1,540 research outputs found
A dynamic pricing model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display advertising
There are two major ways of selling impressions in display advertising. They
are either sold in spot through auction mechanisms or in advance via guaranteed
contracts. The former has achieved a significant automation via real-time
bidding (RTB); however, the latter is still mainly done over the counter
through direct sales. This paper proposes a mathematical model that allocates
and prices the future impressions between real-time auctions and guaranteed
contracts. Under conventional economic assumptions, our model shows that the
two ways can be seamless combined programmatically and the publisher's revenue
can be maximized via price discrimination and optimal allocation. We consider
advertisers are risk-averse, and they would be willing to purchase guaranteed
impressions if the total costs are less than their private values. We also
consider that an advertiser's purchase behavior can be affected by both the
guaranteed price and the time interval between the purchase time and the
impression delivery date. Our solution suggests an optimal percentage of future
impressions to sell in advance and provides an explicit formula to calculate at
what prices to sell. We find that the optimal guaranteed prices are dynamic and
are non-decreasing over time. We evaluate our method with RTB datasets and find
that the model adopts different strategies in allocation and pricing according
to the level of competition. From the experiments we find that, in a less
competitive market, lower prices of the guaranteed contracts will encourage the
purchase in advance and the revenue gain is mainly contributed by the increased
competition in future RTB. In a highly competitive market, advertisers are more
willing to purchase the guaranteed contracts and thus higher prices are
expected. The revenue gain is largely contributed by the guaranteed selling.Comment: Chen, Bowei and Yuan, Shuai and Wang, Jun (2014) A dynamic pricing
model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display
advertising. In: The Eighth International Workshop on Data Mining for Online
Advertising, 24 - 27 August 2014, New York Cit
Pricing average price advertising options when underlying spot market prices are discontinuous
Advertising options have been recently studied as a special type of
guaranteed contracts in online advertising, which are an alternative sales
mechanism to real-time auctions. An advertising option is a contract which
gives its buyer a right but not obligation to enter into transactions to
purchase page views or link clicks at one or multiple pre-specified prices in a
specific future period. Different from typical guaranteed contracts, the option
buyer pays a lower upfront fee but can have greater flexibility and more
control of advertising. Many studies on advertising options so far have been
restricted to the situations where the option payoff is determined by the
underlying spot market price at a specific time point and the price evolution
over time is assumed to be continuous. The former leads to a biased calculation
of option payoff and the latter is invalid empirically for many online
advertising slots. This paper addresses these two limitations by proposing a
new advertising option pricing framework. First, the option payoff is
calculated based on an average price over a specific future period. Therefore,
the option becomes path-dependent. The average price is measured by the power
mean, which contains several existing option payoff functions as its special
cases. Second, jump-diffusion stochastic models are used to describe the
movement of the underlying spot market price, which incorporate several
important statistical properties including jumps and spikes, non-normality, and
absence of autocorrelations. A general option pricing algorithm is obtained
based on Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, an explicit pricing formula is
derived for the case when the option payoff is based on the geometric mean.
This pricing formula is also a generalized version of several other option
pricing models discussed in related studies.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 201
A lattice framework for pricing display advertisement options with the stochastic volatility underlying model
Advertisement (abbreviated ad) options are a recent development in online
advertising. Simply, an ad option is a first look contract in which a publisher
or search engine grants an advertiser a right but not obligation to enter into
transactions to purchase impressions or clicks from a specific ad slot at a
pre-specified price on a specific delivery date. Such a structure provides
advertisers with more flexibility of their guaranteed deliveries. The valuation
of ad options is an important topic and previous studies on ad options pricing
have been mostly restricted to the situations where the underlying prices
follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). This assumption is reasonable for
sponsored search; however, some studies have also indicated that it is not
valid for display advertising. In this paper, we address this issue by
employing a stochastic volatility (SV) model and discuss a lattice framework to
approximate the proposed SV model in option pricing. Our developments are
validated by experiments with real advertising data: (i) we find that the SV
model has a better fitness over the GBM model; (ii) we validate the proposed
lattice model via two sequential Monte Carlo simulation methods; (iii) we
demonstrate that advertisers are able to flexibly manage their guaranteed
deliveries by using the proposed options, and publishers can have an increased
revenue when some of their inventories are sold via ad options.Comment: Bowei Chen and Jun Wang. A lattice framework for pricing display
advertisement options with the stochastic volatility underlying model.
