18 research outputs found
Subjective Equilibria under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium
under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in
which each player chooses its decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a
stochastic environment process driving the system is exogenous whereas in
actuality this process is a solution of closed-loop dynamics affected by each
individual player. Players observe past realizations of the environment
variables and their local information. At equilibrium, if players are given the
full distribution of the stochastic environment process as if it were an
exogenous process, they would have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
their strategies. This notion thus generalizes what is known as the
price-taking equilibrium in prior literature to a stochastic and dynamic setup.
We establish existence of SEBEU, study various properties and present explicit
solutions. We obtain the -Nash equilibrium property of SEBEU when
there are many players
Optimal Control for LQG Systems on Graphs---Part I: Structural Results
In this two-part paper, we identify a broad class of decentralized
output-feedback LQG systems for which the optimal control strategies have a
simple intuitive estimation structure and can be computed efficiently. Roughly,
we consider the class of systems for which the coupling of dynamics among
subsystems and the inter-controller communication is characterized by the same
directed graph. Furthermore, this graph is assumed to be a multitree, that is,
its transitive reduction can have at most one directed path connecting each
pair of nodes. In this first part, we derive sufficient statistics that may be
used to aggregate each controller's growing available information. Each
controller must estimate the states of the subsystems that it affects (its
descendants) as well as the subsystems that it observes (its ancestors). The
optimal control action for a controller is a linear function of the estimate it
computes as well as the estimates computed by all of its ancestors. Moreover,
these state estimates may be updated recursively, much like a Kalman filter
Dynamic Decision Problems with Cooperative and Strategic Agents and Asymmetric Information.
There exist many real world situations involving multiple decision makers with asymmetric information, such as communication systems, social networks, economic markets and many others. Through this dissertation, we attempt to enhance the conceptual understanding of such systems and provide analytical tools to characterize the optimum or equilibrium behavior.
Specifically, we study four discrete time, decentralized decision problems in stochastic dynamical systems with cooperative and strategic agents. The first problem we consider is a relay channel where nodes' queue lengths, modeled as conditionally independent Markov chains, are nodes' private information, whereas nodes' actions are publicly observed. This results in non-classical information pattern. Energy-delay tradeoff is studied for this channel through stochastic control techniques for cooperative agents. Extending this model for strategic users, in the second problem we study a general model with strategic players having conditionally independent, Markovian types and publicly observed actions. This results in a dynamic game with asymmetric information. We present a forward/backward sequential decomposition algorithm to find a class of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. Using this methodology, in the third problem, we study a general two player dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information, where players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. We show that under certain conditions, players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with Gaussian beliefs, form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Finally, we consider two sub problems in decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games. In the first part, we consider an ergodic version of a sequential buyers game where strategic users sequentially make a decision to buy or not buy a product. In this problem, we design incentives to align players' individual objectives with the team objective. In the second part, we present a framework to study learning dynamics and especially informational cascades for decentralized dynamic games. We first generalize our methodology to find PBE to the case when players do not perfectly observe their types; rather they make independent, noisy observations. Based on this, we characterize informational cascades for a specific learning model.PhDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133294/1/dvasal_1.pd
Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic
complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the
payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the
empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used
to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models,
recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are
generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated
when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding
examples).
We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to
study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long
run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the
existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple
consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity
properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium
among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is
nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these
equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics
are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide
sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in
response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of
incentives to players).Comment: 56 pages, 5 figure