Strategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall

The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

Tableaux for the Logic of Strategically Knowing How

The logic of goal-directed knowing-how extends the standard epistemic logic with an operator of knowing-how. The knowing-how operator is interpreted as that there exists a strategy such that the agent knows that the strategy can make sure that p. This paper presents a tableau procedure for the multi-agent version of the logic of strategically knowing-how and shows the soundness and completeness of this tableau procedure. This paper also shows that the satisfiability problem of the logic can be decided in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Second-Order Know-How Strategies

The fact that a coalition has a strategy does not mean that the coalition knows what the strategy is. If the coalition knows the strategy, then such a strategy is called a know-how strategy of the coalition. The paper proposes the notion of a second-order know-how strategy for the case when one coalition knows what the strategy of another coalition is. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing the interplay between the distributed knowledge modality and the second-order coalition know-how modality

Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

The paper investigates the second-order blameworthiness or duty to warn modality "one coalition knew how another coalition could have prevented an outcome". The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the distributed knowledge and the duty to warn modalities.Comment: Proc. of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020) May 9--13, 2020, Auckland, New Zealand, B. An, N. Yorke-Smith, A. El Fallah Seghrouchni, G.~Sukthankar (eds.). arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1811.0244