29,589 research outputs found

    Polynomial Time Algorithms for Branching Markov Decision Processes and Probabilistic Min(Max) Polynomial Bellman Equations

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    We show that one can approximate the least fixed point solution for a multivariate system of monotone probabilistic max(min) polynomial equations, referred to as maxPPSs (and minPPSs, respectively), in time polynomial in both the encoding size of the system of equations and in log(1/epsilon), where epsilon > 0 is the desired additive error bound of the solution. (The model of computation is the standard Turing machine model.) We establish this result using a generalization of Newton's method which applies to maxPPSs and minPPSs, even though the underlying functions are only piecewise-differentiable. This generalizes our recent work which provided a P-time algorithm for purely probabilistic PPSs. These equations form the Bellman optimality equations for several important classes of infinite-state Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Thus, as a corollary, we obtain the first polynomial time algorithms for computing to within arbitrary desired precision the optimal value vector for several classes of infinite-state MDPs which arise as extensions of classic, and heavily studied, purely stochastic processes. These include both the problem of maximizing and mininizing the termination (extinction) probability of multi-type branching MDPs, stochastic context-free MDPs, and 1-exit Recursive MDPs. Furthermore, we also show that we can compute in P-time an epsilon-optimal policy for both maximizing and minimizing branching, context-free, and 1-exit-Recursive MDPs, for any given desired epsilon > 0. This is despite the fact that actually computing optimal strategies is Sqrt-Sum-hard and PosSLP-hard in this setting. We also derive, as an easy consequence of these results, an FNP upper bound on the complexity of computing the value (within arbitrary desired precision) of branching simple stochastic games (BSSGs)

    Approximating n-player behavioural strategy nash equilibria using coevolution

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    Coevolutionary algorithms are plagued with a set of problems related to intransitivity that make it questionable what the end product of a coevolutionary run can achieve. With the introduction of solution concepts into coevolution, part of the issue was alleviated, however efficiently representing and achieving game theoretic solution concepts is still not a trivial task. In this paper we propose a coevolutionary algorithm that approximates behavioural strategy Nash equilibria in n-player zero sum games, by exploiting the minimax solution concept. In order to support our case we provide a set of experiments in both games of known and unknown equilibria. In the case of known equilibria, we can confirm our algorithm converges to the known solution, while in the case of unknown equilibria we can see a steady progress towards Nash. Copyright 2011 ACM

    Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables

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    We consider generalized potential games, that constitute a fundamental subclass of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We propose different methods to compute solutions of generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, i.e., games in which some variables are continuous while the others are discrete. We investigate which types of equilibria of the game can be computed by minimizing a potential function over the common feasible set. In particular, for a wide class of generalized potential games, we characterize those equilibria that can be computed by minimizing potential functions as Pareto solutions of a particular multi-objective problem, and we show how different potential functions can be used to select equilibria. We propose a new Gauss–Southwell algorithm to compute approximate equilibria of any generalized potential game with mixed-integer variables. We show that this method converges in a finite number of steps and we also give an upper bound on this number of steps. Moreover, we make a thorough analysis on the behaviour of approximate equilibria with respect to exact ones. Finally, we make many numerical experiments to show the viability of the proposed approaches
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