The World Gas Market in 2030: Development Scenarios Using the World Gas Model

In this paper, we discuss potential developments of the world natural gas industry at the horizon of 2030. We use the World Gas Model (WGM), a dynamic, strategic representation of world natural gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. We specify a "base case" which defines the business-as-usual assumptions based on forecasts of the world energy markets. We then analyze the sensitivity of the world natural gas system with scenarios: i) the emergence of large volumes of unconventional North American natural gas reserves, such as shale gas; ii) on the contrary, tightly constrained reserves of conventional natural gas reserves in the world; and iii) the impact of CO2-constraints and the emergence of a competing environmental friendly "backstop technology". Regional scenarios that have a global impact are: iv) the full halt of Russian and Caspian natural gas exports to Western Europe; v) sharply constrained production and export activities in the Arab Gulf; vi) heavily increasing demand for natural gas in China and India; and finally vii) constraints on liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure development on the US Pacific Coast. Our results show considerable changes in production, consumption, traded volumes, and prices between the scenarios. Investments in pipelines, LNG terminals and storage are also affected. However, overall the world natural gas industry is resilient to local disturbances and can compensate local supply disruptions with natural gas from other sources. Long-term supply security does not seem to be at risk.Natural gas, investments, reserves, climate policy

European Energy Security: What Should It Mean? What to Do? ESF Working Paper, No. 23, 30 October 2006

[From the Introduction]. • Is energy a strategic good? If it is, to what extent does it make sense to deny the extraction of political leverage from energy policy? In criticising Russian energy policy, are we not protesting too much against the fact that Russia (as others) is using energy for political ends – instead of criticising, as we should, the content of Russia’s policy? And if energy is strategic, should a European Union energy policy be primarily about the liberalisation of the energy market? • Is claiming reciprocity always smart? After all, do we really want Russian firms to control both the downstream as well as the upstream elements of the EU’s energy supply chain, in exchange for access by EU firms to Russian energy production and transport? • Should it really be EU policy to help Turkey to make full use of its potential as a major energy hub? After all, half of Russia’s oil exports already pass through the Bosporus, creating a major risk if that very vulnerable route were to be cut

Inter-Organizational Trust as a Shift Parameter in the Extended Transaction Cost Framework: A first Application to the LNG Industry.

This paper provides an empirical analysis examining the effect of both transaction characteristics and the institutional environment on governance choice. Using a dataset of 237 corporate-specific value chains in the global LNG industry, we introduce inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter. Following transaction cost economics, it is hypothesized that specific investments under uncertainty provide incentives to integrate vertically. Second, it is argued that inter-organizational trust changes the relative costs of vertical integration and non-integration and supports less hierarchical organizational structures. These economic relationships are tested based on probit and ordered probit models. Estimation results provide broad support for both propositions.Inter-organizational trust, liquefied natural gas, shift parameter, transaction cost economics, vertical integration

Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited –An Empirical Analysis of Producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry

In this paper, we analyze structural changes in long-term contracts in the international trade of natural gas. Using a unique data set of 262 long-term contracts between natural gas producers and importers, we estimate the impact of different institutional, structural and technical variables on the duration of contracts. We find that contract duration decreases as the market structure of the industry develops to more competitive regimes. Our main finding is that contracts that are linked to an asset specific investment are on average four years longer than those who are not

Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply

Energy market liberalization and international economic interdependence have affected governments’ ability to react to security of supply challenges. On the other side, whereas in the past security of supply was largely seen as a national responsibility, the frame of reference has increasingly become the EU in which liberation increases security of supply mainly by increasing the number of markets participants and improving the flexibility of energy systems. In this logic, security of supply becomes a risk management strategy with a strong inclination towards cost effectiveness, involving both the supply and the demand side. Security of supply has two major components that interrelate: cost and risk. This paper focus the attention on costs in the attempt to develop a market compatible approach geared towards security of supply.Energy supply, Market-based options

