3 research outputs found
Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.03.006In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. (1991). In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. 漏 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals
In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish
incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former,
for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of
information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the
signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a
"non-selective" use.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor-
mation Characteristics