Grounding and Auto-abstraction

Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural way (Rosen 2010, 117; Schwartzkopff 2011, 362]). However, some ground-theoretic abstraction principles entail that there are circles of partial ground (Donaldson 17, 793). I call this problem auto-abstraction. In this paper I sketch a solution. Sections 1 and 2 are introductory. In section 3 I start comparing different solutions to the problem. In section 4 I contend that the thesis that the right-hand side of an abstraction principle is (metaphysically) prior to its left-hand side motivates an independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to predicative restric- tions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction principles. In section 5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In section 6 I highlight sev- eral parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground. I finally compare my solution with the strategies listed in section 3

Grounding and Auto-abstraction

Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural way (Rosen 2010, 117; Schwartzkopff 2011, 362]). However, some ground-theoretic abstraction principles entail that there are circles of partial ground (Donaldson 17, 793). I call this problem auto-abstraction. In this paper I sketch a solution. Sections 1 and 2 are introductory. In section 3 I start comparing different solutions to the problem. In section 4 I contend that the thesis that the right-hand side of an abstraction principle is (metaphysically) prior to its left-hand side motivates an independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to predicative restric- tions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction principles. In section 5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In section 6 I highlight sev- eral parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground. I finally compare my solution with the strategies listed in section 3

An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle's method. The main argument is made in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method.</p

Debunking logical grounding: distinguishing metaphysics from semantics

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground, even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground.Accepted manuscrip

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground ) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground

Categories of insight and their correlates: An exploration of relationships among classic-type insight problems, rebus puzzles, remote associates and esoteric analogies.

A central question in creativity concerns how insightful ideas emerge. Anecdotal examples of insightful scientific and technical discoveries include Goodyear's discovery of the vulcanization of rubber, and Mendeleev's realization that there may be gaps as he tried to arrange the elements into the Periodic Table. Although most people would regard these discoveries as insightful, cognitive psychologists have had difficulty in agreeing on whether such ideas resulted from insights or from conventional problem solving processes. One area of wide agreement among psychologists is that insight involves a process of restructuring. If this view is correct, then understanding insight and its role in problem solving will depend on a better understanding of restructuring and the characteristics that describe it. This article proposes and tests a preliminary classification of insight problems based on several restructuring characteristics: the need to redefine spatial assumptions, the need to change defined forms, the degree of misdirection involved, the difficulty in visualizing a possible solution, the number of restructuring sequences in the problem, and the requirement for figure-ground type reversals. A second purpose of the study was to compare performance on classic spatial insight problems with two types of verbal tests that may be related to insight, the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and rebus puzzles. In doing so, we report on the results of a survey of 172 business students at the University of Waikato in New Zealand who completed classic-type insight, RAT and rebus problems

A simpler puzzle of ground

Metaphysical grounding is standardly taken to be irreflexive: nothing grounds itself. Kit Fine has presented some puzzles that appear to contradict this principle. I construct a particularly simple variant of those puzzles that is independent of several of the assumptions required by Fine, instead employing quantification into sentence position. Various possible responses to Fine's puzzles thus turn out to apply only in a restricted range of cases