Long-term vs. Short-term Contracts; A European perspective on natural gas

This paper analyses the economics of long-term gas contracts under changing institutional conditions, mainly gas sector liberalisation. The paper is motivated by the increasingly tense debate in continental Europe, UK and the US on the security of long-term gas supply. We discuss the main issues regarding long-term contracts, i.e. the changing role of the flexibility clause, the effect of abandoning the destination clause, and the strategic behaviour of producers between long-term sales and spot-sales. The literature suggests consumers and producers benefit from risk hedging through long-term contracts. Furthermore long-term contracts may reduce exercise of market power. This was argued to benefit consumers at the ‘expense’ of producers’ profits. Our analysis shows if the long-run demand elasticity is significantly lower than the short-run elasticity, both strategic producers and consumers benefit from lower prices and larger market volume. Some policy implications of the findings are also discussed

The World Gas Model: A Multi-Period Mixed Complementarity Model for the Global Natural Gas Market

We provide the description and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global natural gas market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG liquefiers and regasifiers as well as marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide natural gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border natural gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG market. The Base Case results of our numerical simulations show that the rush for LNG observed in the past years will not be sustained throughout 2030 and that Europe will continue to rely on pipeline gas for a large share of its imports and consumption.

Vertical Structures in the Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Vertical Structures in the Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Empirical Analyses Based on Recent Developments in Transaction Cost Economics

During the last decade, the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market altered substantially. Significant investments have been realized, traded volumes increased and contracting structures gained in flexibility. Various governance forms co-exist, including the poles of spot market transactions and vertical integration as well as numerous hybrid forms such as long-term contracts, joint ventures, and strategic partnerships. This dissertation empirically investigates, based on transaction cost economics and recent extensions thereof, which motivations drive companies towards the choice of hierarchical governance forms. First, the likelihood of vertical integration and the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter accounting for differences in the institutional environment are analyzed. Estimation results confirm transaction cost economics by showing that relationship-specific investments in an uncertain environment drive LNG companies to invest in successive stages along the value chain. Furthermore, the presence of inter-organizational trust increases the likelihood of less hierarchical governance modes. Second, alternative theories of the firm are linked in order to explain the menu of strategic positions recently observed in this dynamic market. Estimation results support the positioning-economizing perspective of the firm. The three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure are interdependent. Third, the determinants of optimal contract length as a trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain environments is discussed. Estimation results show that the presence of high asset specificity results in longer contracts whereas the need for flexibility in today’s LNG market supports shorter agreements. When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract duration decreases. In addition, countries heavily reliant on natural gas imports via LNG are often willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts dedicated to competitive downstream markets on average are shorter than those concluded with customers in non-liberalized importing countries

Introducción de la tecnología avanzada basada en la estrategia de desarrollo de la industria del petróleo y el gas de Uzbekistán

The article starts with perspective indicators of five years of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It also describes the development of the oil and gas industry in Uzbekistan, which is inextricably linked with the implementation of tasks to ensure the effective functioning of the fuel and energy complex of the country, as one of the key areas of economic development. Further, there is mention of strategic direction of activity of the companies, which should become not the growth of export of such strategic raw materials as natural gas, but the development of own production on its processing and production of highly liquid oil and gas and chemical products with high added value, meeting the world standards on quality and environmental requirements.El artículo comienza con indicadores de perspectiva de cinco años de la República de Uzbekistán. También describe el desarrollo de la industria del petróleo y el gas en Uzbekistán, que está indisolublemente ligada a la implementación de tareas para garantizar el funcionamiento efectivo del complejo de combustible y energía del país, como una de las áreas clave del desarrollo económico. Además, se menciona la dirección estratégica de la actividad de las empresas, que no debería convertirse en el crecimiento de la exportación de materias primas estratégicas como el gas natural, sino en el desarrollo de la producción propia en su procesamiento y producción de petróleo y gas altamente líquido y químico productos con alto valor agregado, que cumplen con los estándares mundiales de calidad y requisitos ambientales

Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry

In this paper, we analyze structural changes in long-term contracts in the international trade of natural gas. Using a unique data set of 262 long-term contracts between natural gas producers and importers, we estimate the impact of different institutional, structural and technical variables on the duration of contracts. We find that contract duration decreases as the market structure of the industry develops to more competitive regimes. Our main finding is that contracts that are linked to an asset specific investment are on average four years longer than those who are not.asset specificity, econometric analysis, long-term contracts, natural gas