Superintelligence as a Cause or Cure for Risks of Astronomical Suffering

Discussions about the possible consequences of creating superintelligence have included the possibility of existential risk, often understood mainly as the risk of human extinction. We argue that suffering risks (s-risks) , where an adverse outcome would bring about severe suffering on an astronomical scale, are risks of a comparable severity and probability as risks of extinction. Preventing them is the common interest of many different value systems. Furthermore, we argue that in the same way as superintelligent AI both contributes to existential risk but can also help prevent it, superintelligent AI can both be a suffering risk or help avoid it. Some types of work aimed at making superintelligent AI safe will also help prevent suffering risks, and there may also be a class of safeguards for AI that helps specifically against s-risks

The imperfect observer: Mind, machines, and materialism in the 21st century

The dualist / materialist debates about the nature of consciousness are based on the assumption that an entirely physical universe must ultimately be observable by humans (with infinitely advanced tools). Thus the dualists claim that anything unobservable must be non-physical, while the materialists argue that in theory nothing is unobservable. However, there may be fundamental limitations in the power of human observation, no matter how well aided, that greatly curtail our ability to know and observe even a fully physical universe. This paper presents arguments to support the model of an inherently limited observer and explores the consequences of this view

Internet of things and automation of imaging: beyond representationalism

It is no doubt that the production of digital imagery invites for the major update of theoretical apparatus: what up until now was perceived solely or primarily as the stable representation of the world gives way to the image understood in terms of “the continuous actualization of networked data”[1] or “networked terminal”.[2] In my article I would like to argue that analysis of this new visual environment should not be limited to the procedures of data processing. What also invites serious investigation is acknowledging the reliance of contemporary media ecology on wireless communication which according to Adrian Mackenzie functions as “prepositions (‘at,’ ‘in,’ ‘with,’ by’, ‘between,’ ‘near,’ etc) in the grammar of contemporary media”.[3] It seems especially important in the case of the imagery accompanying some instances of internet of things, where the considerable part of networked imagery is produced in a fully automated and machinic way, as illustrated with my main example, Air Quality Egg.[4] This crowdsourced air pollution monitoring platform consists of networked sensors transmitting signals and data which are then visualized as graphs and maps through the IoT service provider, Xively. Such examples prompt the need for a major reconfiguration of the theory of digital image beyond the constraints of representationalism[5] and also beyond what has already been named “new aesthetic”.[6] In my opinion focusing not so much on the ontology of digital imagery as on its ontogenesis plays a key role in such undertaking. In other words, the main point of interest shifts from image’s being in the world to its becoming with and in the world. Hence I would like to propose the processual and relational concept of image as energy exchange, to some extent inspired the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, yet with a strong posthumanist twist. Such metaphor allows for another step needed to transform how we think about production of digital imagery: shifting the focus from purely human intentionality to the machinic, hybrid and distributed agencies. [1] R.Marie, I. Hoelzl, Softimage. Towards a New Theory of the Digital Image, Intellect, Bristol – Chicago 2015, loc. 146 (Kindle version) [2] Ibid. [3] A. Mackenzie, „Wirelessness as the Experience of Transition”, „Fibreculture Journal” 13/2008, online: http://thirteen.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-085-wirelessness-as-experience-of-transition/ Retrieved: December 10, 2015. [4] http://airqualityegg.com/ Retrieved: December 10, 2015. [5] The recent critique of representationalism stems from at least a few sources, including performative theory and posthumanism, por. S. Kember, J. Zylinska, Life After New Media. Mediation as a Vital Process, MIT Press, Cambridge – London 2012; Ch. Salter, Entangled. Technology and the Transformation of Performance, MIT Press, Cambridge – Londyn 2010. See also: N. Thrift, Non-representational Theory. Space, Politics, Affect, Routledge, London - New York 2008; B. Anderson, P. Harris, The Promise of Non-Representationalist Theories [w:] idem, ed., Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography, Ashgate, Farnham – Burlington 2010. [6] D. M. Berry, M. van Dartel, M. Dieter, M. Kasprzak, N. Muller, R. O’Reilly, J.L. De Vincente, New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, V2, Amsterdam 2012, http://v2.nl/publishing/new-aesthetic-new-anxieties Retrieved: November 29, 2015; J. Bridle, „#sxaesthetic”, 15. 03. 2012, http://booktwo.org/notebook/sxaesthetic/ Retrieved: November 20, 2015; J. Bridle, http://new-aesthetic.tumblr.com

On the Matter of Robot Minds

The view that phenomenally conscious robots are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one we call “nomological behaviorism.” The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious; indeed it would have all and only the states of phenomenal consciousness that the phenomenally conscious being in question has. We experimentally investigate whether the folk think that certain (hypothetical) robots made of silicon and steel would have the same conscious states as certain familiar biological beings with the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as the robots. Our findings provide evidence that the folk largely reject the view that silicon-based robots would have the sensations that they, the folk, attribute to the biological beings in question

Artificial intelligence: ChatGPT and human gullibility

Artificial intelligence (AI) has advanced rapidly in the past decade. The arrival of ChatGPT last year has pushed the debate about AI into the public sphere. ChatGPT, and similar tools, do things we once thought were outside the ability of computers. This raises questions for how we educate people about the capability and the limitations of such tools. This article provides an overview of artificial intelligence and explores what ChatGPT is capable of doing. It also raises questions about morality, responsibility, sentience, intelligence, and how humans’ propensity to anthropomorphise makes us gullible and thus ready to believe that this technology is delivering something that it cannot

Animated space

This article revisits the canon that imagines urban public space as a site of civic and political formation, based on active subjects. In contrast, the article explores the implications of thinking the urban landscape as sentient in its own right, as a hum of interacting humans and nonhumans that exceeds and performs its occupants. Citing hybrid performances—software in the “smart city,” witchcraft in the streets of Kinshasa, the sermon-filled outdoors in Cairo, and the sensoria of Canton’s opium-trading quarters in the nineteenth century—the article argues that such is the eventfulness of urban public space that the politics of place are always fleeting, hidden, and never reducible to human sociality alone.This is the accepted manuscript. The final version is available at http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/27/2_76/239