2,271 research outputs found
Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques
We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee unconditional
privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and
practical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the
``tally'' by more than their own vote -- which will be given the exact same
weight as that of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem
based on both traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.Comment: 21 page
Functional Encryption as Mediated Obfuscation
We introduce a new model for program obfuscation, called mediated obfuscation. A mediated obfuscation is a 3-party protocol for evaluating an obfuscated program that requires minimal interaction and limited trust. The party who originally supplies the obfuscated program need not be online when the client wants to evaluate the program. A semi-trusted third-party mediator allows the client to evaluate the program, while learning nothing about the obfuscated program or the client’s inputs and outputs. Mediated obfuscation would provide the ability for a software vendor to safely outsource the less savory aspects (like accounting of usage statistics, and remaining online to facilitate access) of “renting out” access to proprietary software. We give security definitions for this new obfuscation paradigm, and then present a simple and generic construction based on functional encryption. If a functional encryption scheme supports decryption functionality F (m, k), then our construction yields a mediated obfuscation of the class of functions {F (m, ·) | m}. In our construction, the interaction between the client and the mediator is minimal (much more efficient than a general- purpose multi-party computation protocol). Instantiating with existing FE constructions, we achieve obfuscation for point-functions with output (under a strong “virtual black-box” notion of security), and a general feasibility result for obfuscating conjunctive normal form and disjunctive normal form formulae (under a weaker “semantic” notion of security). Finally, we use mediated obfuscation to illustrate a connection between worst-case and average-case static obfuscation. In short, an average-case (static) obfuscation of some component of a suitable functional encryption scheme yields a worst-case (static) obfuscation for a related class of functions. We use this connection to demonstrate new impossibility results for average-case (static) obfuscation
Order-Revealing Encryption and the Hardness of Private Learning
An order-revealing encryption scheme gives a public procedure by which two
ciphertexts can be compared to reveal the ordering of their underlying
plaintexts. We show how to use order-revealing encryption to separate
computationally efficient PAC learning from efficient -differentially private PAC learning. That is, we construct a concept
class that is efficiently PAC learnable, but for which every efficient learner
fails to be differentially private. This answers a question of Kasiviswanathan
et al. (FOCS '08, SIAM J. Comput. '11).
To prove our result, we give a generic transformation from an order-revealing
encryption scheme into one with strongly correct comparison, which enables the
consistent comparison of ciphertexts that are not obtained as the valid
encryption of any message. We believe this construction may be of independent
interest.Comment: 28 page
Anonymous and Adaptively Secure Revocable IBE with Constant Size Public Parameters
In Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems, key revocation is non-trivial.
This is because a user's identity is itself a public key. Moreover, the private
key corresponding to the identity needs to be obtained from a trusted key
authority through an authenticated and secrecy protected channel. So far, there
exist only a very small number of revocable IBE (RIBE) schemes that support
non-interactive key revocation, in the sense that the user is not required to
interact with the key authority or some kind of trusted hardware to renew her
private key without changing her public key (or identity). These schemes are
either proven to be only selectively secure or have public parameters which
grow linearly in a given security parameter. In this paper, we present two
constructions of non-interactive RIBE that satisfy all the following three
attractive properties: (i) proven to be adaptively secure under the Symmetric
External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) and the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions;
(ii) have constant-size public parameters; and (iii) preserve the anonymity of
ciphertexts---a property that has not yet been achieved in all the current
schemes
SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search
Protected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of
reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation
limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system
breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown
rapidly; systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies.
However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques.
Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality,
performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing
database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL,
NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the
protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality
consistent with newly invented databases.
At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the
tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide
the following contributions:
1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database
paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used
and combined to support a large number of database paradigms.
2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in
implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main
approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts
protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in
functionality.
3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base
queries.
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a
protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform
and initial user opinions of protected search.Comment: 20 pages, to appear to IEEE Security and Privac
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