Single-Peaked Consistency for Weak Orders Is Easy

In economics and social choice single-peakedness is one of the most important and commonly studied models for preferences. It is well known that single-peaked consistency for total orders is in P. However in practice a preference profile is not always comprised of total orders. Often voters have indifference between some of the candidates. In a weak preference order indifference must be transitive. We show that single-peaked consistency for weak orders is in P for three different variants of single-peakedness for weak orders. Specifically, we consider Black's original definition of single-peakedness for weak orders, Black's definition of single-plateaued preferences, and the existential model recently introduced by Lackner. We accomplish our results by transforming each of these single-peaked consistency problems to the problem of determining if a 0-1 matrix has the consecutive ones property.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Testing Top Monotonicity

Top monotonicity is a relaxation of various well-known domain restrictions such as single-peaked and single-crossing for which negative impossibility results are circumvented and for which the median-voter theorem still holds. We examine the problem of testing top monotonicity and present a characterization of top monotonicity with respect to non-betweenness constraints. We then extend the definition of top monotonicity to partial orders and show that testing top monotonicity of partial orders is NP-complete

Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these rules suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra studied the computational complexity of strategic behavior in nearly single-peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure. In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness. We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. In case the single-peaked axis is given, we show that determining the distance is always possible in polynomial time. Furthermore, we explore the relations between the new notions introduced in this paper and existing notions from the literature.Comment: Published in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR). A short version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2013). An even earlier version appeared in the proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice 2012 (COMSOC 2012

Reinstating Combinatorial Protections for Manipulation and Bribery in Single-Peaked and Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates

Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past two decades. A recent body of work, however, has shown that many of the NP-hardness shields, previously obtained, vanish when the electorate has single-peaked or nearly single-peaked preferences. In light of these results, we investigate whether it is possible to reimpose NP-hardness shields for such electorates by allowing the voters to specify partial preferences instead of insisting they cast complete ballots. In particular, we show that in single-peaked and nearly single-peaked electorates, if voters are allowed to submit top-truncated ballots, then the complexity of manipulation and bribery for many voting rules increases from being in P to being NP-complete.Comment: 28 pages; A shorter version of this paper will appear at the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16

Acyclic domains of linear orders: a survey

Among the many significant contributions that Fishburn made to social choice theory some have focused on what he has called "acyclic sets", i.e. the sets of linear orders where majority rule applies without the "Condorcet effect" (majority relation never has cycles). The search for large domains of this type is a fascinating topic. I review the works in this field and in particular consider a recent one that allows to show the connections between some of them that have been unrelated up to now.acyclic set;alternating scheme;distributive lattice;effet Condorcet;linear order,maximal chain,permutoèdre lattice, single-peaked domain,weak Bruhat order,value restriction.

Possible Winners in Noisy Elections

We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which candidates exactly register for the election or which voters cast their votes. Under reasonable assumptions, our problems reduce to counting variants of election control problems. We either give polynomial-time algorithms or prove #P-completeness results for counting variants of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters for Plurality, k-Approval, Approval, Condorcet, and Maximin voting rules. We consider both the general case, where voters' preferences are unrestricted, and the case where voters' preferences are single-peaked.Comment: 34 page

Bisymmetric and quasitrivial operations: characterizations and enumerations

We investigate the class of bisymmetric and quasitrivial binary operations on a given set $X$ and provide various characterizations of this class as well as the subclass of bisymmetric, quasitrivial, and order-preserving binary operations. We also determine explicitly the sizes of these classes when the set $X$ is finite.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1709.0916