The evolution of morality and the end of economic man

1871 saw the publication of two major treatises in economics, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and contained a powerful argument that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. Essentially this stance is supported by modern research. This paper considers the nature of morality and how it has evolved. It reconciles Darwin's notion that a developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other view that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically-inherited basis. The social role of morality and its difference with altruism is illustrated by an agent-based simulation. The fact that humans combine both moral and selfish dispositions has major implications for the social sciences and obliges us to abandon the pre-eminent notion of selfish economic man. Economic policy must take account of our moral nature.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

ALTRUISM, EGOISM AND GROUP COHESION IN A LOCAL INTERACTION MODEL

In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of ?group cohesion? in a model of local interaction with a population divided into groups. This allows us to control the level of ?isolation? of these groups: We thus analyze if the degree of group cohesion is relevant to achieve an efficient behaviour and which level would be the best one for this purpose. We are interested in situations where there is a trade off between efficiency and individual incentives. This trade off is stronger when the efficient strategy or norm is strictly dominated, as in the Prisoner?s Dilemma or in some cases of Altruism. In our model we have considered that agents could choose to be Altruist of Egoist, in fact, they behave as in Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) model.Group Cohesion, Cooperation, Local Interaction, Altruism, Group selection.

Interpersonal and Ideological Kindness: A Biocultural Approach

In accordance with Richard Dawkins’ materialist “selfish gene” theory of human behavior, altruism is a subject matter that is treated conservatively by biologists, whose understanding of the human version of altruism tends toward mutualistic and sometimes reputation-based explanations of charity, kindness, and helping. Trivers (1971) first stated that non-kin altruism could evolve if altruistic behavior is balanced between partners over time, implicating a strictly mutualistic domain for kindness. But kindness herein is defined, beyond mere mutualism or reciprocity, as “the quality of being friendly, generous, and considerate.” Further, kindness tends to have an action-oriented dimension, as in Goetz et al.’s (2010) definition of compassion, denoting helpfulness, the reduction of another’s suffering, or self-sacrifice. In this paper, I will employ a biocultural approach in exploring the psychological and neuroscientific data on the evolutionary aspect of social behavior as it pertains to kindness. First, I will draw on evolutionary theories of cooperation in suggesting that an individual and ideological ethos of kindness could have evolved as an adaptive orientation that, in a Durkheimian sense, preempted ostracism and cemented alliances as a beneficial balance to the fitness risks inherent in altruism. Then, consulting data on the neurochemical profiles of dopamine and oxytocin, I will describe the sort of human psychological variation that would reveal a complimentary continuum of evolved social proclivities, from selfish to giving. In proposing that non-reciprocal kindness indeed exists, however, I argue that its presence in human societies is statistically rare, as assumptions about human biology suggest. This study thus concludes with a cautious message about the human condition: while the rareness of kindness should have a profoundly fundamental explanatory value in social analysis, scientific confirmation of its fragility would recommend further scholarship designed to highlight its exceptional biological position vis-à-vis the selfish gene

Co-Operative Punishment Cements Social Cohesion

Most current attempts to explain the evolution - through individual selection - of pro-social behavior (i.e. behavior that favors the group) that allows for cohesive societies among non related individuals, focus on altruistic punishment as its evolutionary driving force. The main theoretical problem facing this line of research is that in the exercise of altruistic punishment the benefits of punishment are enjoyed collectively while its costs are borne individually. We propose that social cohesion might be achieved by a form of punishment, widely practiced among humans and animals forming bands and engaging in mob beatings, which we call co-operative punishment. This kind of punishment is contingent upon - not independent from - the concurrent participation of other actors. Its costs can be divided among group members in the same way as its benefits are, and it will be favoured by evolution as long as the benefits exceed the costs. We show with computer simulations that co-operative punishment is an evolutionary stable strategy that performs better in evolutionary terms than non-cooperative punishment, and demonstrate the evolvability and sustainability of pro-social behavior in an environment where not necessarily all individuals participate in co-operative punishment. Co-operative punishment together with pro-social behavior produces a self reinforcing system that allows the emergence of a 'Darwinian Leviathan' that strengthens social institutions.Altruism, Cooperation, Social, Prosocial, Cohesion, Evolution, Punishment, Retribution

Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer`s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group

Violence and Revenge in Egalitarian Societies

Discrete agent simulation was used to investigate the role of violence and revenge in model egalitarian societies. A population of 100 agents inhabited a landscape of 20x20 squares containing five sources of food. Agents moved about the landscape in search of food, shared, stole, mated, produced offspring, and ultimately died of old age. Violence and revenge reduced the survival probability of the population and, for surviving populations, replaced hunger as the second leading cause of death after old age. Excluding large segments of the population from violence and revenge significantly improved survival rates. Tolerance to transgressions reduced the number of agents killed in revenge attacks. Higher population density increased the number of revenge deaths but also increased the survival rate of the total population. Decreasing the food supply for a fixed initial population resulted in more deaths due to violence and revenge. Flight from known aggressors enhanced the survival of the total population, at the expense of social cohesion. When killing had a positive social value the survival rate of the total population increased as the number of revenge killings decreased. These results are discussed in the context of ethnographic observations of a number of egalitarian societies.Violence, Revenge, Egalitarian Culture, Homicide, Population Density, Tolerance, Food Supply

Leadership in Small Societies

Multi-agent simulation was used to study several styles of leadership in small societies. Populations of 50 and100 agents inhabited a bounded landscape containing a fixed number of food sources. Agents moved about the landscape in search of food, mated, produced offspring, and died either of hunger or at a predetermined maximum age. Leadership models focused on the collection and redistribution of food. The simulations suggest that individual households were more effective at meeting their needs than a simple collection-redistribution scheme. Leadership affected the normative makeup of the population: altruistic leaders caused altruistic societies and demanding leaders caused aggressive societies. Specific leadership styles did not provide a clear advantage when two groups competed for the same resources. The simulation results are compared to ethnographic observations of leadership in Pacific island societies.Leadership, Reciprocity, Pacific Island Societies, Norms

The philanthropy scale: a sociological perspective in measuring new forms of pro social behaviour

Philanthropy re-appears on the public stage. It has become part again of daily life in most industrialized countries. Growing wealth, uneven distributed, evokes the philanthropic response. The media attention for donors as Gates and Buffet may proof this. But also the plea for a “civil society” in Western European welfare states and the founding of the Volunteering and Charitable Giving Unit in the P.M. Cabinet in the UK (2005) show a shift from state responsibility into the direction of “market” and “philanthropy”. The European Commission launched December 2007 the “European Forum on Philanthropy and Research Funding”. Giving Campaigns have been started in France and the UK , the release of Clinton’s book Giving (2007), the fast growth of community foundations and family foundations (Gouwenberg et al 2007), these facts and actions all show a strong and renewed appearance of philanthropy in industrialized economies. Scholars follow and rediscover philanthropy as an interesting domain of research (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). They stem from different academic disciplines and cover a wide range and different aspects of the phenomenon. Psychologists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, all strive to discover the underlying incentives, facilitators and motivators of philanthropic behavior. These developments at the academia side as well as at the philanthropic practice, amplify each other. A first question emerges “how may the appearance of a new kind of philanthropy be explained?” and “how may this new kind of philanthropy be defined?” [...]