Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness

Evolution and complexity: the double-edged sword

We attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to the question of whether, and when, an arrow of complexity emerges in Darwinian evolution. We note that this expression can be interpreted in different ways, including a passive, incidental growth, or a pervasive bias towards complexification. We argue at length that an arrow of complexity does indeed occur in evolution, which can be most reasonably interpreted as the result of a passive trend rather than a driven one. What, then, is the role of evolution in the creation of this trend, and under which conditions will it emerge? In the later sections of this article we point out that when certain proper conditions (which we attempt to formulate in a concise form) are met, Darwinian evolution predictably creates a sustained trend of increase in maximum complexity (that is, an arrow of complexity) that would not be possible without it; but if they are not, evolution will not only fail to produce an arrow of complexity, but may actually prevent any increase in complexity altogether. We conclude that, with regard to the growth of complexity, evolution is very much a double-edged sword

Bifurcation into functional niches in adaptation

One of the central questions in evolutionary biology concerns the dynamics of adaptation and diversification. This issue can be addressed experimentally if replicate populations adapting to identical environments Call be investigated in detail. We have studied 501 such replicas Using digital organisms adapting to at least two fundamentally different functional niches (survival strategies) present in the same environment: one in which fast replication is the way to live, and another where exploitation of the environment's complexity leads to complex organisms with longer life spans and smaller replication rates. While these two modes of survival are closely analogous to those expected to emerge in so-called r and K selection scenarios respectively, the bifurcation of evolutionary histories according to these functional niches occurs in identical environments, under identical selective pressures. We find that the branching occurs early, and leads to drastic phenotypic differences (in fitness, sequence length, and gestation time) that are permanent and irreversible. This study confirms an earlier experimental effort using microorganisms, in that diversification can be understood at least in part in terms of bifurcations on saddle points leading to peak shifts, as in the picture drawn by Sewall Wright

The emotional contents of the ‘space’ in spatial music

Human spatial perception is how we understand places. Beyond understanding what is where (William James’ formulation of the psychological approach to perception); there are holistic qualities to places. We perceive places as busy, crowded, exciting, threatening or peaceful, calm, comfortable and so on. Designers of places spend a great deal of time and effort on these qualities; scientists rarely do. In the scientific world-view physical qualities and our emotive responses to them are neatly divided in the objective-subjective dichotomy. In this context, music has traditionally constituted an item in a place. Over the last two decades, development of “spatial music” has been within the prevailing engineering paradigm, informed by psychophysical data; here, space is an abstract, Euclidean 3-dimensional ‘container’ for events. The emotional consequence of spatial arrangements is not the main focus in this approach. This paper argues that a paradigm shift is appropriate, from ‘music-in-a-place’ to ‘music-as-a-place’ requiring a fundamental philosophical realignment of ‘meaning’ away from subjective response to include consequences-in-the-environment. Hence the hegemony of the subjective-objective dichotomy is questioned. There are precedents for this, for example in the ecological approach to perception (Gibson). An ecological approach to music-as-environment intrinsically treats the emotional consequences of spatio-musical arrangement holistically. A simplified taxonomy of the attributes of artificial spatial sound in this context will be discussed

3D audio as an information-environment: manipulating perceptual significance for differntiation and pre-selection

Contemporary use of sound as artificial information display is rudimentary, with little 'depth of significance' to facilitate users' selective attention. We believe that this is due to conceptual neglect of 'context' or perceptual background information. This paper describes a systematic approach to developing 3D audio information environments that utilise known cognitive characteristics, in order to promote rapidity and ease of use. The key concepts are perceptual space, perceptual significance, ambience labelling information and cartoonification

Where there is life there is mind: In support of a strong life-mind continuity thesis

This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic)

Evolutionary Robotics: a new scientific tool for studying cognition

We survey developments in Artificial Neural Networks, in Behaviour-based Robotics and Evolutionary Algorithms that set the stage for Evolutionary Robotics in the 1990s. We examine the motivations for using ER as a scientific tool for studying minimal models of cognition, with the advantage of being capable of generating integrated sensorimotor systems with minimal (or controllable) prejudices. These systems must act as a whole in close coupling with their environments which is an essential aspect of real cognition that is often either bypassed or modelled poorly in other disciplines. We demonstrate with three example studies: homeostasis under visual inversion; the origins of learning; and the ontogenetic acquisition of entrainment

Selective Attention, Priming, and Foraging Behavior

Animals selectively filter and transform their sensory input, increasing the accuracy with which some stimuli are detected and effectively ignoring others. This filtering process, collectively referred to as “selective attention,” takes place at a variety of different levels in the nervous system. It was described in considerable detail by William James over a century ago (James, 1890/1950) and has been a principal focus of research in cognitive psychology for nearly 50 years (Parasuraman & Davies, 1984; Pashler, 1998; Richards, 1998). Investigations of selective attention have also been central to the study of animal cognition, where the process of attention has been considered to play an important role in a variety of behavioral paradigms (e.g.. Mackintosh, 1975; Riley & Roitblat, 1978). Most attention research, particularly in the realm of visual search, has been directed to the nature of the filtering processes applied to relatively simple, geometrical stimuli (reviewed in Humphreys & Bruce, 1989). Such stimuli can easily be varied along independent physical dimensions, allowing the relationship between targets and distracters to be controlled with considerable precision (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). However, the role of selective attention in determining responses to more complex visual stimuli, of the sort that organisms regularly deal with in the course of their normal behavioral routines, has been less explored. This neglect is of particular concern because, in the absence of artificial limitations on search time, simple geometrical stimuli do not place a sufficient demand on information processing capacity to demonstrate selective attention effects (Riley & Leith, 1976). In addition to their use of simple geometrical stimuli, most attention studies in animals have used tasks with no clear, direct connection to the perceptual world of the species under study. There is, however, substantial literature suggesting that selective attention may play a significant role in nature, particularly in predator-prey interactions. A review of this literature, integrating it with more customary work on attentional psychology, raises questions of considerable interest to both psychologists and biologists. For psychologists, naturalistic experimental methods using more complex, multidimensional stimuli cast light on additional, unanticipated aspects of attentional processes in animals. For biologists, selective attention has long been considered a primary cognitive mechanism underlying the well-known tendency of visually searching predators to concentrate their attacks on relatively common prey types. As a consequence, the circumstances under which selective attention occurs and the magnitude of the enhancement in detection accuracy that results can have significant ecological and evolutionary effects. Our goal in this chapter, therefore, is to integrate data and hypotheses from both the ecological and the cognitive perspectives. When these two groups of literature are considered together, a variety of parallels emerge, parallels that lay the groundwork for a unified account of attentional phenomena in animals

Duplication of modules facilitates the evolution of functional specialization

The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied. We compared a non-modular feed forward network, a hardwired modular and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state