Dynamic models of residential ségrégation: an analytical solution

We propose an analytical resolution of Schelling segregation model for a general class of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide conditions under which a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state, exists. We use this potential function to analyze the outcome of the model for three utility functions corresponding to different degrees of preference for mixed neighborhoods. Schelling original utility function is shown to drive segregation at the expense of collective utility. If agents have a strict preference for mixed neighborhoods but still prefer being in the majority versus in the minority, the model converges to perfectly segregated configurations, which clearly diverge from the social optimum. Departing from earlier literature, these conclusions are based on analytical results. These results pave the way to the analysis of many structures of preferences, for instance those based on empirical findings concerning racial preferences. As a by-product, our analysis builds a bridge between Schelling model and the Duncan and Duncan segregation index.Residential segregation ; Schelling ; dynamic model ; potential function ; social preferences

Did Schelling Misunderstand Fichte’s Transcendental Method?

The Fichte-Schelling Correspondence interweaves intriguing personal stories and philosophical combat. One of the sadder personal stories involves Schelling getting wind of Fichte’s remark to Friedrich Schlegel that he did not understand transcendental method. The letters document several clumsy attempts by Fichte to minimize the criticism only to have it surface again in a letter Fichte wrote to a former student, Jean Baptiste Schad, who showed the letter to Schelling. In it, Fichte claimed that Schelling understood Wissenschaftslehre no better than Friedrich Nicolai, whom Fichte had publicly excoriated for critiquing as “I-philosophy” a superficial assemblage of random quotes from mixed sources

Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction

We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model. These models provide a benchmark for studying a combined model with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We study this combined model both analytically and using agent-based simulations. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it is increased.Schelling Tipping Model, Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation, Segregation

Thomas S. Schelling: game theory and indirect communication

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery and threatSocial Science, Schelling, game theory, strategic communications, bribes, threats

An Analysis of One-Dimensional Schelling Segregation

We analyze the Schelling model of segregation in which a society of n individuals live in a ring. Each individual is one of two races and is only satisfied with his location so long as at least half his 2w nearest neighbors are of the same race as him. In the dynamics, randomly-chosen unhappy individuals successively swap locations. We consider the average size of monochromatic neighborhoods in the final stable state. Our analysis is the first rigorous analysis of the Schelling dynamics. We note that, in contrast to prior approximate analyses, the final state is nearly integrated: the average size of monochromatic neighborhoods is independent of n and polynomial in w.Comment: 24 pages, to appear in STOC 201

German Idealism Meets Indian Vedanta and Kasmiri Saivism

Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza, this article compares the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Vedanta of Sa?kara and Ramanuja, as well as Abhinavagupta\u27s Kasmiri Saivism. It argues that only Hegel\u27s philosophy does not fail. For Śaṅkara, Ramanuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, the experience of ultimate reality—Brahman for Śaṅkara and Ramanuja, Siva for Abhinavagupta, the Absolute for Schelling—is self-authenticating and so excludes the possibility of error. However, there is also no possibility of truth as no criterion distinguishes truth from error when individuals make contradictory claims. By contrast, Hegel\u27s Geist is an extended mind that potentially encompasses the human community. Geist develops historically. Experience is conceptual and concepts must be socially recognized to be legitimate. Experience is fallible, for Hegel, and better accounts are obtained through mutual criticism. Although disagreement represents an impassible impasse for Sa?kara, Ramanuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, it is the road forward for Hegel

A Biased Review of Sociophysics

Various aspects of recent sociophysics research are shortly reviewed: Schelling model as an example for lack of interdisciplinary cooperation, opinion dynamics, combat, and citation statistics as an example for strong interdisciplinarity.Comment: 16 pages for J. Stat. Phys. including 2 figures and numerous reference

Interview : Thomas Schelling

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