7,507 research outputs found
Decompositions of two player games: potential, zero-sum, and stable games
We introduce several methods of decomposition for two player normal form
games. Viewing the set of all games as a vector space, we exhibit explicit
orthonormal bases for the subspaces of potential games, zero-sum games, and
their orthogonal complements which we call anti-potential games and
anti-zero-sum games, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, every anti-potential
game comes either from the Rock-Paper-Scissors type games (in the case of
symmetric games) or from the Matching Pennies type games (in the case of
asymmetric games). Using these decompositions, we prove old (and some new)
cycle criteria for potential and zero-sum games (as orthogonality relations
between subspaces). We illustrate the usefulness of our decomposition by (a)
analyzing the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game, (b) completely
characterizing the set of all null-stable games, (c) providing a large class of
strict stable games, (d) relating the game decomposition to the decomposition
of vector fields for the replicator equations, (e) constructing Lyapunov
functions for some replicator dynamics, and (f) constructing Zeeman games
-games with an interior asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium and a pure
strategy ESS
On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative
solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that
Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these
two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component
efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket,
where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that
all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations
for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only
changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the
same amount
Matroids are Immune to Braess Paradox
The famous Braess paradox describes the following phenomenon: It might happen
that the improvement of resources, like building a new street within a
congested network, may in fact lead to larger costs for the players in an
equilibrium. In this paper we consider general nonatomic congestion games and
give a characterization of the maximal combinatorial property of strategy
spaces for which Braess paradox does not occur. In a nutshell, bases of
matroids are exactly this maximal structure. We prove our characterization by
two novel sensitivity results for convex separable optimization problems over
polymatroid base polyhedra which may be of independent interest.Comment: 21 page
POTENTIAL, VALUE AND PROBABILITY
This paper focuses on the probabilistic point of view and proposes a extremely simple probabilistic model that provides a single and simple story to account for several extensions of the Shapley value, as weighted Shapley values, semivalues, and weak (weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself. Moreover, some of the most interesting conditions or notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley's seminal characterization, as 'balanced contributions' and the 'potential', are reinterpreted from this same point of view. In this new light these notions and some results lose their 'mystery' and acquire a clear and simple meaning. These illuminating reinterpretations strongly vindicate the complementariness of the probabilistic and the axiomatic approaches, and shed serious doubts about the achievements of the axiomatic approach since Nash's and Shapley's seminal papers in connection with the genuine notion of value.Coalition games, value, potential
A multiplicative potential approach to solutions for cooperative TU-games
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative games with transferable utility, it is well-known that the Shapley value is the most appealing representative of the family of (not necessarily efficient) game-theoretic solutions with an additive potential representation. This paper introduces a new solution concept, called Multiplicativily Proportional () value, that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value if the additive potential approach to the solution theory is replaced by a multiplicative potential approach in that the difference of two potential evaluations is replaced by its quotient. One out of two main equivalence theorems states that every solution with a multiplicative potential representation is equivalent to this specifically chosen efficient value in that the solution of the initial game coincides with the value of an auxiliary game. The associated potential function turns out to be of a multiplicative form (instead of an additive form) with reference to the worth of all the coalitions. The second equivalence theorem presents four additional characterizations of solutions that admit a multiplicative potential representation, e.g., preservation of discrete ratios or path independence
Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy profile of all players. Aggregate games possess a set of purely algebraic properties that can often provide simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without first requiring that one solves for the equilibrium strategy profile. The defining nature of payoffs in an aggregate game allows one to project the n-player strategic analysis of a normal form game onto a lower-dimension aggregate-strategy space, thereby converting an n-player game to a simpler object – a self-generating single-person maximization program. We apply these techniques to a number of economic settings including competition in supply functions and multi-principal common agency games with nonlinear transfer functions.Aggregate games, common agency, asymmetric informa- tion, menu auctions
Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games
In problems of choosing ‘aspirations’ for TU-games, we study two axioms, ‘MW-consistency’ and ‘converse MW-consistency.’ In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus
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