189 research outputs found
Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain
Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in
many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things.
However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and
computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of
blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge
computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based
edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since
there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and
negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we
maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual
rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment
results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of
successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the
performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing
resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization
problem for the edge computing service provider
Differential Privacy-Based Online Allocations towards Integrating Blockchain and Edge Computing
In recent years, the blockchain-based Internet of Things (IoT) has been
researched and applied widely, where each IoT device can act as a node in the
blockchain. However, these lightweight nodes usually do not have enough
computing power to complete the consensus or other computing-required tasks.
Edge computing network gives a platform to provide computing power to IoT
devices. A fundamental problem is how to allocate limited edge servers to IoT
devices in a highly untrustworthy environment. In a fair competition
environment, the allocation mechanism should be online, truthful, and privacy
safe. To address these three challenges, we propose an online multi-item double
auction (MIDA) mechanism, where IoT devices are buyers and edge servers are
sellers. In order to achieve the truthfulness, the participants' private
information is at risk of being exposed by inference attack, which may lead to
malicious manipulation of the market by adversaries. Then, we improve our MIDA
mechanism based on differential privacy to protect sensitive information from
being leaked. It interferes with the auction results slightly but guarantees
privacy protection with high confidence. Besides, we upgrade our
privacy-preserving MIDA mechanism such that adapting to more complex and
realistic scenarios. In the end, the effectiveness and correctness of
algorithms are evaluated and verified by theoretical analysis and numerical
simulations
Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle,
which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high
computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time,
consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we
study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile
blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded
to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg
game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and
the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service
provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the
miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices.
We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in
each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform
pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and
uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best
response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the
different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium
is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality
theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our
proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things
Journa
When Mobile Blockchain Meets Edge Computing
Blockchain, as the backbone technology of the current popular Bitcoin digital
currency, has become a promising decentralized data management framework.
Although blockchain has been widely adopted in many applications, e.g.,
finance, healthcare, and logistics, its application in mobile services is still
limited. This is due to the fact that blockchain users need to solve preset
proof-of-work puzzles to add new data, i.e., a block, to the blockchain.
Solving the proof-of-work, however, consumes substantial resources in terms of
CPU time and energy, which is not suitable for resource-limited mobile devices.
To facilitate blockchain applications in future mobile Internet of Things
systems, multiple access mobile edge computing appears to be an auspicious
solution to solve the proof-of-work puzzles for mobile users. We first
introduce a novel concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain. Then, we
introduce an economic approach for edge computing resource management.
Moreover, a prototype of mobile edge computing enabled blockchain systems is
presented with experimental results to justify the proposed concept.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Magazin
When energy trading meets blockchain in electrical power system: The state of the art
With the rapid growth of renewable energy resources, energy trading has been shifting from the centralized manner to distributed manner. Blockchain, as a distributed public ledger technology, has been widely adopted in the design of new energy trading schemes. However, there are many challenging issues in blockchain-based energy trading, e.g., low efficiency, high transaction cost, and security and privacy issues. To tackle these challenges, many solutions have been proposed. In this survey, the blockchain-based energy trading in the electrical power system is thoroughly investigated. Firstly, the challenges in blockchain-based energy trading are identified and summarized. Then, the existing energy trading schemes are studied and classified into three categories based on their main focuses: energy transaction, consensus mechanism, and system optimization. Blockchain-based energy trading has been a popular research topic, new blockchain architectures, models and products are continually emerging to overcome the limitations of existing solutions, forming a virtuous circle. The internal combination of different blockchain types and the combination of blockchain with other technologies improve the blockchain-based energy trading system to better satisfy the practical requirements of modern power systems. However, there are still some problems to be solved, for example, the lack of regulatory system, environmental challenges and so on. In the future, we will strive for a better optimized structure and establish a comprehensive security assessment model for blockchain-based energy trading system.This research was funded by Beijing Natural Science Foundation (grant number 4182060).Scopu
Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Forwarding and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network
In traditional blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to
full nodes (i.e., miners) regardless of the contribution of forwarding
behaviors of light nodes. However, the lack of forwarding incentive reduces the
willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the
energy-constrained Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). This paper proposes a novel
dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for forwarding and
validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction
mechanism consists of two auction models: the forwarding auction and the
validation auction. In the forwarding auction, forwarding nodes use Generalized
First Price (GFP) auction to choose transactions to forward. Besides,
forwarding nodes adjust the forwarding probability through a no-regret
algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation auction, full nodes select
transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block.
We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility
(IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE).
Especially, we derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between
the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and
spectrum resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without
sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network
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