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2015, Volume 14, Issue 6,
pages 465-479, ISSN: 1567-422
Multi-keyword multi-click advertisement option contracts for sponsored search
In sponsored search, advertisement (abbreviated ad) slots are usually sold by
a search engine to an advertiser through an auction mechanism in which
advertisers bid on keywords. In theory, auction mechanisms have many desirable
economic properties. However, keyword auctions have a number of limitations
including: the uncertainty in payment prices for advertisers; the volatility in
the search engine's revenue; and the weak loyalty between advertiser and search
engine. In this paper we propose a special ad option that alleviates these
problems. In our proposal, an advertiser can purchase an option from a search
engine in advance by paying an upfront fee, known as the option price. He then
has the right, but no obligation, to purchase among the pre-specified set of
keywords at the fixed cost-per-clicks (CPCs) for a specified number of clicks
in a specified period of time. The proposed option is closely related to a
special exotic option in finance that contains multiple underlying assets
(multi-keyword) and is also multi-exercisable (multi-click). This novel
structure has many benefits: advertisers can have reduced uncertainty in
advertising; the search engine can improve the advertisers' loyalty as well as
obtain a stable and increased expected revenue over time. Since the proposed ad
option can be implemented in conjunction with the existing keyword auctions,
the option price and corresponding fixed CPCs must be set such that there is no
arbitrage between the two markets. Option pricing methods are discussed and our
experimental results validate the development. Compared to keyword auctions, a
search engine can have an increased expected revenue by selling an ad option.Comment: Chen, Bowei and Wang, Jun and Cox, Ingemar J. and Kankanhalli, Mohan
S. (2015) Multi-keyword multi-click advertisement option contracts for
sponsored search. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, 7
(1). pp. 1-29. ISSN: 2157-690
Multi-Keyword Multi-Click Option Contracts for Sponsored Search Advertising
In sponsored search, advertising slots are usually sold by a search engine to an advertiser through an auction mechanism in which advertisers bid on keywords. In theory, an auction mechanism encourages the advertisers to truthfully bid for keywords. However, keyword auctions have a number of problems including: (i) volatility in revenue, (ii) uncertainty in the bidding and charged prices for advertisers’ keywords, and (iii) weak brand loyalty between the advertiser and the search engine. To address these issues, we study the possibility of creating a special option contract that alleviates these problems. In our proposal, an advertiser purchases an option in advance from a search engine by paying an upfront fee, known as the option price. The advertiser then has the right, but no obligation, to then purchase specific keywords for a fixed costper-click (CPC) for a specified number of clicks in a specified period of time. Hence, the advertiser has increased certainty in sponsored search while the search engine could raise the customers’ loyalty. The proposed option contract can be used in conjunction with traditional keyword auctions. As such, the option price and corresponding fixed CPC price must be set such that there is no arbitrage opportunity. In this paper, we discuss an option pricing model tailored to sponsored search that deals with spot CPCs of targeted keywords in a generalized second price (GSP) auction. We show that the pricing model for keywords is closely related to a special exotic option in finance that contains multiple underlying assets (multi-keywords) and is also multi-exercisable (multi-clicks). Experimental results on real advertising data verify our pricing model and demonstrate that advertising options can benefit both advertisers and search engines
Real-time Bidding for Online Advertising: Measurement and Analysis
The real-time bidding (RTB), aka programmatic buying, has recently become the
fastest growing area in online advertising. Instead of bulking buying and
inventory-centric buying, RTB mimics stock exchanges and utilises computer
algorithms to automatically buy and sell ads in real-time; It uses per
impression context and targets the ads to specific people based on data about
them, and hence dramatically increases the effectiveness of display
advertising. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis and measurement of
a production ad exchange. Using the data sampled from both demand and supply
side, we aim to provide first-hand insights into the emerging new impression
selling infrastructure and its bidding behaviours, and help identifying
research and design issues in such systems. From our study, we observed that
periodic patterns occur in various statistics including impressions, clicks,
bids, and conversion rates (both post-view and post-click), which suggest
time-dependent models would be appropriate for capturing the repeated patterns
in RTB. We also found that despite the claimed second price auction, the first
price payment in fact is accounted for 55.4% of total cost due to the
arrangement of the soft floor price. As such, we argue that the setting of soft
floor price in the current RTB systems puts advertisers in a less favourable
position. Furthermore, our analysis on the conversation rates shows that the
current bidding strategy is far less optimal, indicating the significant needs
for optimisation algorithms incorporating the facts such as the temporal
behaviours, the frequency and recency of the ad displays, which have not been
well considered in the past.Comment: Accepted by ADKDD '13 worksho
Risk-aware dynamic reserve prices of programmatic guarantee in display advertising
Display advertising is one important online advertising type where banner advertisements (shortly ad) on websites are usually measured by how many times they are viewed by online users. There are two major channels to sell ad views. They can be auctioned off in real time or be directly sold through guaranteed contracts in advance. The former is also known as real-time bidding (RTB), in which media buyers come to a common marketplace to compete for a single ad view and this inventory will be allocated to a buyer in milliseconds by an auction model. Unlike RTB, buying and selling guaranteed contracts are not usually programmatic but through private negotiations as advertisers would like to customise their requests and purchase ad views in bulk. In this paper, we propose a simple model that facilitates the automation of direct sales. In our model, a media seller puts future ad views on sale and receives buy requests sequentially over time until the future delivery period. The seller maintains a hidden yet dynamically changing reserve price in order to decide whether to accept a buy request or not. The future supply and demand are assumed to be well estimated and static, and the model's revenue management is using inventory control theory where each computed reverse price is based on the updated supply and demand, and the unsold future ad views will be auctioned off in RTB to the meet the unfulfilled demand. The model has several desirable properties. First, it is not limited to the demand arrival assumption. Second, it will not affect the current equilibrium between RTB and direct sales as there are no posted guaranteed prices. Third, the model uses the expected revenue from RTB as a lower bound for inventory control and we show that a publisher can receive expected total revenue greater than or equal to those from only RTB if she uses the computed dynamic reserves prices for direct sales
Combining guaranteed and spot markets in display advertising: Selling guaranteed page views with stochastic demand
While page views are often sold instantly through real-time auctions when users visit Web pages, they can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts. In this paper, we combine guaranteed and spot markets in display advertising, and present a dynamic programming model to study how a media seller should optimally allocate and price page
views between guaranteed contracts and advertising auctions. This optimisation problem is challenging because the allocation and pricing of guaranteed contracts endogenously affects the expected revenue from advertising auctions in the future. We take into consideration several distinct characteristics regarding the media buyers’ purchasing behaviour, such as risk aversion, stochastic demand arrivals, and devise a scalable and efficient algorithm to solve the optimisation problem. Our work is one of a few studies that investigate the auction-based posted price guaranteed contracts for display advertising. The proposed model is further empirically validated with a display advertising data set from a UK supply-side platform. The results show that the optimal pricing and allocation strategies from our model can significantly increase the media seller’s expected total revenue, and the model suggests different optimal strategies based on the level of competition in advertising auctions
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