via extensive
experiments
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