23,975 research outputs found
A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without Money for Facility Games
In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to
serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In
a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as
possible, and the cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her
location and the closest facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent
wants to be far away from all facilities, and her utility is the distance from
her location to the facility set. The objective of each agent is to minimize
her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may lie if, by doing so, more
benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice mechanisms that do
not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism that is
strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her
address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition
of agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the
mechanism to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective
function. Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money
for facility games have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these
models and related results for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms,
and meanwhile we present a general framework for approximation mechanism design
without money for facility games
Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their
locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each
agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing
function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work,
that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in
mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost
function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the
maximum cost of the agents.
We present a randomized mechanism, called Equal Cost, which is group
strategyproof and achieves a bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for
any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio is at most 2 for Max
Cost and at most n for Social Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k > 2
facilities and any number of agents. Our result implies an interesting
separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio for Max
Cost jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized
mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the
negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of
Equal Cost for strictly convex cost functions. We also present a randomized
mechanism, called Pick the Loser, which applies to instances with k facilities
and n = k+1 agents, and for any given concave cost function, is strongly group
strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for Social Cost
Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in- divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments.stability, fairness, membership, coalition formation
Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.Stability, Fairness, Membership, Coalition Formation
Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.Stability, Fairness, Membership, Coalition Formation
Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and
each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has
a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has
to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the
budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order
of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The
complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality
of equilibria are analyzed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget
game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential
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