Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures

This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity. The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii) to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v

Average-energy games

Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the objective is to optimize the long-run average gain per action, and energy games, where the system has to avoid running out of energy. We study average-energy games, where the goal is to optimize the long-run average of the accumulated energy. We show that this objective arises naturally in several applications, and that it yields interesting connections with previous concepts in the literature. We prove that deciding the winner in such games is in NP inter coNP and at least as hard as solving mean-payoff games, and we establish that memoryless strategies suffice to win. We also consider the case where the system has to minimize the average-energy while maintaining the accumulated energy within predefined bounds at all times: this corresponds to operating with a finite-capacity storage for energy. We give results for one-player and two-player games, and establish complexity bounds and memory requirements.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.0685

Toward a general theory of quantum games

We study properties of quantum strategies, which are complete specifications of a given party's actions in any multiple-round interaction involving the exchange of quantum information with one or more other parties. In particular, we focus on a representation of quantum strategies that generalizes the Choi-Jamio{\l}kowski representation of quantum operations. This new representation associates with each strategy a positive semidefinite operator acting only on the tensor product of its input and output spaces. Various facts about such representations are established, and two applications are discussed: the first is a new and conceptually simple proof of Kitaev's lower bound for strong coin-flipping, and the second is a proof of the exact characterization QRG = EXP of the class of problems having quantum refereed games.Comment: 23 pages, 12pt font, single-column compilation of STOC 2007 final versio