Reason Maintenance - Conceptual Framework

This paper describes the conceptual framework for reason maintenance developed as part of WP2

Initial Draft of a Possible Declarative Semantics for the Language

This article introduces a preliminary declarative semantics for a subset of the language Xcerpt (so-called grouping-stratifiable programs) in form of a classical (Tarski style) model theory, adapted to the specific requirements of Xcerpt’s constructs (e.g. the various aspects of incompleteness in query terms, grouping constructs in rule heads, etc.). Most importantly, the model theory uses term simulation as a replacement for term equality to handle incomplete term specifications, and an extended notion of substitutions in order to properly convey the semantics of grouping constructs. Based upon this model theory, a fixpoint semantics is also described, leading to a first notion of forward chaining evaluation of Xcerpt program

Embedding Non-Ground Logic Programs into Autoepistemic Logic for Knowledge Base Combination

In the context of the Semantic Web, several approaches to the combination of ontologies, given in terms of theories of classical first-order logic and rule bases, have been proposed. They either cast rules into classical logic or limit the interaction between rules and ontologies. Autoepistemic logic (AEL) is an attractive formalism which allows to overcome these limitations, by serving as a uniform host language to embed ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs into it. For the latter, so far only the propositional setting has been considered. In this paper, we present three embeddings of normal and three embeddings of disjunctive non-ground logic programs under the stable model semantics into first-order AEL. While the embeddings all correspond with respect to objective ground atoms, differences arise when considering non-atomic formulas and combinations with first-order theories. We compare the embeddings with respect to stable expansions and autoepistemic consequences, considering the embeddings by themselves, as well as combinations with classical theories. Our results reveal differences and correspondences of the embeddings and provide useful guidance in the choice of a particular embedding for knowledge combination.Comment: 52 pages, submitte

What is a logical diagram?

Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles Peirce’s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a “picture on a page”

Robust Linear Temporal Logic

Although it is widely accepted that every system should be robust, in the sense that "small" violations of environment assumptions should lead to "small" violations of system guarantees, it is less clear how to make this intuitive notion of robustness mathematically precise. In this paper, we address this problem by developing a robust version of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), which we call robust LTL and denote by rLTL. Formulas in rLTL are syntactically identical to LTL formulas but are endowed with a many-valued semantics that encodes robustness. In particular, the semantics of the rLTL formula $\varphi \Rightarrow \psi$ is such that a "small" violation of the environment assumption $\varphi$ is guaranteed to only produce a "small" violation of the system guarantee $\psi$. In addition to introducing rLTL, we study the verification and synthesis problems for this logic: similarly to LTL, we show that both problems are decidable, that the verification problem can be solved in time exponential in the number of subformulas of the rLTL formula at hand, and that the synthesis problem can be solved in doubly exponential time

Boundary Algebra: A Simple Notation for Boolean Algebra and the Truth Functors

Boundary algebra [BA] is a simpler notation for Spencer-Brown’s (1969) primary algebra [pa], the Boolean algebra 2, and the truth functors. The primary arithmetic [PA] consists of the atoms ‘()’ and the blank page, concatenation, and enclosure between ‘(‘ and ‘)’, denoting the primitive notion of distinction. Inserting letters denoting the presence or absence of () into a PA formula yields a BA formula. The BA axioms are "()()=()" (A1), and "(()) [=?] may be written or erased at will” (A2). Repeated application of these axioms to a PA formula yields a member of B= {(),?} called its simplification. (a) has two intended interpretations: (a) ? a? (Boolean algebra 2), and (a) ? ~a (sentential logic). BA is self-dual: () ? 1 [dually 0] so that B is the carrier for 2, ab ? a?b [a?b], and (a)b [(a(b))] ? a=b, so that ?=() [()=?] follows trivially and B is a poset. The BA basis abc= bca (Dilworth 1938), a(ab)= a(b), and a()=() (Bricken 2002) facilitates clausal reasoning and proof by calculation. BA also simplifies normal forms and Quine’s (1982) truth value analysis. () ? true [false] yields boundary logic.G. Spencer Brown; boundary algebra; boundary logic; primary algebra; primary arithmetic; Boolean algebra; calculation proof; C.S. Peirce; existential graphs.