- SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES WITH SEVERAL COMMODITIES

We consider the problem of allocating m(m>=2) infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. In the two-agents case any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. First, we propose a solution that, in the two-agents case, is the only one that satisfies strategy-proofness, no-envy and a weak requirement related to efficiency. Moreover, it is implementable in dominant strategies and satisfies consistency properties. Second, we propose an extension of the Mas-Colells Walrasian equilibrium with slack to characterize the efficient allocations.This new solution allow us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution necessary to obtain it. We prove that the original solution proposed by Mas-Colell is the efficient selection which requires an income redistribution with smallest range, and that it satisfies consistency properties.consistency, single-peaked preferences, strategy-proofness

A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.

Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities

In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and anonymity, if the number of good is only one and preferences are single peaked. (Sprumont [7].) However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the situation drastically changes and a tradeoff between efficiency and strategy-proofness arises. The generalized uniform rule in multiple-commodity settings is still strategy-proof, but not Pareto efficient in general. In this paper, we show that in a class of all strategy-proof mechanisms the generalized uniform rule is a "second best" strategy-proof mechanism in that there is no other strategy-proof mechanism which gives a "better" outcome than the generalized uniform rule in terms of Pareto domination.

On algorithmic solutions to simple allocation problems

We interpret solution rules to a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a policy-maker. We study the properties of rational rules. We show that every rational rule falls into a class of algorithmic rules that we describe. The Equal Gains rule is a member of this class and it uniquely satisfies rationality, continuity, and equal treatment of equals. Its dual, the Equal Losses rule, uniquely satisfies continuity, equal treatment of equals, and two properties that constitute the dual of rationality: translation down and translation up

Single Peakedness and Giffen Demand

I provide a simple example of a single peaked utility function that generates a Giffen demand. The utility function is smooth, non piecewise defined, strictly concave but not globally increasing. A full characterization of the parameter conditions under which the Giffen demand arises is provided. In addition the properties of the demand function are studied: I find that the inferior commodity with a Giffen demand must be cheaper relatively to a substitue and that Giffen demand arises at relatively low levels of income. However it is not required that the share of income spent on that commodity be large.Giffen behavior; Utility function; Single peakedness; Expenditure share.

A Revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems

We interpret solution rules on a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a policy-maker. We analyze conditions under which the policy maker’s choices are (i) rational (ii) transitive-rational, and (iii)representable; that is, they coincide with maximization of a (i) binary relation, (ii) transitive binary relation, and (iii) numerical function on the allocation space. Our main results are as follows: (i) a well known property, contraction independence (a.k.a. IIA) is equivalent to rationality; (ii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule is transitive-rational;and (iii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule, if additionally continuous, can be represented by a numerical function

Public Choice: an Overview

Public Choice begins with the observation that in politics, as in economics, individuals and institutions compete for scarce resources and that, therefore, the same methods of analyses used by economists to explain the behaviour of consumers and producers might also serve well to explain the behaviour of governments and other (allegedly) “public-spirited” organisations . As Tullock (1988) succinctly put it, Public Choice is "the invasion of politics by economics". Public Choice derives its rationale from the fact that, in many areas, 'political' and 'economic' considerations interact so that a proper understanding of issues in one field requires a complementary understanding of issues in the other. Although the incursion of the analytical methods of economics into political science - which is the hall-mark of Public Choice - began in the 1950s, it was not until at least three decades later that the trickle became a flood. This chapter provides an overview of this field

Value and Politics

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium

The 'restaurant-table effect': Europe and the common agricultural policy.

Policy; Trade;

Distribution and Politics: A Brief History and Prospect

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium