30 research outputs found
A csalásbiztosságot sértő szabályok a sportban
Egy sportverseny csalásbiztos, ha nem fordulhat elĹ‘ olyan állapot, ahol egy játĂ©kos jobban jár számára rosszabb (kisebb erĹ‘feszĂtĂ©ssel elĂ©rhetĹ‘) eredmĂ©ny bekövetkezĂ©se esetĂ©n. Az elĹ‘adásban olyan, a gyakorlatbĂłl vett szabályok mellett alkalmazhatĂł manipuláciĂłs stratĂ©giákat tárgyalunk, melyek rĂ©vĂ©n egy versenyzĹ‘ biztosan – tehát nem csak várhatĂł Ă©rtĂ©kben – elĹ‘nyösebb helyzetbe kerĂĽl. Megmutatjuk, hogy az egymást követĹ‘ csoportköröket tartalmazĂł bajnokságok nem teljesĂtik a csalásbiztosság követelmĂ©nyĂ©t, amennyiben a kĂ©sĹ‘bbi csoportkörökben korábban játszott mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sek eredmĂ©nyei is számĂtanak. BizonyĂtjuk az UEFA Bajnokok Ligája elmĂşlt három szezonban használt kvalifikáciĂłs szabályainak manipulálhatĂłságát. IsmertetĂĽnk egy olyan labdarĂşgĂł-mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©st, ahol mindkĂ©t csapat a döntetlenben volt Ă©rdekelt, kĂĽlönben mindketten kiestek volna. Mindegyik esetben javaslatot teszĂĽnk egy olyan, az eredetihez minĂ©l közelebb állĂł mechanizmusra, mely kizárja a manipuláciĂł lehetĹ‘sĂ©gĂ©t
Néhány gondolat a labdarúgás rangsorolási szabályairól a 2018. évi labdarúgó-világbajnokság európai selejtezője kapcsán
A cikk a labdarĂşgásban alkalmazott rangsorolási szabályok problĂ©máit tárgyalja. Bemutatjuk a 2018. Ă©vi labdarĂşgĂł-világbajnokság eurĂłpai selejtezĹ‘jĂ©nek manipulálhatĂłságát: mĂ©g 2017 oktĂłberĂ©ben, a mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sek nĂ©gyötödĂ©nek lejátszását követĹ‘en is megtörtĂ©nhetett volna, hogy – az összes többi eredmĂ©ny változatlansága mellett – egy csapat az utolsĂł mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©sĂ©n elĂ©rt gyĹ‘zelemmel kiesik, döntetlennel viszont kijuthat a világbajnokságra. AzonosĂtunk további nyolc olyan világbajnoki Ă©s EurĂłpa-bajnoki selejtezĹ‘t, amelyek nem teljesĂtettĂ©k a csalásbiztosság feltĂ©telĂ©t, Ă©s javaslatot teszĂĽnk egy ezen követelmĂ©nyt minden körĂĽlmĂ©nyek között teljesĂtĹ‘ mechanizmus alkalmazására, amely nem áll távol a selejtezĹ‘k törtĂ©nelmileg kialakult elveitĹ‘l. IsmertetĂĽnk egy további kijátszhatĂł szabályt, Ă©s felidĂ©zĂĽnk nĂ©hány vitát generálĂł mĂ©rkĹ‘zĂ©st a labdarĂşgás törtĂ©netĂ©bĹ‘l. Munkánkkal szeretnĂ©nk felhĂvni a sportvezetĂ©s figyelmĂ©t, hogy a jövĹ‘beli botrányok elkerĂĽlĂ©se Ă©rdekĂ©ben elengedhetetlen a rangsorolás axiomatikus vizsgálata.*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kĂłd: C44, D71, L83
Mitigating the risk of tanking in multi-stage tournaments
Multi-stage tournaments consisting of a round-robin group stage followed by a
knockout phase are ubiquitous in sports. However, this format is incentive
incompatible if at least two teams from a group advance to the knockout stage
where the brackets are predetermined. A model is developed to quantify the risk
of tanking in these contests. Our approach is applied to the 2022 FIFA World
Cup in order to uncover how its design could have been improved by changing the
group labelling policy (a reform that has received no attention before) and the
schedule of group matches. The proposed interventions can halve the level of
unfairness without changing any fundamental aspect of the tournament.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures, 4 table
UEFA Champions League entry has not satisfied strategyproofness in three seasons
The paper investigates the qualification for the UEFA Champions League, the
most prestigious club competition in European football with respect to the
theoretical property of strategy-proofness. We find that in three seasons
(2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18), the UEFA Europa League titleholder might have been
better off by losing its match against the Champions League titleholder in
their domestic championship. A straightforward solution is suggested in order
to avoid the occurrence of this paradox. The use of an incentive compatible
rule would have a real effect on the qualification in these three seasons of
the UEFA Champions League.Comment: 6 pages, 1 tabl
Format and schedule proposals for a FIFA World Cup with 12 four-team groups
After the expansion of the FIFA World Cup from 32 to 48 teams starting from the 2026 edition, the initial proposal was to split the 48 national teams into 16 groups of three. Among other drawbacks, this proposal provides potential for collusion. Recently, after widespread criticism, FIFA officials signaled the possibility to re-discuss that proposal, pointing to a tournament with 12 groups of four teams. If this new proposal prevails, relevant questions arise about tournament design and schedule. In this paper, we propose tournament formats for a World Cup with 12 groups of four teams, considering a number of criteria, such as non-collusion, symmetry in rest days, no dead rubbers, and a tournament length of about one month. At the same time, our proposals attempt to adhere to the traditional format, with some nuances either in the group stage or in the knockout stage
A note on the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs
The 2018-19 UEFA Nations League is the inaugural season of this competition, which provides the basis of the seeding for the 55 men's national football teams participating in the qualification process of the UEFA European Championship 2020. In addition, unlike previous editions, the teams for the play-offs are also selected with the consideration of their performance in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League. Thus 16 teams, which failed to qualify through their group, are divided into four paths of four teams each according to a complicated rule because the places vacated by the 20 directly qualified teams should be filled.
We provide a critical examination of the relevant UEFA regulations and show that the articles may contradict to each other and may lead to an unfair formulation of play-off paths. Straightforward solutions for both problems are suggested
A note on the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs
The 2018-19 UEFA Nations League is the inaugural season of this competition, which provides the basis of the seeding for the 55 men's national football teams participating in the qualification process of the UEFA European Championship 2020. In addition, unlike previous editions, the teams for the play-offs are also selected with the consideration of their performance in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League. Thus 16 teams, which failed to qualify through their group, are divided into four paths of four teams each according to a complicated rule because the places vacated by the 20 directly qualified teams should be filled.
We provide a critical examination of the relevant UEFA regulations and show that the articles may contradict to each other and may lead to an unfair formulation of play-off paths. Straightforward solutions for both problems are suggested
The UEFA Champions League seeding is not strategy-proof since the 2015/16 season
Fairness has several interpretations in sports, one of them being that the
rules should guarantee incentive compatibility, namely, a team cannot be worse
off due to better results in any feasible scenario. The current seeding regime
of the most prestigious annual European club football tournament, the UEFA
(Union of European Football Associations) Champions League, is shown to violate
this requirement since the 2015/16 season. In particular, if the titleholder
qualifies for the first pot by being a champion in a high-ranked league, its
slot is given to a team from a lower-ranked association, which can harm a top
club from the domestic championship of the titleholder. However, filling all
vacancies through the national leagues excludes the presence of perverse
incentives. UEFA is encouraged to introduce this policy from the 2021-24 cycle
onwards.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figure, 1 tabl