Searching for joint gains in automated negotiations based on multi-criteria decision making theory

It is well established by conflict theorists and others that successful negotiation should incorporate "creating value" as well as "claiming value." Joint improvements that bring benefits to all parties can be realised by (i) identifying attributes that are not of direct conflict between the parties, (ii) tradeoffs on attributes that are valued differently by different parties, and (iii) searching for values within attributes that could bring more gains to one party while not incurring too much loss on the other party. In this paper we propose an approach for maximising joint gains in automated negotiations by formulating the negotiation problem as a multi-criteria decision making problem and taking advantage of several optimisation techniques introduced by operations researchers and conflict theorists. We use a mediator to protect the negotiating parties from unnecessary disclosure of information to their opponent, while also allowing an objective calculation of maximum joint gains. We separate out attributes that take a finite set of values (simple attributes) from those with continuous values, and we show that for simple attributes, the mediator can determine the Pareto-optimal values. In addition we show that if none of the simple attributes strongly dominates the other simple attributes, then truth telling is an equilibrium strategy for negotiators during the optimisation of simple attributes. We also describe an approach for improving joint gains on non-simple attributes, by moving the parties in a series of steps, towards the Pareto-optimal frontier

On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods

In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map from the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties. ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM class is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven by showing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiation methods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Pareto efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few of them. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus we find necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalent to actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the efficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence actually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong and weak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback which is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one, so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharing the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is a drawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain in a particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actual inefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that to falsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informed about the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which constrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the preferences of each single agent are well modeled

Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation

Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested the "fixed pie bias" of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a satisficing (not optimizing) behavior of negotiators, which leads them to a "zone of agreement bias"(ZAB). --integrative negotiation,logrolling,cognitive bias,satisficing

An Improved Two-Party Negotiation Over Continues Issues Method Secure Against Manipulatory Behavior

This contribution focuses on two-party negotiation over continuous issues. We firstly prove two drawbacks of the jointly Improving Direction Method (IDM), namely that IDM is not a Strategy-Proof (SP) nor an Information Concealing (IC) method. Thus we prove that the concurrent lack of these two properties implies the actual non-efficiency of IDM. Finally we propose a probabilistic method which is both IC and stochastically SP thus leading to efficient settlements without being affected by manipulatory behaviors

Cross-Sector Partnership Formation

A cross-sector partnership is a collaborative effort in which parties from different societal sectors pool resources to provide solutions to (perceived) common problems.These partnerships are often rather complex because of a number of reasons: (1) they address complex issues, (2) they are implemented under (often) uncertain circumstances, and (3) they bring together parties that each have a different language, a different culture, and different interests and strategies. This knowledge is not new, but has been poorly understood so far. Complexity is further increased by the factors that influence the actual formation of a partnership when they are not well understood or managed as well

Automated Negotiation for Provisioning Virtual Private Networks Using FIPA-Compliant Agents

This paper describes the design and implementation of negotiating agents for the task of provisioning virtual private networks. The agents and their interactions comply with the FIPA specification and they are implemented using the FIPA-OS agent framework. Particular attention is focused on the design and implementation of the negotiation algorithms

Conflict resolution: the missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice

This Handbook is a collection of works from leading scholars in the Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR) field, all working from their own disciplines yet cognizant of the multidisciplinary nature of that field. The central theme is the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the analysis and resolution of conflicts. This approach consists of moving from the study of analytical approaches to understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict to third-party intervention approaches to prevent or end violence and resolve conflict

Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling: An experimental analysis of negotiators' cognition processes

In the present study we analyse the topic of coalition formation in multi-issue multilateral negotiations under different voting rules when there is the opportunity of logrolling. We have carried out 3 experiments and compare our findings with the standard public choice theory predictions. In the first experiment we have shown that in a situation of 3-issues and 3-parties negotiations with majority rule, most of the subjects behave in a satisficing, not in a optimizing, way. They are found to be subject to a "Zone of Agreement Bias" (ZAB) which induces them to form suboptimal coalitions and to choose Pareto-dominated agreements. Moreover, we find that the cycling problem predicted by public choice theory in most cases does not arise. In experiment 2 we have shown that the adoption of the unanimity, instead of the majority, rule reduced the suboptimizing effect of the ZAB, and produced a much higher rate of optimal agreements. Experiment 3 shows that the results obtained in experiments 1 and 2 hold even when the level of complexity of the negotiation problem increases. To this aim we considered a situation of four-issues and four-parties negotiations under both the majority and the unanimity rule. --

Institutions in comparative policy research

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Negotiations in project sales and delivery process : an application of negotiation analysis

Project sales and delivery processes entail complex negotiations between client and contractor, as the details of the project are agreed upon during extensive interaction, often over a substantial period of time. Although very little research has been done on project negotiations as such, established research in the area of negotiation analysis provides a theoretically well-founded framework for studying project negotiations. This study applies the negotiation analysis framework to describe and analyze negotiations in the context of project sales and delivery processes. The body of this report first develops an understanding of the concept of negotiation and reviews the negotiation analysis approach. Second, the project sales and delivery process and its distinctive features are reviewed and their implications on negotiations in projects are analyzed. Third, the logic and concepts of negotiation analysis are used to describe and analyze a selected set of negotiation strategies available to either the client or contractor at different phases of a single project. The main results of the study include a conceptualization of the project sales and delivery process as a negotiation problem, and a qualitative description of selected negotiation strategies in terms of negotiation analysis. The concepts used (e.g. phases of negotiation, interests, issues, and best alternatives to a negotiated agreement) can be applied in practical settings for the purposes of training professionals and preparing for negotiations, and ultimately for transforming negotiation games in the favor of practicing negotiators