184 research outputs found
Constrained Non-Monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms
Constrained submodular maximization problems have long been studied, with
near-optimal results known under a variety of constraints when the submodular
function is monotone. The case of non-monotone submodular maximization is less
understood: the first approximation algorithms even for the unconstrainted
setting were given by Feige et al. (FOCS '07). More recently, Lee et al. (STOC
'09, APPROX '09) show how to approximately maximize non-monotone submodular
functions when the constraints are given by the intersection of p matroid
constraints; their algorithm is based on local-search procedures that consider
p-swaps, and hence the running time may be n^Omega(p), implying their algorithm
is polynomial-time only for constantly many matroids. In this paper, we give
algorithms that work for p-independence systems (which generalize constraints
given by the intersection of p matroids), where the running time is poly(n,p).
Our algorithm essentially reduces the non-monotone maximization problem to
multiple runs of the greedy algorithm previously used in the monotone case.
Our idea of using existing algorithms for monotone functions to solve the
non-monotone case also works for maximizing a submodular function with respect
to a knapsack constraint: we get a simple greedy-based constant-factor
approximation for this problem.
With these simpler algorithms, we are able to adapt our approach to
constrained non-monotone submodular maximization to the (online) secretary
setting, where elements arrive one at a time in random order, and the algorithm
must make irrevocable decisions about whether or not to select each element as
it arrives. We give constant approximations in this secretary setting when the
algorithm is constrained subject to a uniform matroid or a partition matroid,
and give an O(log k) approximation when it is constrained by a general matroid
of rank k.Comment: In the Proceedings of WINE 201
Near-optimal irrevocable sample selection for periodic data streams with applications to marine robotics
We consider the task of monitoring spatiotemporal phenomena in real-time by
deploying limited sampling resources at locations of interest irrevocably and
without knowledge of future observations. This task can be modeled as an
instance of the classical secretary problem. Although this problem has been
studied extensively in theoretical domains, existing algorithms require that
data arrive in random order to provide performance guarantees. These algorithms
will perform arbitrarily poorly on data streams such as those encountered in
robotics and environmental monitoring domains, which tend to have
spatiotemporal structure. We focus on the problem of selecting representative
samples from phenomena with periodic structure and introduce a novel sample
selection algorithm that recovers a near-optimal sample set according to any
monotone submodular utility function. We evaluate our algorithm on a seven-year
environmental dataset collected at the Martha's Vineyard Coastal Observatory
and show that it selects phytoplankton sample locations that are nearly optimal
in an information-theoretic sense for predicting phytoplankton concentrations
in locations that were not directly sampled. The proposed periodic secretary
algorithm can be used with theoretical performance guarantees in many real-time
sensing and robotics applications for streaming, irrevocable sample selection
from periodic data streams.Comment: 8 pages, accepted for presentation in IEEE Int. Conf. on Robotics and
Automation, ICRA '18, Brisbane, Australia, May 201
The Submodular Secretary Problem Goes Linear
During the last decade, the matroid secretary problem (MSP) became one of the
most prominent classes of online selection problems. Partially linked to its
numerous applications in mechanism design, substantial interest arose also in
the study of nonlinear versions of MSP, with a focus on the submodular matroid
secretary problem (SMSP). So far, O(1)-competitive algorithms have been
obtained for SMSP over some basic matroid classes. This created some hope that,
analogously to the matroid secretary conjecture, one may even obtain
O(1)-competitive algorithms for SMSP over any matroid. However, up to now, most
questions related to SMSP remained open, including whether SMSP may be
substantially more difficult than MSP; and more generally, to what extend MSP
and SMSP are related.
Our goal is to address these points by presenting general black-box
reductions from SMSP to MSP. In particular, we show that any O(1)-competitive
algorithm for MSP, even restricted to a particular matroid class, can be
transformed in a black-box way to an O(1)-competitive algorithm for SMSP over
the same matroid class. This implies that the matroid secretary conjecture is
equivalent to the same conjecture for SMSP. Hence, in this sense SMSP is not
harder than MSP. Also, to find O(1)-competitive algorithms for SMSP over a
particular matroid class, it suffices to consider MSP over the same matroid
class. Using our reductions we obtain many first and improved O(1)-competitive
algorithms for SMSP over various matroid classes by leveraging known algorithms
for MSP. Moreover, our reductions imply an O(loglog(rank))-competitive
algorithm for SMSP, thus, matching the currently best asymptotic algorithm for
MSP, and substantially improving on the previously best
O(log(rank))-competitive algorithm for SMSP
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement
auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function
subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful
mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the
participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of
general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first
truthful, budget-feasible and -approximate mechanisms that run in
polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions.
Prior to our work, the only -approximation mechanism known for
non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value
queries.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone
submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two
candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet
ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly
enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem
where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal
value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online
setting as well.
To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the
case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain
-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular
objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a -system.
With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known
for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting
that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial
time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201
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