Sharing risk through concession contracts

In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy

Property rights, right to efficiency?

The assignment of property rights to incentivise risk-sharing in a principal-agent relationship is a recurrent theme of contract theory. This paper examines the incentive effects of property rights in a principal-agent relationship involving government as the principal, that is, the ownership concession model of publicprivate- partnership (PPP) procurement contracts for tollroads. Specifically, the paper investigates the effects of property rights on the agent’s preference for contract structure to manage risks and to exert performance effort; and the effects on both parties’ risk preferences when ownership transfer is being perceived as transferring accountability. Analysis of data collected through an online experiment surveying stakeholders who have been engaging in road contracts procured under the PPP model in 32 countries concludes that: (1) property rights offer the agent a protective shield against poor planning by the principal in the meantime gives rise to ex ante opportunism; (2) the agent’s reservation on ex post decision rights distorts allocative efficiency; and (3) revenue-sharing is a powerful incentive for non-revenueenhancing performance effort. Further investigation attests that incentive effects of property rights can be enhanced through equitable allocation of risks; nevertheless, ex post efficiency is debilitated by considerations of political sensitivity concerning toll pricing

Developing a concession pricing model for PPP highway projects

The concession pricing is one of the most important issues during the negotiation period of PPP contracts. Pricing should vary in accordance with risks assumed by the private sector and embody equitable risk sharing between the government and the private sector to lower the minimum feasible concession price and ensure effective risk management. In this study, a general concession pricing model is developed through cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the private sector. The model integrates project risk variables, price parameters, and other financial elements into a concession pricing formula based on cash flow table. Meanwhile, to cope with the occurrence of unforeseeable losses triggered by risk factors, such as interest rate fluctuation, inflation, traffic volume change, etc., a price adjustment mechanism is established to adjust the initial price and ensure the project's financial viability. The concession pricing model and adjustment mechanism allow the government and the private sector to reach a consensus on the tariff scheme of a PPP project. It is believed that the model is beneficial to create a “win-win” situation for both the government and the private sector

Subordinated Public Participation Loans for Financing Motorway concessions in Spain.

Budgetary constraints are prompting many governments to encourage private financing of transportation infrastructure through concession contracts. The length and complexity of such contracts often force governments to provide fiscal support in order to increase the attractiveness of concessions. This paper deals with a new public support mechanism for concession contracts, called Subordinated Public Participation Loans (SPPLs), which has been implemented in Spain during the last few years. SPPLs are subordinated loans that may be given by the government to the concessionaire if the latter requests them in the tender. SPPLs are defined in such a way that the increase in interest accrued will reflect the traffic level: the larger the traffic the larger will be the SPPL yield. SPPLs have a twofold goal. First, they increase the financial attractiveness, and hence the feasibility, of concessions contracts. And second, they set up a fairer risksharing approach between the public and the private sector. This paper analyzes the implications of SPPLs in motorway concessions by contrasting the theoretical analysis with the empirical results obtained form the tender of five motorway concessions in Spain. Overall we found that the implementation of this mechanism may be considered a success. In spite of that, we propose some measures that may contribute to improving the SPPL performance in the future

Policy Issues in U.S. Transportation Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Australia, Research Report 09-15

In this report, the authors examine Australia’s experience with transportation public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the lessons that experience holds for the use of PPPs in the United States. Australia now has decades of experience in PPP use in transportation, and has used the approach to deliver billions of dollars in project value. Although this report explores a range of issues, the authors focus on four policy issues that have been salient in the United States: (1) how the risks inherent in PPP contracts should be distributed across public and private sector partners; (2) when and how to use non-compete (or compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how concerns about monopoly power are best addressed; and (4) the role and importance of concession length. The study examines those and other questions by surveying the relevant literature on PPP international use. The authors also interviewed 23 Australian PPP experts from the academic, public and private sectors, and distilled lessons from those interviews

Traffic Risk in toll motorway concessions in Spain: An analysis of the ramp-up period.

This paper analyzes the behaviour of actual traffic versus the traffic declared by the concessionaire in its offer in toll motorway concessions in Spain during the first few years of operation (ramp-up period). We obtain the result that, on average, there is a clear bias towards overestimation though the behaviour of any single concession may not have much to do with the average. In addition, we found that unlike what happens with annual traffic volumes, traffic growth rates are mostly underestimated by concessionaires in the ramp-up period. We explain this trend towards overestimation in the strategic behaviour of the bidders in the tender rather than in systematic modelling errors. The cause of this strategic behaviour lies in the willingness to renegotiate as shown by the government of Spain when actual traffic turns out to be lower than expected

Bidding for concessions

Privatization of infrastructure ventures in sectors such as energy, telecommunication, transport, and water has become popular over the last decade. Often- for good or bad reasons - private firms are given monopoly franchises under some type of long-term concession agreement, for example"Build-Operate-Transfer"schemes. The article surveys the issues arising in designing specifications as well as incentive and risk-sharing parameters comprehensively and consistently both to achieve efficient performance by the concessionaire and to minimize post-award renegotiations. Concession award should as a rule be made competitively, unless special requirements of speed, innovation, or excessive transaction cost argue otherwise. Typically, competitive concession award is made by first price sealed bids. There are strong arguments, however, to consider open auctions more seriously in a number of cases. Auctions may also be re-awarded by way of auction. However, somewhat arbitrary bid preferences may have to be set. Auctioneers for complex concession contracts should operate at arms-length from all interested parties, including politicians. It may be sensible to let independent agencies that regulate the concession scheme run the auction.Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research

Road infrastructure concession practice in Europe

In a road infrastructure concession, a public authority grants specific rights to a private, or semi-public company to construct, overhaul, maintain, and operate infrastructure for a given period. By contract, the public authority charges that company with making the investments needed to create the service at its own cost, and to operate it at its own risk. The price paid to the company comes from the service's users, the public authority, or both. In 1999, out of roughly 51,000 kilometers of European motorways, about 17,000 kilometers (33 percent) were concessioned - 16,400 kilometers by toll, and 670 kilometers by shadow toll (design, build, finance, and operate arrangements). Of these, 73 percent are managed by the public sector, and 27 percent by private companies. State-owned companies have been important in European motorway concessions. Systems vary among countries, for example, in how they share risks between the concession authority, and the concession company. As the motorway network has grown denser, attributing commercial risk has become more difficult. Increasingly, public authorities must play a greater regulatory role. Already, bad experiences have made the private sector reluctant to bear the commercial risk. Ant the commercial risk is sometimes too great to be carried by the concession company alone. Commercial risk should be controlled by mechanisms incorporated in the contract, but control of the commercial risk must not eliminate incentives. In addition to safeguarding the community's interests, the public concession authority, must increase citizen awareness about concession decisions, to ensure their social acceptability. Formulas for determining toll charges, differ through Europe. So do criteria for selecting concession companies. In 1999, the main criteria used were these: 1) the amount of public subsidy required; 2) the credibility of the financial arrangements; 3) the project's technical quality; 4) the operating strategy, and price policy; and, 5) the reputation of the concession company (whether it has a construction company among its shareholders, for example). The increasingly frequent use of private funding, must be taken into account when defining the training required by personnel responsible for monitoring the concessions.Information Technology,Roads&Highways,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Roads&Highways,Toll Roads,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Airports and Air Services,Public Sector Economics&Finance