1,037 research outputs found
Using Hover to Compromise the Confidentiality of User Input on Android
We show that the new hover (floating touch) technology, available in a number
of today's smartphone models, can be abused by any Android application running
with a common SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to record all touchscreen input
into other applications. Leveraging this attack, a malicious application
running on the system is therefore able to profile user's behavior, capture
sensitive input such as passwords and PINs as well as record all user's social
interactions. To evaluate our attack we implemented Hoover, a proof-of-concept
malicious application that runs in the system background and records all input
to foreground applications. We evaluated Hoover with 40 users, across two
different Android devices and two input methods, stylus and finger. In the case
of touchscreen input by finger, Hoover estimated the positions of users' clicks
within an error of 100 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 79%.
Hoover captured users' input by stylus even more accurately, estimating users'
clicks within 2 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 98%. We discuss
ways of mitigating this attack and show that this cannot be done by simply
restricting access to permissions or imposing additional cognitive load on the
users since this would significantly constrain the intended use of the hover
technology.Comment: 11 page
Inferences from Interactions with Smart Devices: Security Leaks and Defenses
We unlock our smart devices such as smartphone several times every day using a pin, password, or graphical pattern if the device is secured by one. The scope and usage of smart devices\u27 are expanding day by day in our everyday life and hence the need to make them more secure. In the near future, we may need to authenticate ourselves on emerging smart devices such as electronic doors, exercise equipment, power tools, medical devices, and smart TV remote control. While recent research focuses on developing new behavior-based methods to authenticate these smart devices, pin and password still remain primary methods to authenticate a user on a device.
Although the recent research exposes the observation-based vulnerabilities, the popular belief is that the direct observation attacks can be thwarted by simple methods that obscure the attacker\u27s view of the input console (or screen). In this dissertation, we study the users\u27 hand movement pattern while they type on their smart devices. The study concentrates on the following two factors; (1) finding security leaks from the observed hand movement patterns (we showcase that the user\u27s hand movement on its own reveals the user\u27s sensitive information) and (2) developing methods to build lightweight, easy to use, and more secure authentication system. The users\u27 hand movement patterns were captured through video camcorder and inbuilt motion sensors such as gyroscope and accelerometer in the user\u27s device
Seamless Authentication for Ubiquitous Devices
User authentication is an integral part of our lives; we authenticate ourselves to personal computers and a variety of other things several times a day. Authentication is burdensome. When we wish to access to a computer or a resource, it is an additional task that we need to perform~-- an interruption in our workflow. In this dissertation, we study people\u27s authentication behavior and attempt to make authentication to desktops and smartphones less burdensome for users. First, we present the findings of a user study we conducted to understand people\u27s authentication behavior: things they authenticate to, how and when they authenticate, authentication errors they encounter and why, and their opinions about authentication. In our study, participants performed about 39 authentications per day on average; the majority of these authentications were to personal computers (desktop, laptop, smartphone, tablet) and with passwords, but the number of authentications to other things (e.g., car, door) was not insignificant. We saw a high failure rate for desktop and laptop authentication among our participants, affirming the need for a more usable authentication method. Overall, we found that authentication was a noticeable part of all our participants\u27 lives and burdensome for many participants, but they accepted it as cost of security, devising their own ways to cope with it. Second, we propose a new approach to authentication, called bilateral authentication, that leverages wrist-wearable technology to enable seamless authentication for things that people use with their hands, while wearing a smart wristband. In bilateral authentication two entities (e.g., user\u27s wristband and the user\u27s phone) share their knowledge (e.g., about user\u27s interaction with the phone) to verify the user\u27s identity. Using this approach, we developed a seamless authentication method for desktops and smartphones. Our authentication method offers quick and effortless authentication, continuous user verification while the desktop (or smartphone) is in use, and automatic deauthentication after use. We evaluated our authentication method through four in-lab user studies, evaluating the method\u27s usability and security from the system and the user\u27s perspective. Based on the evaluation, our authentication method shows promise for reducing users\u27 authentication burden for desktops and smartphones
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences
In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks,
highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are
performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control
(C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by
attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked
parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side
of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection
and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in
current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages.
Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor
Continuous Smartphone Authentication using Wristbands
Many users find current smartphone authentication methods (PINs, swipe patterns) to be burdensome, leading them to weaken or disable the authentication. Although some phones support methods to ease the burden (such as fingerprint readers), these methods require active participation by the user and do not verify the user’s identity after the phone is unlocked. We propose CSAW, a continuous smartphone authentication method that leverages wristbands to verify that the phone is in the hands of its owner. In CSAW, users wear a wristband (a smartwatch or a fitness band) with built-in motion sensors, and by comparing the wristband’s motion with the phone’s motion, CSAW continuously produces a score indicating its confidence that the person holding (and using) the phone is the person wearing the wristband. This score provides the foundation for a wide range of authentication decisions (e.g., unlocking phone, deauthentication, or limiting phone access). Through two user studies (N=27,11) we evaluated CSAW’s accuracy, usability, and security. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that CSAW was able to conduct initial authentication with over 99% accuracy and continuous authentication with over 96.5% accuracy
A Management Perspective On The People, Procedures And Prevention Of Computer Crime
The area of computer crime is a new and complex one. Corporations are increasingly feeling the ramifications of computer crime. It is estimated that computer crime has an impact of over four billion dollars yearly.
The types of computer crime include vandalism, theft of industrial secrets, and theft of financial assets. The range of computer crime includes profit organizations, service centers, and research facilities. A new danger for research and medical centers is the possibility of destroying vital research data.
The type of people involved in computer crime are varied. Most of the people are not super intelligent; rather they are people who have had an opportunity to use the computer and understand ways of circumventing computer safeguards. The most common abuser is the company employee who uses his or her position and has the skill, knowledge, and access. Their are numerous methods of entering the system; including data diddling and the trojan horse technique.
Because of the rise in computer crime, including data there has been a need to upgrade security systems. Until recently, the gap between computer technology and security technology has been increasing. New innovations have started to add more security to the system. New computer systems must have the capability to be upgraded as the techniques of computer crime improve.
There has also been a push to get legislation passed aimed at slowing down computer crime. Because the area of computer crime is new, it is taking time to implement the laws. The courts are also having to approach the area slowly. There are few cases pertaining to computer crime, so many of the cases now in court are setting precedents.
The purpose of this study is to enlighten managers and users of computers on the need for a secure system. There are a number of useful policies and procedures which can be implemented to keep computers and their assets safe increasing. New innovations have started to add more security to the system. New computer systems must have the capability to be upgraded as the techniques of computer crime improve.
There has also been a push to get legislation passed aimed at slowing down computer crime. Because the area of computer crime is new, it is taking time to implement the laws. The courts are also having to approach the area slowly. There are few cases pertaining to computer crime, so many of the cases now in court are setting precedents.
The purpose of this study is to enlighten managers and users of computers on the need for a secure system. There are a number of useful policies and procedures which can be implemented to keep computers and their assets safe
Learning More About the Underground Economy : A Case-Study of Keyloggers and Dropzones
We study an active underground economy that trades stolen digital credentials.We present a method with which it is possible to directly analyze the amount of data harvested through these types of attacks in a highly automated fashion. We exemplify this method by applying it to keylogger-based stealing of credentials via dropzones, anonymous collection points of illicitly collected data. Based on the collected data from more than 70 dropzones, we present the first empirical study of this phenomenon, giving many first-hand details about the attacks that were observed during a seven-month period between April and October 2008. This helps us better understand the nature and size of these quickly emerging underground marketplaces
SAW: Wristband-Based Authentication for Desktop Computers
Token-based proximity authentication methods that authenticate users based on physical proximity are effortless, but lack explicit user intentionality, which may result in accidental logins. For example, a user may get logged in when she is near a computer or just passing by, even if she does not intend to use that computer. Lack of user intentionality in proximity-based methods makes them less suitable for multi-user shared computer environments, despite their desired usability benefits over passwords. \par We present an authentication method for desktops called Seamless Authentication using Wristbands (SAW), which addresses the lack of intentionality limitation of proximity-based methods. SAW uses a low-effort user input step for explicitly conveying user intentionality, while keeping the overall usability of the method better than password-based methods. In SAW, a user wears a wristband that acts as the user\u27s identity token, and to authenticate to a desktop, the user provides a low-effort input by tapping a key on the keyboard multiple times or wiggling the mouse with the wristband hand. This input to the desktop conveys that someone wishes to log in to the desktop, and SAW verifies the user who wishes to log in by confirming the user\u27s proximity and correlating the received keyboard or mouse inputs with the user\u27s wrist movement, as measured by the wristband. In our feasibility user study (n=17), SAW proved quick to authenticate (within two seconds), with a low false-negative rate of 2.5% and worst-case false-positive rate of 1.8%. In our user perception study (n=16), a majority of the participants rated it as more usable than passwords
On the security of mobile sensors
PhD ThesisThe age of sensor technology is upon us. Sensor-rich mobile devices
are ubiquitous. Smart-phones, tablets, and wearables are increasingly
equipped with sensors such as GPS, accelerometer, Near Field Communication
(NFC), and ambient sensors. Data provided by such sensors, combined
with the fast-growing computational capabilities on mobile platforms,
offer richer and more personalised apps. However, these sensors
introduce new security challenges to the users, and make sensor management
more complicated.
