1,267 research outputs found
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution
protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited
control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the
detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical
implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the
asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping
attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit
weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent
efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.Comment: 22 pages. (v3): Minor changes. (v2): Extensively revised and
expanded. New results include a security proof for generic small flaws in the
source and the detecto
Experimental quantum key distribution with source flaws
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is a standard technique in current
quantum cryptographic implementations. Unfortunately, existing experiments have
two important drawbacks: the state preparation is assumed to be perfect without
errors and the employed security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key
effects for general attacks. These two drawbacks mean that existing experiments
are not guaranteed to be secure in practice. Here, we perform an experiment
that for the first time shows secure QKD with imperfect state preparations over
long distances and achieves rigorous finite-key security bounds for decoy-state
QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. We
quantify the source flaws experimentally and demonstrate a QKD implementation
that is tolerant to channel loss despite the source flaws. Our implementation
considers more real-world problems than most previous experiments and our
theory can be applied to general QKD systems. These features constitute a step
towards secure QKD with imperfect devices.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures, updated experiment and theor
Secure quantum key distribution with an uncharacterized source
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution
protocol for an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis-independent, a
condition that is automatically satisfied if the source is suitably designed.
The proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key extraction
process is equivalent to a measurement in the sigma_x-basis performed on a pure
sigma_z-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the
bit error rate is the same as that established by Shor and Preskill for a
perfect source, indicating that the defects in the source are efficiently
detected by the protocol.Comment: 4 pages, 1 figure, REVTeX, minor revision
Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to
communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the
laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations
always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single
photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two
commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using
specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly
acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of
off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD
systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that
our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by
identifying and patching technological deficiencies.Comment: Revised version, rewritten for clarity. 5 pages, 5 figures. To
download the Supplementary information (which is in open access), go to the
journal web site at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nphoton.2010.21
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