The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election

In the world's largest-ever deployment of online voting, the iVote Internet voting system was trusted for the return of 280,000 ballots in the 2015 state election in New South Wales, Australia. During the election, we performed an independent security analysis of parts of the live iVote system and uncovered severe vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to manipulate votes, violate ballot privacy, and subvert the verification mechanism. These vulnerabilities do not seem to have been detected by the election authorities before we disclosed them, despite a pre-election security review and despite the system having run in a live state election for five days. One vulnerability, the result of including analytics software from an insecure external server, exposed some votes to complete compromise of privacy and integrity. At least one parliamentary seat was decided by a margin much smaller than the number of votes taken while the system was vulnerable. We also found protocol flaws, including vote verification that was itself susceptible to manipulation. This incident underscores the difficulty of conducting secure elections online and carries lessons for voters, election officials, and the e-voting research community

THE IMPACT OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES ON THE SOFTWARE’S SECURITY

Security is usually defined as the ability of a system to protect itself against accidental or deliberate intrusion1. Ensuring integrity, confidentiality, availability, and accountability requirements even in the presence of a determined, malicious opponent is essential for computer security. Sensitive data has to be manipulated and consulted by authorized users only (integrity, confidentiality). Furthermore, the system should resist “denial of service” attacks that attempt to render it unusable (availability). Also the system has to ensure the inability to deny the ownership of prior actions (accountability).security

Accelerating NTRUEncrypt for in-browser cryptography utilising graphical processing units and WebGL

One of the challenges encryption faces is it is computationally intensive and therefore slow, it is vital to find faster methods to accelerate modern encryption algorithms to keep performance high whilst also preserving information security. Users often do not want to wait for applications to become responsive, applications on limited devices such as mobiles often compromise security in order to keep execution times quick. Often they use algorithms and key sizes which are not considered cryptographically secure in order to maintain a smooth user experience. Emerging approaches have begun using a devices Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) to offload some of the computational burden from the Central Processing Unit (CPU) in an effort to parallelize and accelerate the encryption algorithms. Programming for a GPU often involves the use of CUDA or OpenCL programming, however these approaches are platform dependant. This research focuses on utilizing a GPU to perform in-browser cryptography using WebGL and JavaScript. This allows any GPU-enabled device capable of launching an OpenGL compatible browser to perform GPU accelerated cryptography. A GPU based implementation of the NTRUEncrypt algorithm was created and tested against a CPU based version on a range of hardware devices with results, challenges and limitations discussed

A study of security for web applications and APIs

Estudio de las vunlerabilidades presentes en aplicaiones webEstudi sobre les vulnerabilitats més comuns en aplicacions webStudy of the most frequently found vulnerabilities in web