Guarantees on learning depth-2 neural networks under a data-poisoning attack

In recent times many state-of-the-art machine learning models have been shown to be fragile to adversarial attacks. In this work we attempt to build our theoretical understanding of adversarially robust learning with neural nets. We demonstrate a specific class of neural networks of finite size and a non-gradient stochastic algorithm which tries to recover the weights of the net generating the realizable true labels in the presence of an oracle doing a bounded amount of malicious additive distortion to the labels. We prove (nearly optimal) trade-offs among the magnitude of the adversarial attack, the accuracy and the confidence achieved by the proposed algorithm.Comment: 11 page

Exacerbating Algorithmic Bias through Fairness Attacks

Algorithmic fairness has attracted significant attention in recent years, with many quantitative measures suggested for characterizing the fairness of different machine learning algorithms. Despite this interest, the robustness of those fairness measures with respect to an intentional adversarial attack has not been properly addressed. Indeed, most adversarial machine learning has focused on the impact of malicious attacks on the accuracy of the system, without any regard to the system's fairness. We propose new types of data poisoning attacks where an adversary intentionally targets the fairness of a system. Specifically, we propose two families of attacks that target fairness measures. In the anchoring attack, we skew the decision boundary by placing poisoned points near specific target points to bias the outcome. In the influence attack on fairness, we aim to maximize the covariance between the sensitive attributes and the decision outcome and affect the fairness of the model. We conduct extensive experiments that indicate the effectiveness of our proposed attacks