DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries

I carry out a power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty of the EU on the widening and deepening of European integration, by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decrease in voting power of small countries makes widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increase in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increase in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more in the coalitions they form, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist face for the EU in the way votes are distributed in Nice.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39962/3/wp576.pd

DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries

I carry out a power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty of the EU on the widening and deepening of European integration, by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decrease in voting power of small countries makes widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increase in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increase in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more in the coalitions they form, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist face for the EU in the way votes are distributed in Nice.EU, Voting Power, Integration, Enlargement, Federalis

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources

This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry

Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem

We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e. there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an outcome of this procedure. In a final concluding section of this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, generalised contract choice problems. The model we propose is a generalisation of the model due to Shapley and Scarf (1974) called the housing market. We are able to show with the help of a three agent example, that there exists a generalised contract choice problem, which does not admit any stable outcome.Stable outcomes, Matchings, pay-offs, Generalised marriage problem, Contract choice problem

Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications

This book provides a theoretical framework for systematically evaluating the "pros" and "cons" of various methods. It also includes a series of case studies in cost allocation to give a sense of the real problems encountered in implementation. Among the examples treated are telecommunications pricing, multipurpose reservoir charges, and airport landing fees. Finally several articles address the broader fairness issues inherent in the pricing of public services. The history of the notion of the "just price" from medieval to modern times is discussed, together with observations on what principles seem to guide decisions in telecommunications rate cases in the United States. The connections between cost allocation, efficiency, and entry in the telecommunications market are also examined in two different contexts: the U.S. and France. The overall aim of the book is to provide theoretical foundations for using specific methods, to examine the distributional and fairness issues involved in cost allocation, and to give a sense of the practical problems encountered in implementation. The book will appeal to practitioners interested in what allocation methods are available, and to theorists concerned with their axiomatic foundations

Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management: An Introduction

Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade,

Application of the Cooperative Game Theory to Global Strategic Alliances

Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää yhteistyön peliteorian sovellusmahdollisuuksia globaaleihin strategisiin liittoutumiin. Globaalien strategisten liittoutumien kirjallisuustutkimuksella analysoidaan liittoutumien muodostumiseen ja pysyvyyteen liittyviä tekijöitä. Yhteistyön peliteorian peruskäsitteet ja ratkaisukonseptit kuvataan ja käsitellään niiden sovellusmahdollisuuksia strategisiin liittoutumiin. Kolme kirjallisuusesimerkkiä kuvaa erilaisia yhteistyön peliteorian sovellustapoja strategisiin liittoutumiin. Työhön sisältyy tapaustutkimus, jossa muodostetaan laskennallinen malli globaalien matkapuhelinoperaattoreiden strategisista liittoutumista soveltamalla yhteistyön peliteoriaa. Käytetty ratkaisukonsepti on yhteistyöpelin ydin. Kirjallisuusesimerkit ja tapaustutkimus todentavat, että yhteistyön peliteoriaa voidaan soveltaa strategisten liittoutumien mallintamiseen. Liittoutumien muodostumisen todennäköisyyttä ja niiden stabiilisuutta voidaan arvioida yhteistyön peliteorian avulla. Myös liiketoiminnan dynamiikka ja liiketoimintaympäristön muutokset voidaan ottaa mallinnuksessa huomioon. Tämä mahdollistaa liittoutumien pitkän aikavälin elinkelpoisuuden tarkastelun. Tapaustutkimuksen avulla osoitetaan, että laskennallisen mallinnuksen avulla saatavat tulokset vastaavat strategisten liittoutumien kvalitatiivisen tutkimuksen tuloksia. Tapaustutkimuksen yhteydessä esitellään uusi menetelmä liittoutumien pitkän aikavälin stabiilisuuden arvioimiseksi liiketoiminnan muutoksissa. Liiketoimintaa kuvaavat epävarmat ja muuttuvat parametrit mallinnetaan soveltuvalla todennäköisyysjakaumalla. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että yhdistämällä Monte Carlo -simulointi ja yhteistyöpelin ydin -ratkaisukonsepti, voidaan muodostaa stabiilisuusindikaattori, joka kuvaa liittoutuman pitkän aikavälin stabiilisuutta muuttuvassa liiketoimintaympäristössä.The scope of this thesis is the application of the cooperative game theory to global strategic alliances. The objective is to find out how the cooperative game theory can be applied to global strategic alliances. Global strategic alliances are studied to understand the major questions of the alliance formation and the long-term stability. Various concepts of the cooperative game theory are investigated to find a feasible way to apply them to the modelling of strategic alliances. Three examples from literature are presented in which the cooperative game theory is applied to strategic alliances. Also a case study is introduced in which the global mobile operators' alliances are modelled as cooperative games using the core solution concept. The literature examples and also the case study demonstrate that the theory of cooperative games can be applied to model the global strategic alliances. The stability and likelihood of strategic alliances can be assessed by modelling them as cooperative games. With this modelling the stability of strategic alliances can be assessed in the alliance formation. Also the business dynamics and changes in the business environment can be taken into account in order to understand the alliance's long-term vitality. The case study demonstrates that the findings of the computational model of the strategic alliances reflect the respective findings made with qualitative methods. In the case study a new computational method is introduced to estimate an alliance's long-term stability in the changing business environment. In this method the uncertain and changing business parameters are modelled with applicable probability distributions. By combining the Monte Carlo simulation and the core solution concept of the cooperative game theory, a measure called a stability indicator can be calculated. It reflects the stability of an alliance in the changing business environment