In this PhD thesis, we contribute to the field of mobile sensor security by
investigating a wide spectrum of open problems in this field covering attacks
and defences, standardisation and industrial approaches, and human
dimensions. We study the problems in detail and propose solutions.
First, we propose “Tap-Tap and Pay” (TTP), a sensor-based protocol to
prevent the Mafia attack in NFC payment. The Mafia attack is a special
type of Man-In-The-Middle attack which charges the user for something
more expensive than what she intends to pay by relaying transactions
to a remote payment terminal. In TTP, a user initiates the payment by
physically tapping her mobile phone against the reader. We observe that
this tapping causes transient vibrations at both devices which are measurable
by the embedded accelerometers. Our observations indicate that
these sensor measurements are closely correlated within the same tapping,
and different if obtained from different tapping events. By comparing the
similarity between the two measurements, the bank can distinguish the
Mafia fraud apart from a legitimate NFC transaction. The experimental
results and the user feedback suggest the practical feasibility of TTP. As
compared with previous sensor-based solutions, ours is the only one that
works even when the attacker and the user are in nearby locations or share
similar ambient environments. Second, we demonstrate an in-app attack based on a real world problem
in contactless payment known as the card collision or card clash. A card
collision happens when more than one card (or NFC-enabled device) are
presented to the payment terminal’s field, and the terminal does not know
which card to choose. By performing experiments, we observe that the
implementation of contactless terminals in practice matches neither EMV
nor ISO standards (the two primary standards for smart card payment)
on card collision. Based on this inconsistency, we propose “NFC Payment
Spy”, a malicious app that tracks the user’s contactless payment transactions.
This app, running on a smart phone, simulates a card which
requests the payment information (amount, time, etc.) from the terminal.
When the phone and the card are both presented to a contactless
terminal (given that many people use mobile case wallets to travel light
and keep wallet essentials close to hand), our app can effectively win the
race condition over the card. This attack is the first privacy attack on
contactless payments based on the problem of card collision. By showing
the feasibility of this attack, we raise awareness of privacy and security
issues in contactless payment protocols and implementation, specifically
in the presence of new technologies for payment such as mobile platforms.
Third, we show that, apart from attacking mobile devices by having access
to the sensors through native apps, we can also perform sensor-based
attacks via mobile browsers. We examine multiple browsers on Android
and iOS platforms and study their policies in granting permissions to
JavaScript code with respect to access to motion and orientation sensor
data. Based on our observations, we identify multiple vulnerabilities,
and propose “TouchSignatures” and “PINLogger.js”, two novel attacks in
which malicious JavaScript code listens to such sensor data measurements.
We demonstrate that, despite the much lower sampling rate (comparing to
a native app), a remote attacker is able to learn sensitive user information
such as physical activities, phone call timing, touch actions (tap, scroll,
hold, zoom), and PINs based on these sensor data. This is the first report
of such a JavaScript-based attack. We disclosed the above vulnerability to
the community and major mobile browser vendors classified the problem
as high-risk and fixed it accordingly.
Finally, we investigate human dimensions in the problem of sensor management.
Although different types of attacks via sensors have been known for many years, the problem of data leakage caused by sensors has remained
unsolved. While working with W3C and browser vendors to fix
the identified problem, we came to appreciate the complexity of this problem
in practice and the challenge of balancing security, usability, and functionality.
We believe a major reason for this is that users are not fully
aware of these sensors and the associated risks to their privacy and security.
Therefore, we study user understanding of mobile sensors, specifically
their risk perceptions. This is the only research to date that studies risk
perceptions for a comprehensive list of mobile sensors (25 in total). We
interview multiple participants from a range of backgrounds by providing
them with multiple self-declared questionnaires. The results indicate that
people in general do not have a good understanding of the complexities
of these sensors; hence making security judgements about these sensors
is not easy for them. We discuss how this observation, along with other
factors, renders many academic and industry solutions ineffective. This
makes the security and privacy issues of mobile sensors and other sensorenabled
technologies an important topic to be investigated further
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