Sequential Voting with Abstention

Dekel and Piccione (2000) have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.

The cost of voting categorized: A comprehensive review

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the research field of cost of voting and review the relevant literature on voter participation. After reviewing the literature, a development of a theoretical framework to categorize multiple variables associated with the cost of voting will be completed. The goal is to create clear, concise, and simple categories that define the cost of voting. This should add conceptual clarity to the field by linking variables into a common foundation. The research also connects the sociological and psychological category of intrapersonal to concepts of social group needs, sense of achieving a greater good, and “us vs. Them theory. This link to human psychology and sociology will set up future research in the field of election studies to be on a more individual level basis, to better understand voter perception and feelings towards the potential cost to voting

Self-Awareness or Context-Awareness? The Role of Awareness in Herd Behavior

Online consumers are increasingly using social commerce platforms to engage in various social interactions and conduct commercial activities. Drawing on latent state-trait (LST) theory, this study investigates how self-awareness (i.e., private and public self-awareness) and context-awareness (i.e., perceived expertise, similarity and familiarity) influence herd behavior (i.e., discounting own information and imitating other). In addition, we examine the interplay between self-awareness and context-awareness. Furthermore, we posit that herd behavior contributes positively to purchase intention, which in turn influences purchase behavior. To test the proposed model, we will collect longitudinal data from actual social commerce users. The theoretical and practical implication will be discusse

Seeking Harmony Amidst Diversity: Consensus Building with Network Externalities

A group of individuals, with a potential conflict of interest, face a choice among alternatives. There is a network externality such that the chosen alternative yields value only if sufficiently many individuals get on board. Their preferences for each alternative and the benefit derived from a successfully formed network are known only privately and might vary between the players who determine whether to make their choices early or late. We characterize the equilibrium timing of adoption as well as the efficient timing which maximizes the total expected payoff. We also show that the efficient timing of adoption can be implemented by a simple fee scheme. The analysis gives an insight into why consensus is often hard-won in some societies and suggests a potential role of social norms in improving the efficiency.

Exit Polls and Voter Turnout

We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter turnout and election outcomes are affected by the publication of exit polls on election day. We find that the introduction of an exit poll influences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is published, but the signs of the effects are generally ambiguous. The fact that exit polls influence the incentive to vote before they are even published is sometimes overlooked in the debate on their desirability. We show that this can lead to premature conclusions about the impact of exit polls on election outcomes.elections; exit polls; voter turnout

Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries

This paper provides an investigation of the role of momentum and social learning in sequential voting systems. In the econometric model, voters are uncertain over candidate quality, and voters in late states attempt to infer the information held by those in early states from voting returns. Candidates experience momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. The empirical application focuses on the responses of daily polling data to the release of voting returns in the 2004 presidential primary. We find that Kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from Dean, who held a strong lead prior to the beginning of the primary season. The voting weights implied by the estimated model demonstrate that early voters have up to 20 times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates, demonstrating a significant departure from the ideal of "one person, one vote." We then address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our results. Finally, we run simulations under different electoral structures and find that a simultaneous election would have been more competitive due to the absence of herding and that alternative sequential structures would have yielded different outcomes.