Tax Reform and the Dutch Labor Market: An Applied General Equilibrium Approach

This paper employs MIMIC, an applied general equilibrium model of the Dutch economy, to explore various tax cuts aimed at combating unemployment and raising labor supply. MIMIC combines modern labor-market theories, a firm empirical foundation detailed description of Dutch labor-market institutions. We develop a small aggregate model which contains the core of MIMIC, namely wage setting, job matching, labor supply demand. In addition to illustrating the main economic mechanisms in MIMIC shows the advantages of employing a larger, more disaggregated model that accounts for heterogeneity, institutional details, and more economic mechanisms. Targeting in-work benefits at the low skilled is the most effective way to cut economy-wide unemployment quality and quantity of labor supply. Cuts in social security contributions paid by employers and subsidies for hiring long-term unemployed reduce unskilled unemployment most substantially. Tax cuts in the higher tax brackets boost the quantity and quality of formal labor supply but are less effective in reducing unemployment and in raising unskilled employment and female labor supply.

Rural workers would benefit from unemployment insurance modernization

Rural workers stand to benefit from the modernization of unemployment insurance (UI) to cover part-time workers, which is an opportunity for states under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Plan (ARRA). Rural workers are more likely to work part-time, and many states that do not provide UI benefits to part-time workers have higher than average proportions of rural residents

EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

In consideration of the Lisbon Agenda, the Romanian Government drew up the National Programme for Reform for 2007-2010, which established national priorities, and ways and tools to achieve economic reform and growth. Transition in Romania implied a complex and extensive system of regulations and institutions for stimulating employment and creating a flexible system of social protection. The new regulations were focused on harmonisation with the Community labour law. Increasing investment in human capital is essential for a competitive and dynamic economy. Besides, labour market policies were formulated for correcting labour market imbalances.Demographic Economics; Labour Standards; Labour-Management Relations; Welfare and Poverty; Quality of Life

Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates

To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not.welfare to work, financial incentives, timing-of-events, dynamic selection

Optimal Size and Intensity of Job Search Assistance Programs

This paper derives the welfare optimal size and intensity of job search assistance programs in a general equilibrium model where the labor market is affected by search frictions. Both instruments have a priori ambiguous fiscal implications: their direct employment stimulating effects broaden the base of the labor income tax and increase revenues, while also incurring direct costs. At optimal levels, the policy instruments trade off the positive effects on the participants against a marginal increase in taxes, which distorts employment decisions and potentially labor market tightness. We find that the higher unemployment insurance benefits, the lower is the optimal program intensity. Further, the introduction of a job search assistance program is more likely to raise welfare if it is highly effective at improving participants' job search skills, direct program costs are low and if the general level of taxation in the economy and thus the labor market participation tax are high.Job search assistance, optimal size, optimal intensity, unemployment insurance

How can Europe solve its unemployment problem?

In continental Europe, the unemployment rate has risen continuously from a low level of below 3 percent in the early 1970s to more than 10 percent in the late 1990s. If those who are in governmental employment schemes and in early retirement are included, the unemployment rate runs as high as 20 percent in quite a few European countries, including France and Spain. The basic rule for a stable employment situation in an economy is: nominal wages should stay in line with labor productivity growth plus the increase in producer prices. In a situation of high unemployment, however, when the unemployed are to be integrated into the labor market, the productivity rule has to be modified: the increase in real wages should stay below the productivity growth rate until a satisfactory level of employment has been obtained. The most elegant approach to creating more employment is to improve labor productivity. If an economy succeeds in raising labor productivity, there is more scope for real wage increases or for more employment. We should, however, not overestimate the potential of an economy to increase labor productivity. If we want to integrate the unemployed, average labor productivity in the economy is likely to decrease. We should be realistic enough as to expect trends in Europe to be similar to those in the United States, where labor productivity per hour has increased by less than 1 percent per year since 1980. The task for Europe is to change the institutional setup of labor relations, to move wage formation closer to the market process, and to allow greater wage differentiation. It is unlikely that the "social partners", i.e., the trade unions and employers' associations, will be able to change the rule system sufficiently. Therefore, it is necessary to change the legal rules, especially those in favor of the unemployed, for instance, by introducing a legal right for each individual to enter the labor market at a wage of his or her choice. If continental Europe wants to reduce unemployment, it will have to change the impact of the welfare state. With respect to the level of benefits provided by unemployment and health insurance, a distinction should be made between large risks and small risks for the individual. Such a distinction between large and small risks would allow the costs of the social security system to be reduced, thus lowering the tax on labor. Insurance against large risks would be mandatory, small risk coverage would be optional. With respect to financing the welfare state, more choice should be given to the individual as concerns the insurance coverage that he/she desires. One serious issue concerning social welfare payments is determining the extent to which the level of social welfare benefits should be scaled down for those who are able to work in order to increase the incentive to work and the intensity of the search for work. A related issue is whether unemployment benefits should be reduced in their level or in the length of time they are paid in order to intensify the job search and reduce the reservation wage. • Shifting the employment issue to the EL) level would take attention away from the need to decentralize wage formation, i.e., to negotiate wages at the level of firms. It would be an incentive not to undertake the necessary steps to solve national unemployment problems and it would shift the financial burden to those countries that are successful in reducing unemployment. It would elevate the national labor market cartels to the EU level and it would blur the lines of responsibility. National governments would shift their responsibility to the EU level. This would be an extremely dangerous development for European integration because the European cause would become the scapegoat of failed national policies. --

Tackling unemployment in China: state capacity and governance issues

This paper considers China's state capacity and changing governance as revealed through its policies to tackle unemployment. Despite high levels of growth, economic restructuring has resulted in rising unemployment over the last decade. The Chinese state has been able to manage job losses from state enterprises, demonstrating some state capacity in relation to this sector and some persistent command economy governance mechanisms. However both design and implementation of policies to compensate and assist particular groups among the unemployed have been shaped by weak state capacity in several other areas. First, capacity to gather accurate employment data is limited, meaning local and central governments do not have a good understanding of the extent and nature of unemployment. Second, the sustainability of supposedly mandatory unemployment insurance schemes is threatened by poor capacity to enforce participation. Third, poor central state capacity to ensure local governments implement policies effectively leads to poor unemployment insurance fund capacity, resulting in provision for only a narrow segment of the unemployed and low quality employment services. Although the adoption of unemployment insurance (and its extension to employers and employees in the private sector), the introduction of a Labour Contract Law in 2007, and the delivery of employment services by private businesses indicate a shift towards the use of new governance mechanisms based on entitlement, contract and private sector delivery of public-sector goods, that shift is undermined by poor state capacity in relation to some of these new mechanisms

Youths on labour market.Features. Particularities. Pro-mobility factors for graduates. Elements of a balanced policy for labour migration

The youths’ labour market, and especially insertion employment has a series of particularities defined by aspects such as: flexibility, efficient employment, interest for career but also informal employment, external mobility, including brain drain, segmentation, employment precariousness, income disadvantages, etc. Therefore, also the labour market policy and particularly managing labour mobility especially through the economic and social effects that might be triggered on the local labour market in the origin country, presents a special importance under the conditions of the economic turnaround stage, by promoting new and sustainable jobs, based on knowledge and competences. In the present paper an analysis is made about the youths’ labour market features, and the outcomes of an empirical analysis about graduates’ migration propensity are presented. Suggestions are made for developing a balanced policy for youths’ labour mobility to the benefit of the country of origin.youth employment, labour force mobility, labour migration/mobility management