Threat Assessment for Multistage Cyber Attacks in Smart Grid Communication Networks

In smart grids, managing and controlling power operations are supported by information and communication technology (ICT) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The increasing adoption of new ICT assets in smart grids is making smart grids vulnerable to cyber threats, as well as raising numerous concerns about the adequacy of current security approaches. As a single act of penetration is often not sufficient for an attacker to achieve his/her goal, multistage cyber attacks may occur. Due to the interdependence between the power grid and the communication network, a multistage cyber attack not only affects the cyber system but impacts the physical system. This thesis investigates an application-oriented stochastic game-theoretic cyber threat assessment framework, which is strongly related to the information security risk management process as standardized in ISO/IEC 27005. The proposed cyber threat assessment framework seeks to address the specific challenges (e.g., dynamic changing attack scenarios and understanding cascading effects) when performing threat assessments for multistage cyber attacks in smart grid communication networks. The thesis looks at the stochastic and dynamic nature of multistage cyber attacks in smart grid use cases and develops a stochastic game-theoretic model to capture the interactions of the attacker and the defender in multistage attack scenarios. To provide a flexible and practical payoff formulation for the designed stochastic game-theoretic model, this thesis presents a mathematical analysis of cascading failure propagation (including both interdependency cascading failure propagation and node overloading cascading failure propagation) in smart grids. In addition, the thesis quantifies the characterizations of disruptive effects of cyber attacks on physical power grids. Furthermore, this thesis discusses, in detail, the ingredients of the developed stochastic game-theoretic model and presents the implementation steps of the investigated stochastic game-theoretic cyber threat assessment framework. An application of the proposed cyber threat assessment framework for evaluating a demonstrated multistage cyber attack scenario in smart grids is shown. The cyber threat assessment framework can be integrated into an existing risk management process, such as ISO 27000, or applied as a standalone threat assessment process in smart grid use cases

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

A Survey of Monte Carlo Tree Search Methods

Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) is a recently proposed search method that combines the precision of tree search with the generality of random sampling. It has received considerable interest due to its spectacular success in the difficult problem of computer Go, but has also proved beneficial in a range of other domains. This paper is a survey of the literature to date, intended to provide a snapshot of the state of the art after the first five years of MCTS research. We outline the core algorithm's derivation, impart some structure on the many variations and enhancements that have been proposed, and summarize the results from the key game and nongame domains to which MCTS methods have been applied. A number of open research questions indicate that the field is ripe for future work

Cyber Defense Remediation in Energy Delivery Systems

The integration of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has resulted in increased efficiency and facilitated real-time information acquisition, processing, and decision making. However, the increase in automation technology and the use of the internet for connecting, remote controlling, and supervising systems and facilities has also increased the likelihood of cybersecurity threats that can impact safety of humans and property. There is a need to assess cybersecurity risks in the power grid, nuclear plants, chemical factories, etc. to gain insight into the likelihood of safety hazards. Quantitative cybersecurity risk assessment will lead to informed cyber defense remediation and will ensure the presence of a mitigation plan to prevent safety hazards. In this dissertation, using Energy Delivery Systems (EDS) as a use case to contextualize a CPS, we address key research challenges in managing cyber risk for cyber defense remediation. First, we developed a platform for modeling and analyzing the effect of cyber threats and random system faults on EDS\u27s safety that could lead to catastrophic damages. We developed a data-driven attack graph and fault graph-based model to characterize the exploitability and impact of threats in EDS. We created an operational impact assessment to quantify the damages. Finally, we developed a strategic response decision capability that presents optimal mitigation actions and policies that balance the tradeoff between operational resilience (tactical risk) and strategic risk. Next, we addressed the challenge of management of tactical risk based on a prioritized cyber defense remediation plan. A prioritized cyber defense remediation plan is critical for effective risk management in EDS. Due to EDS\u27s complexity in terms of the heterogeneous nature of blending IT and OT and Industrial Control System (ICS), scale, and critical processes tasks, prioritized remediation should be applied gradually to protect critical assets. We proposed a methodology for prioritizing cyber risk remediation plans by detecting and evaluating critical EDS nodes\u27 paths. We conducted evaluation of critical nodes characteristics based on nodes\u27 architectural positions, measure of centrality based on nodes\u27 connectivity and frequency of network traffic, as well as the controlled amount of electrical power. The model also examines the relationship between cost models of budget allocation for removing vulnerabilities on critical nodes and their impact on gradual readiness. The proposed cost models were empirically validated in an existing network ICS test-bed computing nodes criticality. Two cost models were examined, and although varied, we concluded the lack of correlation between types of cost models to most damageable attack path and critical nodes readiness. Finally, we proposed a time-varying dynamical model for the cyber defense remediation in EDS. We utilize the stochastic evolutionary game model to simulate the dynamic adversary of cyber-attack-defense. We leveraged the Logit Quantal Response Dynamics (LQRD) model to quantify real-world players\u27 cognitive differences. We proposed the optimal decision making approach by calculating the stable evolutionary equilibrium and balancing defense costs and benefits. Case studies on EDS indicate that the proposed method can help the defender predict possible attack action, select the related optimal defense strategy over time, and gain the maximum defense payoffs. We also leveraged software-defined networking (SDN) in EDS for dynamical cyber defense remediation. We presented an approach to aid the selection security controls dynamically in an SDN-enabled EDS and achieve tradeoffs between providing security and Quality of Service (QoS). We modeled the security costs based on end-to-end packet delay and throughput. We proposed a non-dominated sorting based multi-objective optimization framework which can be implemented within an SDN controller to address the joint problem of optimizing between security and QoS parameters by alleviating time complexity at O(MN2). The M is the number of objective functions, and N is the population for each generation, respectively. We presented simulation results that illustrate how data availability and data integrity can be achieved while maintaining QoS constraints